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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is primarily concerned with the economic value of the sell-
side analyst in the UK equity markets. 
Fundamental to the sell-side analyst's economic value is the concept of 
market efficiency. If markets are fully efficient in the absence of the 
analyst then his/her investment recommendations and earnings forecast 
revisions would not generate abnormal returns as the information content 
of such earnings forecast revisions and recommendations would already 
have been absorbed by the market through other sources. 
Though analysts' investment recommendations may generate abnormal 
returns, it does not necessarily follow that the sell- side analyst plays a 
major role in keeping the equity markets efficient. Analysts' earnings 
forecast revisions and investment recommendations may, in fact, explain 
such a small proportion of company prices changes and trading volume 
activity that their investment recommendations and earnings forecast 
revisions may be dominated by other forms of firm-specific news in 
explaining company share price changes and trading volume activity. In 
such circumstances the economic value of the sell-side analyst may 
indeed be limited. 
Central to the analyst's role in keeping the markets informationally 
efficient is the nature of the information impounded into his/her 
investment recommendations. Is the analyst a superior processor of 
publicly available information and! or is the analyst privy to private 
information not generally available to the market as a whole? In addition 
is the nature of some "information" such that, in the absence of the sell-
side analyst, the information may otherwise go unreported in the 
marketplace perhaps arising from its intangibility (Roll, 1988)? 
In this thesis we undertake three empirical investigations into the 
economic role of the sell-side analyst in the equity markets. 
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Firstly, we test the "absolute" value of sell-side analysts' investment 
recommendations by analysing the abnormal return performance 
associated with the new buy and new sell recommendations made by six 
leading UK based stockbroking houses over the 18 month period January, 
1994 to June, 1995. 
Secondly, we explore the "relative" value of analysts' recommendations 
and earnings forecast revisions by determining the size (proxying for 
information content) of company "large" market-adjusted price changes 
and trading volume movements that are triggered by analysts' 
recommendations and earnings forecast revisions vis-a-vis other fInn 
specifIc information categories. We perform this test on 215 London 
Stock Exchange FTSE 100 and FTSE Mid 250 companies covering the 
two-year period January, 1994 to December, 1995. 
Thirdly, we directly test the nature of the analyst's informational 
advantage, and in particular hislher ability to act as a conduit for the flow 
of "nonpublic" information to the market. We perform this test for a 
sample of 1 00 companies drawn predominantly from the upper regions of 
the FTSE Mid 250 Index. In addition, in performing this test, we examine 
the nature of the information not apparently in the public domain and 
whether it differs in nature from its "publicly -available" counterpart 
(Roll, 1988). 
Our results show that analysts' investment recommendations have value 
in an "absolute" sense. We fInd that share prices are signifIcantly 
influenced by analysts' recommendation changes, not only at the time of 
the recommendation change but also in subsequent months. We also fInd 
that the magnitude of the abnormal return performance generated is 
influenced cross-sectionally by factors associated with fIrms' information 
environments and the analysts' incentives literature. 
In addition, we report that analysts' earnings forecast revisions and 
recommendations not taking place concurrently with other fIrm specifIc 
information releases account for 18 % of large "explained" price changes 
and 160/0 of large "explained" trading volume movements thus suggesting 
that sell-side analysts have a major role to play in keeping the equity 
markets effIcient. 
xx 
Finally, we find that the sell-side analyst is able to explain in excess of 
900/0 of those price movements not traceable to "publicly-available" 
information which is consistent with a high degree of market knowledge. 
We find that a significant proportion of these price changes (17%) are 
attributable to factors unrelated to information per se thus providing 
support for Roll's (1988) hypothesis that a significant proportion of 
company price changes are triggered by "soft" events relating to fads, 
fashions, sentiment etc. 
In summary, therefore, the sell- side analyst plays a major role in the UK 
equity markets. His/her investment recommendations and earnings 
forecast revisions communicate valuable information to the market. In 
addition, an important aspect of the analyst's role in the market is to 
communicate information to the market that may not be available from 
other more conventional sources, thus suggesting that tests of the 
investment value of analysts' company recommendations and earnings 
forecast revisions may, at least in part, be tests of strong-form efficiency. 
A substantial proportion of this information may be classified as "soft" 
information which in the absence of the sell-side analyst may otherwise 
go unreported. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Overview 
Sell- side analysts occupy a privileged position in the equity 
markets. They process information from a variety of sources 
(Arnold and Moizer, 1984~ Bauman and Johnson, 1996) and 
communicate their views to the financial marketplace through their 
investment recommendations and earnings forecast revisions 
(Shipper, 1991). 
1 
Stockbroking houses spend millions of pounds each year gathering, 
processing and disseminating information to the investment 
community through their investment recommendations and 
earnings forecast revisions. Such information gathering, processing 
and dissemination activity is costly and is only worthwhile to the 
extent that the expected profits exceed the costs involved. In the 
same way investors are only willing to pay for analyst services to 
the extent that the benefits exceed the costs incurred. 
In this thesis we are concerned with the economic value of the sell-
side analyst in the equity markets and, in particular, whether hislher 
company recommendations and earnings forecast revisions have 
investment value. Fundamental to the economic value of the sell-
side analyst is the concept of market efficiency. If the markets are 
fully efficient in the absence of the analyst, he/she performs no 
economic role, as the information content of hislher investment 
recommendations and earnings forecast revisions, would already be 
absorbed by the market, and, therefore, would trigger no abnormal 
returns on their dissemination. 
In recent years the analyst community has witnessed considerable 
changes. A process of consolidation has taken place in the funds 
management industry increasing its economic power. In parallel 
with this consolidation these enlarged institutions have been 
developing their own internal financial expertise through improved 
training and a policy of hiring professional accountants thereby 
obviating the need to obtain such expertise indirectly from the sell-
side analyst. In addition, Gaved (1997) points out that due to the 
conflicting incentives facing analysts their role as impartial 
2 
intermediaries has been progressively compromised, particularly 
amongst larger institutions (fund managers). However, smaller 
institutions lacking economies of scale in information gathering 
and financial expertise still continue to rely on the sell-side analyst. 
In the context of this changing business environment and the 
competitive pressures facing the stockbroking industry a key 
research issue is whether analysts' company recommendations and 
earnings forecast revisions have investment value, and, if they do, 
from what sources do analysts' competitive advantage derive. For 
instance are analysts better able to interpret "publicly-available" 
information than the market as a whole and/or do they have 
privileged access to "private" information not generally available to 
other stock market participants? In the former case, any potential 
advantage that the analyst possesses derives from their superior 
information processing skills, particularly in relation to their 
interpretation of complex information (Merton, 1987). In the later 
case, the analyst may act as an important conduit for the flow of 
information to the marketplace (Fama, 1970; Holland, 1998). 
The weight of the evidence (predominantly US) suggests that 
analysts' recommendations have investment value (e.g. Womack, 
1996). However, the number of recent studies examining the 
investment potential of brokers' recommendations in a UK context 
is limited. The notable exception is Dimson and Fraletti (1986). 
No existing research addresses the "relative" value of analysts' 
recommendations vis-a-vis other firm specific information sources 
in explaining company market-adjusted price changes and trading 
3 
volume movements during the course of a financial year. 
In other words, analysts' recommendations may indeed be valuable 
in an "absolute" sense but they may rank secondary to other more 
valuable information releases. In these circumstances then the 
economic value of the analyst in the equity market may be limited. 
1.2 The "Absolute" Value of Analysts' Recommendations 
We examine the share price reaction to the new buy and sell 
recommendations of six leading London based stockbroking houses 
over the 18 month period January, 1994 to June, 1995. 
If analysts' recommendations have investment value they will 
trigger an abnormal price movement at the time of the 
recommendation change. This may arise either from their superior 
processing of existing publicly- available information or the 
dissemination of previously non-public (private) information to the 
market. 
The weight of the recent international evidence (predominantly 
US) tends to suggest that analysts' recommendations have 
investment value (e.g. Bjerring, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen, 1983~ 
Elton, Gruber, and Grossman, 1986; Stickel, 1995; Womack, 
1996). 
4 
Very little evidence exists in the UK on the price impact of 
stockbrokers' recommendations. The most recent study published 
was in 1986 by Dimson and Fraletti. Their results suggest that the 
associated abnormal returns are marginal at best and would in any 
case be zero if transaction costs are taken into account. 
Our results, in Chapter 3, suggest that analysts' recommendations 
have investment value in an "absolute" sense. Share prices are 
significantly influenced by analysts' recommendations both in the 
month of the recommendation and in subsequent months. In 
addition, we show that the magnitude of the price response 
generated is influenced by factors associated with firms' 
information environments and the economic incentives facing 
analysts. 
1.3 The "Relative" Value of Analysts' Recommendations 
Examining the price impact of analysts' earnings forecast revisions 
and investment recommendations may be regarded as assessing the 
economic value of the analyst in "absolute" terms. The typical 
procedure is to apply an event study methodology to a population 
of analysts' recommendations and! or earnings forecast revisions to 
establish whether in aggregate they generate an "abnormal" price 
and! or trading volume impact. Abnormal returns are classified as 
abnormal by reference to some pre-specified retum- generating 
model. If abnormal returns are generated then analysts' 
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recommendations and earnings forecasts have value relevance to 
the market. 
However, analysts' recommendations and earnings forecast 
revisions represent only one possible source of information release 
that may affect company specific price changes or trading volume 
movements during the course of a financial year. Others could 
include preliminary earnings announcements, interim earnings 
announcements, AGM, dividend changes, takeover bids, capital 
structure changes, trading in large blocks of shares, notifications of 
insider dealings, management changes, new product 
announcements etc. All these categories of events, and others, have 
been shown to influence share price movements and trading 
volume activity (e.g. Brookfield and Morris, 1992; Thompson, 
Olsen and Dietrich, 1987; Morse, 1982a). 
No extant study, however, has examined the "relative" impact of 
analysts' earnings forecast revisions and recommendations vis-a-
vis other categories of company specific information. In other 
words, how do analyst investment recommendations and earnings 
forecast revisions rank relative to other categories of news in 
explaining abnormal returns and trading volume movements? 
The "relative" impact or economic significance of the analyst can 
be assessed for each company by comparing the magnitude of the 
price and trading volume impact of recommendations and earnings 
forecast revisions relative to other news categories. This provides 
insight into the marginal information content of a recommendation 
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or earnings forecast revision relative to other information releases. 
The larger the price and! or trading volume impact, the greater the 
information content of the associated event. 
In Chapter 4 we show for a sample of 215 FTSE 100 and FTSE 
Mid 250 companies that analysts' earnings forecast revisions and 
investment recommendations account for a significant proportion 
of "large" market- adjusted price changes and trading volume 
activity. On this basis we confirm that the analyst plays a 
significant role in keeping the market informationally efficient. 
1.4 Analysts' Degree of Market Knowledge and the Nature of 
the Information Driving Company Price Changes and Trading 
Volume Movements 
In theory, sell-side analysts playa pivotal role in keeping the 
market informationally efficient. They assimilate and interpret 
capital market information flows that occur on a continuous basis 
throughout the financial year and communicate their views to the 
equity markets through their earnings forecast revisions and 
company recommendations (Brookfield and Morris, 1992). 
In addition to their role of assimilating and interpreting publicly 
available information, the analyst may, in fact, also act as a conduit 
for the dissemination of previously non- public information to the 
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market, though this issue has received little attention in the 
academic literature. Notable exceptions include Holland (1998) and 
Walmsley, Yadav and Rees (1992). 
Is the analyst a superior processor of existing public information or 
do they incorporate private (non-public) information into their 
investment recommendations and earnings forecast revisions. The 
analyst's role as a superior information processor is consistent with 
Merton's (1987) view of market efficiency. The view that their 
recommendations may be driven by non- public information is in 
keeping with Fama's (1970) definition of strong form efficiency. 
To establish whether the analyst, in fact, is using non- public 
information in arriving at his/ her recommendation changes and 
earnings forecast revisions it is a necessary precondition that the 
analyst does indeed have access to non- public information. 
No existing study on the economic role of the equity analyst 
addresses the analyst's degree of superior market knowledge 
directly in this manner. 
We use the services of equity analysts from three leading City of 
London- based stockbroking houses to determine if they can 
explain company specific price movements that are apparently not 
explicable by reference to "publicly available" information. 
Presumably, if analysts have access to superior information than 
the market as a whole, they will use this information and 
communicate it to the market via investment recommendation 
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changes and earnings forecast revisions. 
If they do not have such superior "insider" information then the 
source of any superior returns generated by their recommendations 
and earnings forecast revisions will be due to superior processing 
and interpretation of existing information in the public domain. 
In addition, we address an unresolved issue in the literature which 
is the nature of any such information not in the public domain. Roll 
(1988) speculates that a significant proportion of firm specific price 
movements is not attributable to public information per se but may 
in fact be driven by either non- public information or by factors 
unrelated to information flows such as fads, fashions, industry 
sentiment etc. We treat the equity analyst as a knowledgeable 
source of non- public information and its nature to explore such 
Issues. 
Our results suggest that analysts are able to explain in excess of 
900/0 of "unexplained" price movements. This is consistent with 
the analyst possessing a high degree of market knowledge i.e. what 
drives company price activity. In addition, we find that a not 
insignificant proportion (17%) of these unexplained movements are 
driven by soft factors unrelated to the flow of information per se as 
hypothesised by Roll. 
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1.5 Organisation of the Remainder of the Thesis 
In chapter 2 we place our three empirical studies in the context of 
the extant literature on the role of the sell-side analyst in equity 
markets. In particular, we address the analyst's role in keeping the 
equity markets informationally efficient. We argue that the 
analyst's role in this context is dependent on both the incentives for 
information acquisition and its dissemination. 
In chapter 3 we assess the abnormal return performance associated 
with new buy and new sell recommendations made by six leading 
London based stockbroking houses over the 18 month period 
January 1994 to June 1995. In addition, we control for factors 
which may cross-sectionally be expected to affect the performance 
of these recommendation changes. 
Chapter 4 addresses the relative value of the sell-side analyst's 
investment recommendations and earnings forecast revisions vis-a-
vis other sources of firm specific news in explaining company 
"large" market-adjusted price changes and trading volume 
movements during the course of a firm's fmancial year. 
Chapter 5 assesses the economic role of the analyst in explaining 
those price movements that are not apparently attributable to 
"publicly-available" information. In this context we gain insight 
into the analyst's degree of market knowledge. We also gain insight 
into the nature of the information that is not in the "public domain" 
and whether it differs in content to information releases coming 
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from "publicly- available" sources. 
In chapter 6 we summarise the three components of the thesis and 
discuss the implications our results may have for the economic 
value of the sell-side analyst in the equity markets and suggest 
potential areas for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE SELL-SIDE ANALYST AND EQUITY 
MARKET INFORMATION FLOWS 
Sell- side equity analysts occupy an important position in the capital 
markets literature. They process information from a variety of sources 
and communicate their views to the investment community through their 
investment recommendations and earnings forecast revisions. 
The literature suggests that sell- side analysts' recommendations have 
investment value (Womack, 1996; Stickel, 1995). Similar evidence exists 
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for analysts' earnings forecast revisions (e.g. Abdel- Khalik and Ajinkya, 
1982; Stickel, 1990,1991; Forbes and Skerratt, 1992). 
This thesis analyses the economic role of the sell- side analyst in the UK 
equity markets in three key aspects. In this chapter we review the extant 
literature on the analyst to place our empirical research outlined in the 
previous chapter in context. 
The key issue we address is the role of the analyst in keeping the equity 
markets efficient. If analysts' recommendations and earnings forecast 
revisions have economic value then that implies that analysts playa key 
role in keeping the market informationally efficient. 
Section 2.1 discusses the extant literature on market efficiency that 
motivates our research. Sections 2.2 - 2.5 explore whether any price 
response to sell-side analysts' recommendations and earnings forecast 
revisions is due to superior processing of existing publicly available 
information or whether they also act as a conduit for the dissemination of 
previously non-public information to the market. The existing literature 
suggests, that in all probability, the analyst's role is a combination of both 
of these. 
In addition, we argue in sections 2.6 and 2.7 that the nature of the 
analyst's role is dependent on both the incentives for information 
acquisition and its dissemination. The incentives for information 
acquisition are a function of several factors. These factors are addressed 
in the information environment literature. Independent of information 
acquisition, there are also differential incentives for analysts to 
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disseminate positive and negative information to the market through their 
investment recommendations and earnings forecast revisions. 
Fundamental to our research is the concept of market efficiency. If 
markets are fully efficient in the absence of the investment analyst then 
the analyst plays no economic role in the equity markets. Their 
investment recommendations and earnings forecast revisions would 
generate no price or trading volume response as the information content 
of their recommendations and earnings forecast revisions would have 
already have been absorbed by the market. 
The information environment literature suggests that less information is 
available about smaller firms due to the lack of incentives for information 
gathering by investors, analysts and the financial press. 
In chapter 3 we argue that as information about smaller firms is gathered 
less frequently analysts' recommendation changes in respect of these 
firms will have more information content for the market and hence 
generate a higher price response than otherwise similar recommendations 
in respect of larger firms. 
In addition, we expressly take into account the differential incentives for 
disseminating positive and negative information to the market when we 
examine the cross- sectional determinants of recommendation 
performance. 
In chapter 4 we hypothesise that sell-side analyst activity will explain a 
significant proportion of companies major market-adjusted price changes 
and trading volume movements and, therefore, will constitute a key 
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component of a fIrm's information environment. In addition, we expect 
that the relative percentage of price changes and the level of trading 
volume explained by analysts' recommendations and earnings forecast 
revisions will be inversely related to fIrm size. 
In chapter 5 we employ the services of the sell-side analyst to explain 
those company market- adjusted price changes not apparently being 
driven by publicly available information. This test directly assesses the 
role of the analyst, particularly for those companies that are not closely 
monitored by the financial press and company news services. 
2.1 Sell-Side Analyst and Market Efficiency 
Central to the equity analyst's position in the market is his/ her role in 
keeping the markets informationally efficient. 
F or Cohen, Zinbarg, and Zeikel (1987) the analyst constitutes the means 
whereby the market can be said to be efficient. 
" It is the thousands of trained security analysts who are the eyes and 
ears of the effiCient market. It is the industrious probing investment 
analyst who ensures that relevant information and even rumour and 
hypotheses are quickly reflected in the current price, and who by their 
collective weight and chain reaction to prospective trends helps to 
determine the future price. "(p. 135) 
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Similarly Brookfield and Morris (1992) argue: 
"In terms of the British securities market, where over 70% of listed 
equities in terms of capitalised value are controlled by financial 
intermediaries, fund managers rely on the skills of a relatively small 
number of financial analysts. They in tum col/ect, sift and synthesise 
information from a variety of sources and continuously revise their profit 
forecasts". (p. 585) 
2.1.1. Nature of Market Efficiency 
Fama (1970) introduced the familiar three- part taxonomy of market 
efficiency with each representing a form of the following statement: The 
market is efficient with respect to an information set if security prices 
reflect that information set. 
The market is weak form efficient if the information set is historical 
prices, semi-strong if the information set is information that is obviously 
publicly available and strong form if some investors have monopolistic 
access to information relevant to price formation. 
Market efficiency tests require (1) a theory of the type of information 
(e.g. earnings increases) that affects share prices and (2) a test of whether 
in fact it does. 
Importantly, Ball (1992) points out that a fundamental limitation of 
market efficiency theory is that it is a pure exchange theory and hence 
totally silent on how information is produced, acquired and processed by 
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analysts and investors. It assumes that given the supply of public domain 
information, rational investors' actions will lead to market efficiency. 
2.1.2 Strong vs. Semi-Strong Form Efficiency 
McGoun (1990) points out that the distinction between information that is 
publicly available and information to which certain investors or groups of 
investors have monopolistic access is only clear in the extremes. 
Crossland and Moizer (1995a) argue: 
"At one end of the continuum is information that is announced very 
publicly such as annual earnings and bonus issues of shares. At the other 
is all information relevant to the valuation of a share that is 'knowable', 
including non-public information. At this extreme some purists would 
argue that strongform efficiency implies that prices reflect what no- one 
knows or what no- one has taken into account. " (p. 2) 
Strong form tests are concerned with whether investors have preferential 
access to information that is relevant to price formation. But such tests are 
fraught with danger. 
There needs to be a clear definition of what is private and what is publicly 
available information: when does information become public; and which 
investors are the public. 
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Tests of the valuation impact of stockbrokers' recommendations and 
earnings forecast revisions are therefore either tests of strong form 
efficiency or semi-strong form efficiency depending on whether the 
information impounded into the analysts' information set is publicly 
available or derives from private sources. 
2.2 Nature of the Analyst's Informational Advantage 
The nature of the analyst's informational advantage is an unresolved 
issue. The literature suggests that the analyst is a superior information 
processor but also that hel she may possess "insider" information 
(Holland, 1998; Womack, 1996; Stickel, 1995). 
Womack and Stickel both report that the release of analysts' 
recommendations do not appear to be related to the release of firm-
specific news. However, they do not explicitly test this. Holland reports 
that there are incentives for company management to disclose certain 
types of information privately to analysts rather than publicly to the 
market as a whole. 
If analysts' recommendations and earnings forecast revisions have 
investment value they arise either from the analysts' superior processing 
of publicly available information or alternatively that the analyst is acting 
as a conduit for the dissemination of previously private (non- public) 
information to the market. 
18 
Merton (1987) and Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) argue that it is possible 
to generate superior returns from trading on the basis of publicly available 
information. 
Merton argues that the standard assumption that the diffusion of every 
type of public information takes place instantaneously among investors 
and investors act on it as soon as it arrives may be suspect. This argument 
is made in the context of a possible explanation for the existence of 
empirical anomalies in the market. 
1/ The acquisition of information and its dissemination to other economic 
units are, as we all know, central in all areas of finance, and especially 
so in capital markets. As we also know, asset- pricing models typically 
assume both that the diffusion of every type of publicly available 
information takes place instantaneously among all investors and that 
investors act on the information as soon as it arrives. Whether so simple 
an information structure is adequate to describe empirical asset pricing 
behaviour depends on both the nature of the information and the time 
scale of analysis. It may, for example be reasonable to expect rapid 
reactions in prices to the announcement through channels of new data 
(e.g. earnings or dividend announcements) that can be readily evaluated 
by investors using generally acceptable structural models. Consider, 
however, the informational event of publication in a scientific journal of 
the empirical discovery of an anomalous profit opportunity (e.g. smaller 
capitalisedfirm earns excessive risk- adjusted returns). The expected 
duration between the creation of this investment opportunity and its 
elimination in the market place can be considerable. " (p. 489) 
Merton argues that the equity analyst can playa major role in the analysis 
and interpretation of this infonnation to the marketplace particularly for 
smaller firms where the information environment is substantially less 
rich. 
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This view is consistent with the neglected firms' literature which suggests 
that analysts are a major source of information to the market (Carvell and 
Strebel, 1984; Arbel, 1985). 
In Merton's model of market efficiency firms have an incentive to 
increase analyst following as it will reduce information asymmetry 
between management and the community of investors which will have a 
favourable effect for firm value and the fmn' s cost of capital. 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) argue that valuable information acquisition 
should earn a return. They start from the premise that if information is 
free, market efficiency implies that security prices reflect all available 
information. But if information is costly to collect it is efficient for the 
arbitrage function to be incomplete; trades by informed traders take place 
at prices sufficiently different from full equilibrium prices to compensate 
them for the cost of becoming informed. 
" If trades are made at prices that reflect full information the market is 
over-efficient. It is so well informed that that it cannot compensate the 
information gatheringjunction, a clearly unstable position. " (p 404) 
In other words they argue that if there are no incentives for information 
gathering no information gathering would take place. If no information 
gathering takes place the markets cannot possibly be efficient. This 
creates a logical paradox. Therefore markets cannot be informationally 
efficient as otherwise no incentives exist for information gathering. It can 
be argued in this context that the analyst is a low cost provider of 
information to the market and therefore plays a pivotal role in keeping the 
markets informationally efficient. As such he/she needs to be 
appropriately remunerated. 
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2.3 Nature of the Information Impounded into Analysts' 
Recommendations and Earnings Forecast Revisions 
Central to the analyst's role in keeping the markets informationally 
efficient is the nature of the information they process. Do analysts rely on 
accounting information or are their investment recommendations and 
earnings forecast revisions driven by access to other information that 
investors may not be privy to? 
The existing literature suggests that analysts process information from a 
variety of sources. Its primary focus tends to be on the role of accounting 
versus other information in driving earnings forecast revisions and stock 
recommendations. 
Methodologies employed vary across studies. Arnold and Moizer (1984) 
adopt a questionnaire based approach and ask analysts to rank, in order of 
importance, the types of information that are important to them in 
arriving at their recommendations. They find that the most influential 
sources on share valuation are deemed in order of importance to be the 
income statement, balance sheet and interim results. The next important 
source is discussion with company management. 
Pike, Meerjanssen, and Chadwick (1993), covering a later period, find, in 
contrast to Arnold and Moizer (1984) and also Lee and Tweedie (1981), 
that discussion with company personnel and analysts' meetings dominate 
the annual and interim report. No direct comparison of the importance of 
the analysts meeting can be made directly with Arnold and Moizer or Lee 
and Tweedie as the analysts were not asked to evaluate that source. 
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However, we can justifiably infer that that source would have ranked 
lower than the annual and interim reports as that category may be 
considered to be somewhat analogous to discussions with company 
personnel. 
The importance of the analyst meeting is confirmed by Walmsley, Y adav, 
and Rees (1992) whose results show that there is a significant increase in 
company price volatility in the aftermath of the various company meeting 
programmes of the Society of Investment Analysts (SIA). 
Their results are consistent with the view that price sensitive information 
is imparted through corporate communications to the market via the 
equity analyst and would be consistent with the analyst being privy to 
"private" information. This would imply that a key component of the 
analyst's information set is non-public information which in tum implies 
that tests of the economic value of analysts' recommendations and 
earnings forecast revisions are, at least in part, tests of strong form 
efficiency. 
This would, at the time of their study, have been contrary to Stock 
Exchange guidance given in the Stock Exchange's Yellow Book which 
requires that any information necessary to enable holders of the 
company's listed securities and the public to appraise the position of the 
company and to avoid the estab~ishment of a false market must be 
notified. 
The Yellow Book requires that information should not be divulged outside 
the company and its advisors in such a way as to place in a privileged 
dealing position any person or class or category of persons. 
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However, Walmsley, Yadav, and Rees (1992) suggest that there are other 
possible interpretations for the increase in price volatility around the time 
of the analysts meetings that are unrelated to the flow of price sensitive 
information (PSI) to the market. 
Firstly, the analysts' meeting may simply serve to focus investor attention 
on the company. Secondly, the information disclosed may fall short of 
regulatory breach, and assumes significance only in the context of other 
information known to analysts. Thirdly, the analysts' meeting may enable 
the analysts to form an opinion as to the quality of management. Fourthly, 
some technical factor in the markets operation may give rise to noise 
trading. 
In this context it is an interesting speculation that information on such 
important issues as future earnings expectations etc. may, in fact, be 
communicated unconsciously in a non- verbal body language manner. 
2.3.1 Role of Accounting Information 
The results of Day (1986) show that accounting information is important 
to the analyst but that typically it does not contain any price sensitive 
information. Its primary function is as a reference document and as a base 
from which to work. Her respondents did not consider it a timely source 
of information. In addition, her analysts note that accounting information 
is deficient in terms of content for share valuation purposes. 
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Crossland and Moizer (1995b) confirm this view of the role of 
accounting information in a survey of company directors, fund managers 
and analysts. 
This analysis of the role of accounting information, in particular its lack 
of timeliness, is consistent with Brookfield and Morris (1992) where they 
argue that the equity analyst plays a major role in analysing and 
disseminating information on a timely basis to the markets: 
" In what is a highly competitive market setting, the role of financial 
statements is largely to confirm or deny such earnings predictions, 
although the accounts themselves provide a valuable forecasting 
framework, and the company annual reports also contain important 
information disclosed on a discretionary basis. Only at the end of a 
financial reporting period is it possible for analysts to check out whether 
their quantified estimates of the effects of the particular events have been 
correct. In such circumstances, one would a priori expect the market to 
anticipate on a gradual basis the period on period earnings changes. " (p. 
584) 
This does not mean that accounting releases are not important to sell-side 
analysts. Brown and Han (1992) show that analysts' long range earnings 
forecasts improve after earnings announcements and Brown and Rozeff 
(1979) find that analysts' forecasts of future quarterly earnings become 
more accurate following the release of interim financial reports. 
In addition, the quality of accounting disclosures influences analysts' 
decisions to follow firms. Lang and Lundholm (1996) examine the link 
between firm disclosure policy and analyst behaviour. 
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Their results suggest that fIrms with more informative disclosure policies 
have a larger analyst following, more accurate earnings forecast revisions, 
and less dispersion among individual analyst's earnings forecasts. 
The argument is that increased disclosure increases investor following, 
reduces estimation risk and information asymmetry, each of which will 
reduce the cost of capital. 
2.3.2 Role of Private Information 
Interestingly, Bauman and Johnson (1996) is the only study that asks 
analysts to assess the importance of private information in arriving at 
their investment recommendations. 
The authors evaluate the importance of different information sources to 
analysts across eleven countries. They fInd that the source of information 
that analysts consider as being the most important is the company's 
financial statements. The second most important source is contacts made 
with company management. 
Their categories "Rumours, leaks, tips, or gossip from friends and 
business acquaintances" and "Non-public information" rank 13 th and 15 th 
respectively out ofa total of 16 categories. The ranking for the UK is 13 th 
and 14th respectively. 
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Their results seem to suggest that non- public (private) information is not 
important to analysts in arriving at their recommendation. But there are 
important caveats. 
Firstly, as already discussed, the distinction between private and public 
information is blurred. For example, analysts' discussions with corporate 
management are privy to the analysts and management only and may 
therefore be properly classified as " private" information. This is treated 
as a separate category to private information in Bauman and Johnson's 
study. 
Secondly, analysts are likely to under-report the amount of private 
information they may have access to in case they run foul of insider 
trading rules, or are in breach of stock exchange guidance rules on the 
dissemination of price sensitive information. 
The results of these studies must be cognisant of the possible limitations 
associated with questionnaire based methodologies (e.g. Breton and 
Taffler, 1999). 
Other studies adopt experimental methodologies and examine aspects of 
the analyst's information processing activity, principally their use of 
accounting information in arriving at their investment decisions (e.g. Day, 
1986; Biggs, 1984; Bouwman, Frishkopff and Frishkopff, 1987). Again 
such studies have potential methodological problems (Breton and Taffler, 
1999) as they tend to give analysts an information set and ask them to 
form a view on potential investment candidates or to value a company 
using this alone. A major component of the material distributed to the 
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analysts is accounting information. Therefore the subjects are not free to 
select the information they would actually use in making their investment 
decisions but rather information that the researchers think they probably 
use. 
Other studies adopt a content analysis methodology of stockbroker 
circulars such as Rogers and Grant, 1997; Previts et ai, 1994; and Breton 
and Taffler, 1999. 
The fIrst two studies focus on the role of accounting information and 
suffer from a potential bias as only accounting information is considered. 
Breton and Taffler, in contrast, evaluate the full text of broker reports in 
explaining the differential importance of accounting versus non-
accounting information. They fInd that analysts are more concerned with 
a fIrm's management and strategy and its trading environment than with 
accounting based measures in arriving at their recommendations. 
Given that accounting information ranks secondary to other more timely 
information releases, particularly contacts with company management, 
the question is what types of information do analysts obtain from 
company management and what are the incentives for management to 
disclose information to a subset of analysts rather than to the market as a 
whole. 
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2.4 Incentives for Companies to Disclose Non- Public Information to 
Analysts 
We have seen that analysts regard information flows from management as 
critical to the share valuation process. An obvious question arising from 
this is what are the incentives for management to disclose information to 
analysts? This is important as, if this is true, it suggests that analysts may 
have an informational advantage over other stockmarket participants. 
This may possibly explain the market's response to their investment 
recommendations and earnings forecast revisions. 
Holland (1998) addresses this issue. He conducted confidential interviews 
with executives in 33 UK listed companies representing 29 FT sectors. 
The sample consisted of 21 companies in the FTSE 100 with the 
remainder drawn from the FTSE Mid 250 and FTSE 250 to 550 groups. 
The participants did not view public disclosure as the best option for 
information dissemination to the marketplace. However, public disclosure 
methods are adopted to satisfy legal and Stock Exchange requirements, 
financial reporting standards, operating and financial review (OFR) 
guidance and, importantly, to legitimise private voluntary disclosure 
around the same public information set. 
Management prefer private voluntary disclosure either to key institutional 
shareholders and/or to financial analysts for a number of reasons. 
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Firstly, they seek the support of these institutions during takeover bids. 
The analyst is important here as a conduit to the fund managers and the 
media. 
This is consistent with Gaved (1997): 
" Brokers analysts are an important audience in the management of 
investor relationships because of their direct links to: market makers and 
institutional salesforces, when these are part of the same organisation; 
fund managers as institutional clients; and sometimes also the media. " 
(p. 18) 
Equity analysts are argued to be particularly important as a conduit of 
information to smaller fund managers. Gaved argues: 
"However, the role of analysts as impartial intermediaries has been 
progressively compromised in the eyes ofmany institutional investors. 
This is one of the reasons why their influence has declined over the past 
few years, particularly amongst larger fund managers. 
In contrast, many smaller fund managers have a greater reliance on the 
views of sell side analysts. Their interest may be far more on working out 
which are the best analysts and focusing on what they say rather than 
direct contact with companies and making personal assessments of 
management competence. " (p. 12) 
Secondly, selective disclosure is seen as a technique for building up 
reputational capital in the market for senior executives. 
Thirdly, senior company executives believe analysts and institutions 
adopt a long- term perspective in assessing a company as an investment. 
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This is consistent with Marston (1993) who surveys company 
management and finds: 
" The vast majority of respondents believe in the vaiue of these 
communication channels and they seem satisfied with the quality of 
research produced by analysts. Most of the companies consider the 
brokers' analysts and fund managers take a long term view and are not 
unduly interested in short term gains. " 
Fourthly, senior company personnel identify certain limitations associated 
with financial information. This arises both from the complexity of the 
financial information disclosed in the annual report, requiring further 
elaboration, together with perceived lack of value relevant disclosure. 
This view of the financial statements is consistent with Gaved (1997) and 
Marston (1993). 
Fifthly, there are transaction cost disincentives in organising bigger 
public information meetings between management and investors. 
Sixthly, senior management have the expectation that analysts will keep 
the wider market informed of the value relevance of the information 
released at these "private" meetings. This is consistent with Merton's 
(1987) model of capital market equilibrium with incomplete information. 
He argues that the analyst plays an important role in keeping the market 
efficient, particularly for smaller firms where the information 
environment is less rich. 
Seventh, a major advantage of these meetings is that they provide a two-
way flow of information. One manager commented: 
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" They give us an opportunity to rethink strategy as they pose (the 
analysts and the institutions) very interesting questions. "(p. 44) 
Eighth, the process of concentration in the funds management industry 
heightens the importance of company communication with selected 
institutional investors and analysts. 
Gaved (1997) points out that 50% of the equity value of the London 
market is held by 50 institutions, with the top 20 holding one third of the 
market. The biggest fund manager, Mercury Asset Management (MAM), 
held 4 % of the market. Since Gaved produced his report two years ago a 
continuing process of consolidation has also taken place in the 
stockbroking industry. 
Holland (1998) indicates that the information communicated through 
such private channels consists primarily of strategic issues, the fIrm's 
trading conditions and soft information releases such as a company's 
R&D programme. 
The implication for our study is that the analyst is likely to be privy to 
information that is not generally available to the market. Thus, a major 
role analysts may play is in the dissemination of important "private" 
information to the market, inter alia, through their investment 
recommendations and earnings forecast revisions. 
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2.5 Analysts' Information Processing Ability 
In addition to the analyst's role in communicating non- public 
information to equity markets, the analyst may also add value in terms of 
his/ her superior processing of existing publicly available information. 
This perspective of the analyst's role plays an important role in Merton's 
(1987) view of capital market efficiency in the presence of incomplete 
information. 
Empirically, such added value will manifest itself in terms of the way 
analysts process information. 
Bouwman, Frishkopff and Frishkopff (1987) examine the decision-
making processes of professional analysts. Their analysts were provided 
with a set of financial materials and asked to form an opinion on potential 
investment candidates verbalising "whatever" came to mind during the 
evaluation. This methodology is known as protocol analysis and studies 
verbalisations of decision- making behaviour. The authors argue that this 
technique is particularly useful in developing an understanding of how 
decisions are made. 
The authors' results suggest that analysts follow a "directed research" 
strategy whereby they seek a specific piece of information and only use a 
"sequential research" strategy as a safeguard after the "directed" strategy 
is complete. 
All their analysts had a high degree of task specific knowledge. In 
addition, the protocols confirm the existence of "financial templates" 
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which are memory structures accumulating a major part of an analyst's 
expenence. 
" Financial templates are complex structures that contain a variety of 
knowledge: industry specific standards of what is acceptable, "pictures" 
of typical company behaviour, typical problems for that type of company 
or industry, and "ready-made" evaluations of the attractiveness of an 
investment. " (p. 26) 
Anderson (1988) assesses the information search and evaluation 
behaviour of a group of professional and non- professional analysts 
(investors). The study compares the problem solving behaviour during the 
analysis of an IPO using protocol analysis. The results suggest that 
analysts use more directed search strategies than non-professional 
analysts. The overall strategies for the professionals are quite unifonn. 
They appear to use a checklist. Non-professionals, on the other hand, tend 
to work systematically through the data i.e. they tend to pursue a 
sequential search strategy. Professionals tend to search for and evaluate 
fewer types of infonnation in arriving at an investment decision. 
Though the Anderson study suggests that analysts' infonnation search 
and processing strategies are different to non-analysts, i.e. they are more 
efficient and selective in processing infonnation, it is not possible to infer 
from their study whether the investment decisions made by analysts are 
superior to those of non-analysts. 
In conclusion, it appears from the literature that analysts process 
information from a variety of sources in making their investment 
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recommendations and earnings forecast revisions. Accounting 
information ranks secondary to other more timely information releases. 
The principal non- accounting source of information is access to company 
management. Analysts obtain softer information from management and 
this softer information dominates their investment reports. Preferential 
access to management would imply that tests of the market's response to 
investment reports are tests of strong form efficiency. In addition, 
analysts appear to process publicly available information in a much more 
directed way than non- professionals do. 
However, even though we have argued that the sell- side analyst plays a 
major role in keeping the equity market informationally efficient, this 
does not mean that the incentives for the analyst to gather information are 
uniform across companies. The information environment literature argues 
that there are fewer incentives for gathering and processing information 
for smaller firms. 
In addition, even though the analyst may have gathered information on 
companies, there may be differential incentives to disseminate positive 
and negative information to the market. 
We address what the literature tells us on these issues in the next two 
sections. 
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2.6 Firms' Information Environments 
2.6.1 Incentives for Information Acquisition 
There is a theoretical literature which argues that the larger the firm the 
richer will be its information environment and the more the incentives 
there are for information acquisition by investors. This will in tum trigger 
information acquisition and dissemination by stockbroking analysts and 
greater reporting of the activities of larger companies by the financial 
press. 
The corollary to this is that the smaller the firm the less rich will be its 
information environment and hence the lower will be the incentives for 
financial analysts and the financial press to acquire and disseminate 
information. 
Grant (1980), Atiase (1985,1987), and Freeman (1987) demonstrate 
empirically that more information is, in fact, generated for larger firms. 
Size is thus a proxy for information availability. 
Freeman (1987) argues that if informed investors could buy all the firm's 
outstanding stock at a set predisclosure price and cover their positions at 
the anticipated post disclosure price trading profits would vary inversely 
proportional to firm size. E.g. knowledge that the equity of a large firm is 
mispriced by 1 % could be used to generate a larger trading profit than if 
a small firm's equity were mispriced by 1 % . 
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Such infonned investors will trade on the basis of this privately 
developed infonnation until it is fully reflected in the stock's price. 
Infonnation production thereby increases the precision of the share price 
valuation. Thus in this case, precision is a decreasing function of the 
unknown (costless) fully revealing equilibrium price. 
Atiase (1985) argues that the post- information search equilibrium prices 
of large frrms are more precise than those of smaller firms. Being more 
precise means that they are less likely to diverge by say 10% from their 
costless full information values. That is at each level of precision, 
expected marginal net trading profit from private information search is an 
increasing function of firm size. 
Net trading profit can be defined as gross trading profit less search costs. 
According to Atiase this condition is satisfied if marginal trading profit is 
proportional to firm size but search cost is independent of firm size. 
Thus in reaching equilibrium, trading profits earned from private 
information search provide incentives for more precise valuation of large 
firms than small finns. Accordingly, once the private search equilibrium 
is reached future public disclosures (which are costless to investors) have 
potentially greater effects on the stock prices of smaller fmns than larger 
finns. 
Freeman (1987) argues that this will also apply if information search 
costs differ across firms. It can be argued that conglomerates which 
operate in different product and market segments will be more costly to 
search due to the complexities of their operating environment. Larger 
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firms are argued to be more likely to be diversified and hence operate in 
more complex environments (Brookfield and Morris, 1992). 
However, if marginal search costs increase with firm size but at a lower 
rate than marginal trading profits a large firm's securities are still less 
likely to be mispriced than those of a smaller firm. 
The empirical literature supports the theory that the information 
environment of larger firms is richer than that of smaller firms. 
Grant (1980) investigates the difference in the information content of the 
annual earnings announcement between a sample of OTe firms and a 
sample of larger NYSE firms. His results demonstrate that the annual 
earnings announcement of OTe stocks, on average, produces higher 
residuals than those for NYSE firms suggesting that such information 
releases have higher information content for OTe listed companies than 
those on the NYSE. 
Grant attributes this difference in response to the relative information 
environments. In his subsequent analysis he indicates that the number of 
news items reported in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) is significantly less 
for OTe stocks compared with NYSE firms. 
Thompson, Olsen and Dietrich (1987), taking all firms listed on the 
NYSE and ASE between I st January 1983 to 31 st December 1983 show 
that larger firms receive greater coverage in the Wall Street Journal Index 
than smaller firms. 
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Atiase (1985) examines the share price impact of second quarter earnings 
announcements for 100 large fIrms and 100 small fIrms. He argues that 
the amount of private predisclosure-information production and 
dissemination is an increasing function of fIrm size. Therefore, other 
things being equal, the amount of unexpected information conveyed to 
the market should be inversely related to market capitalisation. His results 
are consistent with an inverse relationship between fIrm size and the 
market's response to quarterly earnings announcements. 
2.6.2 Analysts and Firms' Information Environments 
The literature suggests that analysts are a critical component of a fIrm's 
information environment and that analyst following is very closely but 
not perfectly related to fIrm size. 
Arbel, Carvell and Strebel (1983) argue that small firms are unsuited to 
the investment requirements of financial institutions and hence attract 
minimal coverage from analysts. This is because 
(1) Any sizeable investment in the fIrm will generate a price effect 
(2) Only a small investment will be required to breach the 5% mandatory 
disclosure rule. 
(3) The holding could quickly become large enough to necessitate 
managerial interest. 
O'Brien and Bhushan (1990) contribute to the debate by modelling the 
factors determining analysts' and institutional decisions to follow stocks. 
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They show that size is correlated with the number of analysts following a 
stock and institutional ownership. Institutional decisions to hold shares 
are positively related to size and prior analyst following as these are 
factors which have been used to establish the prudence of investment in 
legal cases. They argue that it is not size that is important but the 
intervening variable of institutional ownership in ultimately determining 
analysts' decisions to follow stocks. 
Therefore, there is a very close association between the analyst's decision 
to follow a stock and the degree of institutional following. In addition, 
size is then only important to the extent that it proxies for institutional 
ownership. 
The literature argues that investors demand compensation in the form ofa 
higher expected return for holding stocks not closely followed by 
analysts. This compensation takes the form of a higher risk premium for 
holding these "neglected" stocks. 
Carvell and Strebel (1984) argue that for "neglected" fIrms the historical 
CAPM beta is not useful as an ex ante measure of future risk. They argue 
that it can be improved by incorporating the dispersion of analysts' 
earnings forecasts for the fIrm relative to the degree of dispersion of 
earning forecasts for all firms as a proxy for future estimation risk. The 
argument is that the more highly dispersed the analysts' earnings 
forecasts are, the less rich is the firm's information environment. 
They argue that a new beta incorporating the dispersion of analysts' 
earnings forecasts provides a possible explanation for the neglected firm 
effect. As the number of analysts following a fIrm declines, the 
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informational uncertainty surrounding the security increases causing a 
potentially greater spread among the remaining analysts. 
The greater the uncertainty, and by implication the lesser the analyst 
following, the greater the future risk of the firm. Investors thus demand 
compensation for risk. A critical component of risk is the degree of 
information availability. In turn, it is argued, information availability is a 
positive function of the number of analysts following a stock. 
In order to test the proposition that their new beta compensates for the 
greater perceived risk effect when investing in neglected securities 
Carvell and Strebel form three portfolios based on different degrees of 
neglect. They then compare their revised beta to a conventional beta 
calculated for a subsequent period, and find that their revised beta is a 
better predictor of future beta than historical beta alone. In addition, they 
find that the reliability of historical beta as a predictor of future risk is 
inversely related to the degree of neglect. The literature also suggests that 
apparent stock market anomalies (e.g. PIE effect) may in part be proxies 
for the degree of estimation risk associated with neglected stocks in terms 
of less analyst coverage. 
Arbel (1985) argues that the "superb" investment performance of small 
firms, the "outstanding" performance of neglected companies, the 
"better" performance of low pie stocks and the January seasonality effect 
are all related to a common informational variable that affects investors' 
perceived risk level in terms of the richness of the firm's information 
environment. This, as we have argued above, is directly related to degree 
of analyst following. 
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In this context Arbel distinguishes between "generic stocks" and "brand 
name stocks". Brand name stocks are widely held by institutions and 
closely followed by analysts. Part of the price of these stocks is a hidden 
fee for the monitoring cost. Generic stocks are stocks analysts do not 
follow on a regular basis. He argues that this informational deficiency 
implies increased estimation risk for which investors seek compensation. 
Arbel also investigates whether it is the degree of neglect rather than 
company size or the magnitude of the PIE that is the underlying factor in 
generating returns, and whether informational deficiency and resulting 
estimation risk are directly associated with neglect. He argues that (1) 
higher returns will be associated with informational deficiency, proxied 
by number of analysts following the stock, (2) other things being equal, 
the higher the estimation risk the higher the return, and (3) that 
information deficiency and estimation risk exhibit seasonal patterns that 
can explain the January effect. 
Arbel's empirical results are consistent with the degree of neglect and not 
PIE or size generating higher returns. There is, however, a high 
correlation between size and neglect with neglected stocks tending to 
have lower PIEs. In addition, there is a positive relationship between 
estimation risk (as measured by the dispersion of analysts forecasts) and 
degree of neglect. There is also a positive correlation between returns and 
estimation risk and such a relationship is stronger in January. 
Overall, Arbel' s results suggest that the degree of neglect subsumes size 
and that the PIE effect and the January seasonal are all related to the 
neglect factor. In other words the degree of analyst following is a critical 
component of the firm's information environment. 
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Merton (1987), in his model of capital market equilibrium with 
incomplete information, also argues that the existence of stock market 
anomalies (e.g. size effect, PIE etc.) may be proxies for informational 
deficiencies associated with degree of neglect. 
The literature frequently uses the dispersion of analysts' earnings 
forecasts as a proxy for analyst following, and by implication, for 
predisclosure information availability. Ajinkya, Atiase, and Gift (1991) 
indicate that dispersion of such earnings forecasts is an important 
determinant of the trading volume and test Karpoffs (1986) theory that 
heterogeneity of beliefs determines the intensity of trading activity. 
Heterogeneity of beliefs, in this context, is indicative of firms that are not 
closely followed by analysts. 
In summary, the literature discussed in this section suggests that the 
degree of analyst neglect dominates other empirical anomalies including 
size and low PIE in explaining stock returns, and that the degree of 
analyst following is a critical component of a firm's information 
environment. Investors holding shares in firms not closely followed by 
the community of stockbroking analysts demand higher returns to 
compensate for the perceived risks involved in such companies. 
The arguments we have made so far relate to incentives for information 
acquisition by analysts. We now focus on arguments made regarding 
analysts' differential incentives to disseminate positive and negative 
information to the market through their investment recommendations and 
earnings forecast revisions. 
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2.7 Analysts' Incentives for Information Dissemination 
The literature argues that there are incentives for analysts to bias 
optimistically their earnings forecast revisions and recommendations in 
order to maintain links with management (Francis and Philbrick, 1993), 
to preserve the investment banking relationship (Dugar and Nathan, 
1995), or to maximise trading commissions (Darlin, 1983). For negative 
news this may even imply that sell recommendations and negative 
earnings forecast revisions are suppressed (McNichols and O'Brien, 
1996). 
2.7.1. Maintenance of Links with Company Management 
Management contacts constitute a critical information source for sell-side 
analysts (Arnold and Moizer, 1984; Pike, Meerjanssen, and Chadwick, 
1993; Holland, 1998). 
Francis and Philbrick (1993) argue that an unobservable preference for 
cultivating management relations encourages analysts to report optimistic 
earnings forecasts particularly in the presence of less favourable stock 
recommendations. Their sample consists of Value Line Timeliness 
Rankings and earnings forecast revisions. They use Value Line analysts' 
earnings forecast data rather than that of sell-side analysts directly as 
Value Line, they argue, provides a clearer test of whether incentives to 
cultivate management relations affect analysts' earnings forecasts. This is 
because broker analysts are also influenced by brokerage, investment 
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banking and underwriting incentives while Value Line are only 
influenced by their wishes to maintain relations with management. Their 
results show that Value Line analysts do not strive to produce earnings 
forecasts with minimal error, their earnings forecasts are optimistic and 
are, on average, more optimistic for sells than buys. This is consistent 
with their hypothesis that analysts, generally, will bias optimistically their 
earnings forecasts so as not to antagonise company management. 
2.7.2 Existence of Investment Banking Relationship 
In the same way, it is argued, that analysts strive to avoid antagonising 
management by either suppressing unfavourable reports, or by issuing 
biased optimistic earnings forecasts accompanying unfavourable reports, 
similar incentives exist in relation to investment reports for corporate 
clients i.e. where an investment banking relationship exists (Dugar and 
Nathan, 1995). 
The authors argue that investment- banking pressure comes from two 
fronts. It comes directly from the investment- banking department and is 
driven by an apprehension that the client company will tenninate the 
investment banking relationship if a negative report is issued. Pressure 
also comes from the manageme~t of the client finn. The existence of this 
pressure is important as, for brokerage finns, analyst research is an 
overhead and the broker usually provides reports free of charge to 
institutional investors. 
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Francis and Soffer (1997) recognise the tendency for analysts to bias 
optimistically their recommendations and forecasts and argue that the 
reactions to earnings forecasts depends on contemporaneously issued 
stock recommendations. They argue that investors will react more to 
earnings forecast revisions accompanying buy recommendations because 
buy recommendations are less informative than sells about the analysts' 
beliefs about intrinsic share values as the analysts' environment 
encourages issuance of favourable infonnation about fIrms. In the 
presence of such incentives it is to be expected that the analysts will 
expend greater care and effort before issuing an unfavourable report 
which would suggest that sells contain lower valuation errors than buys. 
Their results show that there is a greater price response to earnings 
forecast revisions when a favourable report is issued which is consistent 
with their hypothesis that contemporaneously issued earnings forecast 
revisions have greater investment value in the face of analysts incentives 
to issue favourable investment reports. 
In the presence of incentives to issue optimistic investment reports arising 
either from the desire to maintain links to company management or 
emanating from the investment banking relationship, Womack (1996) 
argues that: 
" Issuing "sell" recommendations can be risky since they are more 
visible because they are less frequent. An incorrect judgement on a "sell" 
is likely to be more costly for an analyst's reputation than an incorrect 
buy recommendation made when other analysts are more likely to be 
making the same recommendation at the same time. That the implicit 
costs of disseminating unfavourable "sell" opinions are greater than 
offering favourable ones can explain the large magnitude of returns at 
and after sell recommendations. That is if the costs of issuing a "sell" are 
greater, the analyst's expected returns for issuing them must be greater 
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as well. It is notable that the greater costs associated with sell 
recommendations are not related to differences in information acquisition 
and synthesis, but rather to the costs of disseminating information. " (p. 
165) 
2.7.3. Other Incentives that affect the Dissemination Process 
Other possible reasons for the asymmetry between buy and sell 
recommendations are advanced by Darlin (1983), and Diefenbach (1972). 
Darlin (1983) argues that there is a bias towards the generation of buy 
recommendations resulting from the analyst's desire to generate trading 
commissions. This argument presumes that buy recommendations 
generate greater revenues than sell recommendations. This is argued on 
the grounds that sell recommendations can motivate trading only by those 
currently holding the stock or those willing to take more costly short 
positions, while buys can generate transactions from a broader set of 
investors. 
Another possible reason for this buy/ sell asymmetry as suggested by 
Diefenbach (1972) is capital gains tax exposure on switching, and the fact 
that institutions generally enjoy net cash inflows and therefore are more 
likely to be seeking opportunities for investing rather than divesting. 
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2.8 Summary 
In this chapter we addressed the extant literature on the value of the sell-
side analyst in the equity markets. Pivotal to the economic value of the 
analyst is his/her role in keeping the equity markets informationally 
efficient. If markets are efficient in the absence of the sell-side analyst the 
analyst has no economic value as the market will already reflect the 
information content of hislher investment recommendations and earnings 
forecast revisions. 
The literature argues that analysts may have an informational advantage 
over other stock market participants arising from their potential superior 
information processing skills and/or their privileged access to "private" 
information. 
Whatever the nature of the analyst's informational advantage the 
literature suggests that the degree of analyst following is a critical 
component of a firm's information environment and that investors 
demand compensation, in terms of increased returns, for holding shares in 
firms not closely followed by the analyst community. 
The literature further suggests that there are differential incentives for 
analysts to acquire and also to disseminate company information. Such 
differential incentives, it is argued, will affect the magnitude of returns 
generated by trading on the basis of analysts' investment 
recommendations and earnings forecast revisions. 
In the next chapter we focus on the economic value of analysts' 
recommendations in an "absolute" sense by analysing the abnormal return 
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performance associated with the new buy and sell recommendations made 
by six leading stockbroking houses situated in the City of London. In 
addition, we control for factors which, as we have discussed in this 
chapter, may cross-sectionally influence the magnitude of the abnormal 
return performance generated. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE "ABSOLUTE" VALUE OF SELL-SIDE 
ANALYSTS' RECOMMENDATION CHANGES 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we evaluate the economic role of sell- side analysts' 
recommendation changes in an "absolute" sense. We apply an event study 
methodology to a population of UK analysts' recommendation changes to 
establish whether these generate abnormal returns. In addition, we 
examine the cross- sectional determinants of recommendation 
performance. 
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Our sample consists of all the recommendations changes made by six 
leading stockbroking houses situated in the City of London over the 
eighteen- month period January 1994 to June, 1995. 
The literature is mixed on the market impact of stockbrokers' 
recommendations. Several studies suggest that such recommendations do 
have investment value (Bjerring, Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 1983; 
Elton, Gruber and Grossman, 1986; Stickel, 1995; Womack, 1996; and 
Barber,Lehavy, McNichols and Trueman 1998). However, other, 
generally earlier research concludes that brokerage house 
recommendations do not, in fact, have investment value (Diefenbach, 
1972; Bidwell, 1977; Groth, Lewellen, Schlarbaum and Lease, 1979, 
Dimson and Fraletti, 1986). 
All of these papers, with the exception of Stickel (1995) and Barber et al 
(1998), fail to condition on factors, which may be related to the cross-
sectional determinants of recommendation performance, such as firm size 
(Banz, 1981; Reinganum, 1981; Carvell and Strebel, 1984; Arbel, 1985; 
Barry and Brown, 1984), the existence of an investment banking 
relationship (Dugar and Nathan, 1995), maintenance of relations with 
company management (Francis and Philbrick, 1993; Francis and Soffer, 
1997) and, stockbroking house reputation (Stickel, 1995). Barber et al 
(1998) controls for size only. Stickel controls for all of the above 
conditioning factors except the existence of an investment banking 
relationship. Nonetheless, there are a number of potential problems 
associated with Stickel's study, discussed below in section 3.2.5. 
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In contrast to the US very little evidence exists on the investment value of 
analysts' recommendations in a UK setting. The only exceptions are 
Dimson and Fraletti (1986) and Dimson and Marsh (1984). However, in 
the fonner case, the authors examine buy recommendations only and for 
only one stockbroking house. In addition, they do not control for potential 
cross- sectional detenninants of finn performance. They conclude 
stockbrokers' buy recommendations generate statistically significant 
returns but these are arguably too small to be economically efficient. The 
second study, Dimson and Marsh (1984) is, strictly speaking, not directly 
comparable as the authors evaluate share return forecasts made by UK 
stockbrokers and not the investment value of their recommendations per 
se. 
The next two sections, 3.2 and 3.3 review earlier work and, in particular, 
evaluate the methodologies and approaches taken. Section 3.4 places our 
work within the existing corpus and highlights our original contribution. 
Section 3.5 describes our methodology and data and descriptive statistics 
are provided in the next section. Section 3.7 provides the initial empirical 
results and the impact of the introduction of conditioning factors is 
discussed in the next two sections 3.8 and 3.9. A summary and 
conclusion of our findings are provided in the final section of the chapter. 
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3.2 Potential Problems Associated with Previous Studies on the 
Economic Value of Analysts' Recommendations 
Existing studies on the investment potential of sell-side analysts' 
investment recommendations have potential problems which are explored 
below in separate subsections. 
3.2.1 Sample Size 0/ Recommendations 
Bjerring, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1983) and Elton, Gruber and 
Grossman (1986) suggest recommendations do have investment value but 
their studies use only 221 and 727 observations respectively. These 
sample sizes are considerably smaller than those of Diefenbach (1972); 
Groth, Lewellen, Schlarbaum and Lease (1979); and Dimson and Fraletti 
(1986) who suggest that brokers recommendations do not have 
investment value. Their sample sizes are 1255,6200 and 1649 
respectively. 
However, more recent research by Stickel (1995), Womack (1996) with 
larger sample sizes (16957 and 1573 recommendations respectively) 
suggest that analysts' recommendations do indeed have investment value. 
3.2.2 Sample o/Stockbroking Houses 
Bjerring, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1983); Groth, Lewellen, 
Schlarbaum and Lease (1979); and Dimson and Fraletti (1986) consider 
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the recommendations made by a single stockbroking house only, thus 
introducing the possibility of selection bias. Of these three studies only 
Bjerring, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1983), documents that the 
recommendations made by their single stockbroking house outperform. 
The possibility of selection bias is compounded in this case as the 
majority of the stocks followed by the house come from a single industry, 
oil and gas. 
3.2.3 Recommendations vs. Recommendation Changes 
Certain of the previous studies examine recommendations without 
partitioning the recommendations into new recommendations or simply 
reiterations of existing recommendations. It seems plausible that new 
recommendations would be more value relevant that simply a restatement 
of a previously held view. 
Those studies employing recommendation changes (Stickel, 1995~ 
Womack, 1996 and Elton, Gruber and Grossman, 1986) tend, on average, 
to have higher event period abnormal returns than those studies that do 
not distinguish between recommendation changes and reiterations of 
existing recommendations (Diefenbach, 1972; Groth, Lewellen, 
Schlarbaum and Lease, 1979; Bjerring, Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 
1983). The only notable exception is Barber, Lehavy, McNichols and 
Trueman (1998). However, their results are not strictly comparable as the 
authors base their findings on the performance of portfolios of stocks that 
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are strong buy and sell recommendations rather than analysing all buy 
and sell recommendations which is the norm in previous research. 
Interestingly, Dimson and Fraletti (1986) directly compare the price 
performance of buy recommendations and additions to buy 
recommendations with the latter generating higher abnormal returns. 
However, they note that the size of the sample of new recommendations 
is too small to form statistically significant conclusions about long term 
performance. Over the short term there does not appear to be much of a 
difference between new buy recommendations and reiterations of existing 
OpInIOns. 
3.2.4 Source of Recommendation Changes 
Another potential problem arises from the source of the recommendation 
changes. Stickel (1995) and Barber, Lehavy, McNichols and Trueman 
(1998) use data provided by Zacks Investment Research. Zacks uses as its 
source of recommendation changes published analysts' reports. The 
problem is that many of these reports may come days or weeks, or even 
not at all after the news is first disseminated orally to institutional clients. 
Other studies do not suffer from this potential bias as they use more 
timely sources of analysts' recommendation changes. 
3.2.5 Womack vs. Stickel 
The most recent publishes research by Womack suggests a much larger 
price response to new sell recommendations than new buy 
recommendations at the time of the recommendation change (-4.7% v 
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+ 2.90/0). In addition, initial price reactions are incomplete. For buy 
recommendations, the drift is modest (+2.4%) and short-lived (one 
month), whilst for new sell recommendations, the drift is larger (-9.1 %) 
and extends for a longer period (6 months). 
These results contrast with contemporaneous research by Stickel (1995) 
who, in fact, documents a smaller price response to new sell 
recommendations at the time of the recommendation change and a drift of 
one month's duration for buy recommendations only. However, four 
potential problems exist with Stickel's study that may potentially 
invalidate his results: 
Firstly, Stickel uses Zacks Investment Research as his source for 
gathering recommendation changes. We argue in section 3.5.5 that this is 
not a timely source. 
Secondly, Stickel includes buy to hold recommendations as "quasi-sell" 
recommendations. As buy to hold recommendations constitute 66% of his 
total portfolio of new sell recommendations this may tend to lead to the 
rejection of the hypothesis that new sell recommendations have 
investment value and also potentially conceal any possible post-
recommendation drift in respect of such recommendations. 
Third, Stickel uses arithmetic CARs rather than geometric CARs in 
cumulating abnormal returns over time. Arithmetic CARs suffer from the 
conceptual problem that their use implicitly amounts to rebalancing the 
stocks every time the abnormal returns are calculated. The appropriate 
measure of performance should be the "buy and hold" return. This would 
imply using a geometric CAR (Strong, 1992; Conrad and Kaul, 1993). 
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Another problem with arithmetic returns is that returns tend to be upward 
biased. The bias is greater the more volatile the stock (Haugen, 1999). 
Fourth, Stickel argues that that he is focusing on recommendation 
changes only in his sample. However, this is only true if all stockbroking 
house recommendations are accompanied by a written circular. This is 
not necessarily the case. Thus, for example, what Stickel records as a new 
buy recommendation may, in fact, be simply a reiteration of an existing 
buy recommendation that was previously issued without an 
accompanying circular. 
3.2.6 Cross- Sectional Determinants of Recommendation Performance 
Even though Stickel suffers from a number of potential problems it is the 
only study that comprehensively examines the cross-sectional 
determinants of recommendation performance. 
The factors that may affect, cross- sectionally, the performance of new 
buy and new sell recommendations arise from both the company's 
information environment and the economic incentives facing analysts. 
These associated literatures are discussed in Sections 2.6 and 2.7 of 
Chapter 2. 
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3.3 UK Evidence 
Very little evidence exists in the UK on the price impact of stockbrokers' 
recommendations. 
The only study published was in 1986 by Dimson and Fraletti. Their 
results suggest that the abnormal returns are marginal at best and would 
in any case be zero if transaction costs are taken into account. 
Their study requires updating for a number of reasons: 
(1) Considerable changes have taken place in the UK market since the 
period of their study e.g. Big Bang; the promulgation of a large 
number of new accounting standards; the enactment of insider-
trading legislation and Stock Exchange rules on the dissemination of 
price sensitive information (PSI). Improved accounting disclosures 
may either increase or reduce the role of the analyst (Lang and 
Lundholm, 1996). PSI and insider trading legislation may affect the 
way that companies communicate with the market, and the analyst's 
role as a conduit between management and the investment community 
(Holland, 1998). 
(2) Their sample consists of buy recommendation changes only. Sell 
recommendations are ignored. However, sell recommendations have 
been shown in US studies to have a greater price impact than buy 
recommendations (Womack, 1996; Stickel, 1995). 
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(3) Their sample is restricted to the buy recommendations of one 
stockbroking house only, thus introducing possible selection bias. 
(4) They admit that their sample had a bias towards large companies. The 
literature suggests that the information environment for small firms is 
less rich than for larger firms (e.g. Freeman, 1987~ Grant, 1980), and, 
therefore, arguably, there may be a greater price response to 
investment recommendations for smaller firms than larger firms 
(Stickel, 1995). 
(5) They did not take account of factors that may be associated with the 
magnitude of the price response to a recommendation change such as 
the maintenance of links with company management (Francis and 
Philbrick, 1993) and the preservation of the investment banking 
relationship (Dugar and Nathan, 1995). 
3.4 Our Contribution to the Literature 
Extant work, as indicated above, may have methodological concerns 
associated with it. We specifically address these methodological issues in 
our study. 
We use a unique data source for obtaining our recommendation changes 
that does not suffer from the potential biases arising from other 
competing sources. 
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We explicitly seek the input of the stockbroking houses themselves both 
in setting up the study and in the interpretations of our results. 
In addition, our study is the fIrst study to specifIcally incorporate the 
incremental impact of the investment banking relationship in the context 
of a multivariate model assessing the factors cross-sectionally 
determining recommendation performance, and we also address the 
potential methodological problems associated with Stickel (1995) which 
is the only previous study that controls in a comprehensive manner for 
those factors that may cross-sectionally affect the market price impact of 
recommendation performance. 
We apply our study in a UK. context where very little evidence exists on 
the economic value of sell-side analysts' investment recommendations. 
3.5 Methodology 
3.5.1 Selection o/Stockbroking Houses 
We analyse the price performance of the recommendation changes of six 
leading London based stockbroking houses over the eighteen-month 
period January 1994 to June 1995. The six participating houses are: ABN 
Amro Hoare Govett, Credit Lyonnais Laing, SBC Warburg, James Capel, 
BZW, and UBS. 
59 
By selecting our sample recommendations from more than one 
stockbroking house we avoid the possible selection bias of Bjerring, 
Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1983) and Dimson and Fraletti (1986) who 
select their sample of recommendations from only one stockbroking 
house. In addition, we only approached those stockbroking houses that 
ranked in the top 10 of the annual Extel rankings as published in the 
Ranking of Investment Analysts Survey, 1994 and 1995 editions. The 
strategy of only collecting recommendation changes from the major 
stockbroking houses ensures breadth of company coverage and that the 
information events analysed are made available immediately to most 
institutional and professional investors and hence the market. 
We use the Extel "Ranking of Investment Analysts Survey to identify the 
top stockbroking houses operating in the UK market as it is regarded as 
the flagship survey for the industry. Each year a questionnaire is 
despatched to a sample of senior fund managers. In 1995 127 fund 
managers responded. The respondents were collectively responsible for 
the investment of over £940bn and included 72% of those who control in 
excess of £ 1 Obn of funds. In formulating their rank of the best investment 
analysts contributors were asked to take into account, inter alia, the depth 
of analyst knowledge of his/ her sector; the quality of their fundamental 
research; the success of the analyst's recommendations and the accuracy 
of their earnings forecast revisions. The rankings are reported on overall 
basis and by Stock Exchange sector. 
Of the nine houses originally approached eight agreed to participate in the 
study. One house subsequently withdrew after the director of research 
was transferred within the firm. Of the remaining eight houses the data 
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provided by two of the houses were insufficient for our purposes. This 
left a total of six houses. 
3.5.2 Anatomy o/Company Recommendations 
We focus on recommendation changes rather than simply reiterations of 
existing recommendations as these should be more value relevant. 
Those studies employing recommendation changes (Stickel, 1995; 
Womack, 1996 and Elton, Gruber and Grossman, 1986), not surprisingly, 
show higher event period abnormal returns than those studies that do not 
distinguish between recommendation changes and reiterations of existing 
recommendations (Diefenbach 1972; Groth, Lewellen, Schlarbaum and 
Lease, 1979; Bjerring, Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 1983). 
Interestingly, Dimson and Fraletti (1986) directly compare the price 
performance of buy recommendations and addition to buy 
recommendations with the later generating slightly higher abnormal 
returns. However, they note that the sample size of the recommendations 
is too small to form statistically significant conclusions. 
We obtain brokerage house recommendation changes from the books 
summarising the stockbroking houses views on the companies they 
follow which are usually published monthly. 
Though they come under different names such books essentially contain 
the same information. Inter alia, they record financial data for each 
company followed. This includes data on forecasted earnings, the PIE 
61 
ratio, dividend yield, PIE relative to the market as a whole or Stock 
Exchange sector, net asset value, current share price and the current share 
price relative to share price performance over the previous 12 months. In 
addition they record the house's current recommendation and any 
earnings forecast revisions. In some cases the brokerage fIrm provides a 
summary page detailing all the recommendations and earnings forecast 
revisions that took place since the last publication date. 
These books are normally prepared on a monthly basis, and are 
despatched to clients (primarily institutions) as a summary record of the 
effect of what has happened on a company's key financials during the 
course of the previous month. In the case of ABN Amro Hoare Govett the 
books are prepared on a weekly basis. 
We abstracted the recommendation changes either directly from a 
summary page if it existed or, if not, by comparing the recommendation 
in month t with month t-l. 
Brokerage houses use a variety of phrases to convey recommendations. 
Standardising these so that they can be compared across houses involves 
an element of judgement. Fortunately, in most cases, it is straightforward 
enough to separate the recommendations into six mutually exclusive 
categories: 
(1) Buy to hold 
(2) Sell to hold 
(3) Sell to buy 
(4) Hold to buy 
(5) Buy to sell 
(6) Hold to sell 
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The typical designation of the recommendations is into buy, sell and hold 
categories. We adopt this three- point designation in our sample. Some 
houses had more elaborate designations. ABN Amro Hoare Govett 
distinguish between "overvalued" and "sell" recommendations and 
between "undervalued" and "buy" recommendations. 
They define their taxonomy of recommendations as follows: 
"Recommendation is based on expected performance relative to the 
market over the next 6 months, using the following parameters: 
Buy + 10%, Undervalued + 5% to + 10%, Hold, -5% to +5%, Overvalued 
-5% to -10%, Se/l-JO% " (ABN Amro Hoare Govett: "Equity Market 
Service" 13th -17th May, 1996). 
For our purposes as both overvalued (undervalued) and sell (buy) 
recommendations are expected to underperform (outperform) the market 
we do not distinguish between them and include them both in the sell 
(buy) category. 
Houses define the expected duration of a recommendation in different 
ways. The majority of houses use a time horizon of six months to one 
year. For instance James Capel states: 
"The recommendation on the shares is based on the divergence between 
the current share price and our assessment of the "correct" or fair price 
for the shares, provided that the divergence is expected to be corrected 
within twelve months. " (James Capel, "The Red Book", January 1996, 
page 126). 
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A notable exception, however, is BZW who do not specifically define a 
timescale over which a recommendation will endure. They say: 
"This is driven partly by the timescale of the investor, the experience of 
the company and price volatility in the market. For a portfolio manager 
to implement an investment recommendation and see it contribute 
significantly to performance may well take a period of months. This is 
particularly true in a period of low institutional liquidity and low market 
volume. Our investment recommendations and changes in those 
recommendations take that into account." (BZW: "UK Equity Working 
List", February 1996, page 53). 
In addition to varying in terms of the expected timescale of 
outperformance (underperformance) houses also differ as to the expected 
magnitude of the outperformance (underperformance). 
For example, James Capel define buy and sell recommendations as 
follows: 
"Buy indicates anticipated outperformance of 15% or more and sell 
anticipated underperformance of 15% or more. " ("The Red Book", 
January 1996, page 126). 
Contrast this with ABN Amro where, as we saw above, the upper limit on 
outperformance is defined as 10% and the lower limit on 
underperformance is defined as. -10%. 
All houses define their recommendations either explicitly or implicitly 
relative to the expected performance of the UK market as a whole over a 
64 
particular time horizon. As such, their models do not incorporate beta or 
other factors. This is interesting as all academic studies use either the 
market model or variations of the market model in assessing the 
performance of analysts' recommendations. One notable exception is 
Womack (1996) who uses three different return- generating models: size 
adjusted model, industry adjusted model and the Fama and French 3-
factor model. 
It is interesting to note that in more recent times the nature of the 
analysts' performance benchmark is changing. Houses are now 
organising themselves on a pan- European basis, and are concentrating 
not on outperforming the UK market index but rather are seeking to 
outperform European sectoral indices. This consolidation parallels a 
similar shift in the European fund management industry which is being 
driven largely by the desire to be diversified internationally, taking bets 
on individual sectors. All this is eased by the development of the Euro. 
3.5.3 Calculation of Abnormal Returns 
We use monthly returns to calculate the abnormal returns associated with 
the recommendation changes in the analysis that follows. There are a 
number of reasons for this: 
(1) We are interested in whether sell-side analysts' recommendations 
have long- term investment potential. 
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(2) Our source for the recommendation changes consists of the 
stockbroking houses monthly books. These books do not record the date 
during the course of the month when the recommendation changes. The 
participating stockbroking houses were asked if they had their own 
recommendation change monitoring system. They indicated that they did 
not. 
(3) Womack (1996) shows that using US data abnormal returns for new 
buy recommendations continue for up to one month after the date of the 
recommendation change. The corresponding number of months for new 
sell recommendations is six months. 
We asked the directors of research of the participating houses to 
rationalise Womack's findings. They suggested that there may be a time 
lag between the time an analyst changes his recommendation and the 
market price changes. The analyst communicates the recommendation 
change to the sales team at the early morning meeting. The sales team 
then ring up their client portfolio. Typically the clients will wait and seek 
corroborating evidence before making a decision, particularly if the news 
is negative. This, they say, can take several days or even weeks. 
3.5.4 Selection of Event Period 
Our event period runs from month -6 to + 6. This is consistent with 
previous research studies (Groth, Lewellen, Schlarbaum and Lease, 1979~ 
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Dimson and Fraletti, 1986; Elton, Gruber, and Grossman, 1986; Womack, 
1996). 
The motivation is that previous research has documented that analysts' 
recommendations may in fact be "price driven" rather than "information 
driven". Dimson and Fraletti (1986) document that their new buy 
recommendations rose by 2.2% in the two weeks prior to the 
recommendation change. Groth, Lewellen, Schlarbaum and Lease (1979) 
document that for buy recommendations returns are positive and 
significant in each of the six months prior to the recommendation. For 
sell recommendations no evidence of price pressure was discovered. 
Elton, Gruber and Grossman (1986) report evidence of price pressure for 
both buy and sell recommendations in the six months prior to the 
recommendation but these returns are not statistically significant. Similar 
results are documented by Womack (1996). 
Parallel evidence is available from the analyst earnings forecast literature. 
For example, Stickel (1990, 1991) confirms that earnings forecast 
revisions are associated with past price movements. Interestingly, Forbes 
and Skerratt (1992) using UK data find no evidence of such price 
following behaviour. 
3.5.5 Problems Associated with Alternatives to the Stockbroking House 
Summary Books for Sourcing Recommendation Changes 
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Alternative sources for identifying recommendation changes exist but 
they have problems associated with them. 
Investext and Dialog, for instance, are databases of written stockbroker 
circulars. However, not all recommendation changes result in a written 
circular and even where they do there may be a considerable lag between 
the date of the recommendation change and any associated circular. This 
was confirmed by our discussions with the directors of research. One 
director of research commented on the verbal nature of the UK market 
compared to the US with over half of their recommendations not having 
associated text. Another director of research stated that in many cases 
there would not be a circular accompanying a recommendation change 
unless there was a request for one from the house's clients. 
Two potential problems arise on using stockbrokers written circulars as 
the source of a recommendation change as in the majority of existing 
studies. One problem is that there is a truncation bias as only those 
recommendation changes that are the subject of a circular will be 
included. 
In addition, there may be a time lag between the date of a 
recommendation change and its formal publication as a circular. 
This creates a number of problems. 
Firstly, if there is a time lag then the date of the circular is not the date of 
the recommendation change and is therefore not the date that the 
information was communicated to the market via the houses institutional 
clients. Therefore, we would not be testing the value of the 
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recommendation change per se but rather its secondary dissemination 
through a written circular. 
Secondly, using circulars alone restricts the sample to a subset of 
recommendations. This is particularly a potential problem if there are 
differences in information content between those recommendation 
changes that result in a circular and those that do not. 
We investigate the potential magnitude of the problem by investigating 
via Dialog what percentage of recommendation changes resulted in a 
circular in the same month that the recommendation change occurred. 
Of the six houses in our sample four had their circulars on Dialog: 
Warburg (16%)~ BZW (440/0)~ ABN Amro Hoare Govett (17%)~ and UBS 
(400/0). The bracketed figures represent the percentage of 
recommendation changes that had an associated circular. Accordingly, 
using Dialog as a source of a house's recommendation changes would 
have resulted in a severely restricted sample of circulars. 
In addition, we focus on recommendation changes only. Ifwe use Dialog 
as the source of our recommendation changes we raise the possibility that 
a proportion of the "recommendation changes" may, in fact, be the 
reiteration of previous recommendations if those previous 
recommendations were not accompanied by a circular. This is a potential 
problem with Stickel's (1995) ,study. 
First Call, however, used by Womack (1996) overcomes these problems. 
This is a real time database that collects the daily commentary of 
stockbrokers, fund managers, economists etc and sells it on line to 
professional investors via the Internet. The cost of subscribing to First 
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Call is substantial. The advantage of First Call from an academic point of 
view is that changes in recommendation made at the early morning 
meeting between research staff and the sales team are put up on First Call 
and distributed to clients instantaneously. 
However, though First Call is well established in the US it is only 
relatively recently established in the UK (June, 1996). Only a small 
number of our sample of stockbroking houses were using First Call and 
even in cases where they were there was not a long time series of 
recommendation changes available for the purpose of conducting an 
academic study. Only one house included the contents of the early 
morning meeting notes on First Call. 
In cases where the company is the subject of a recommendation change 
the analyst is supposed to tick a box to that effect. A pilot study was 
conducted by requesting all the recommendation changes over the last six 
months in respect of two houses. No entries came up, indicating that UK 
analysts do not bother to use this box. 
Accordingly we restrict our source of recommendation changes to the 
summary books of the participating stockbroking houses. 
3.5.6 Analysts' Recommendations and Trading Volume Activity 
A second measure of the market impact of analysts' recommendations is 
the impact on a company's trading volume. Womack (1996) is the only 
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study that measured the trading volume impact of analysts' . 
recommendation changes. He found that, contrary to the price impact, the 
abnormal trading volume impact of a recommendation change quickly 
dissipates within a few days of the recommendation change. As we are 
interested in the longer- term performance of new buy and new sell 
recommendations we do not consider trading volume. 
3.5.7 Abnormal Price Movements 
To test for the existence of abnormal returns surrounding 
recommendation changes requires a return- generating model. 
We apply a variation of the market model. 
The abnormal return metric employed is defined as follows: 
U i,t = AR i,t - ER i,t 
where 
U i,t = the abnormal return associated with company i in month t 
AR i,t = actual return for company i in month t 
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(1) 
ER i,t = expected return for company i in month t 
The expected return generating model is as follows: 
ER i,t = !3i,t R m,t (2) 
where 
R m t = return on the FT All Share Index in month t 
, 
!3i,t = LBS beta coefficient for company i in month t 
This is the market model with no intercept tenn. The market model 
methodology is consistent with the approach used in most previous 
research on stockbrokers' investment recommendations (Elton, Gruber 
and Grossman, 1986, Groth, Bjerring, Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 1983). 
F our separate variations are employed: 
Modell: assume a beta coefficient of 1 
Model 2: using LBS beta from pre-event period 
Model 3: using LBS beta from post-event period 
Model 4: using average of pre- and post- event period betas 
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The period over which to calculate beta is an empirical issue. The basic 
principle is that the calculation of beta should not be contaminated by 
what occurs in the event window. Using a pre-event period beta is 
consistent with the majority of prior studies adopting the event study 
methodology. The argument for choosing a future beta is that analysts 
may base changes in recommendations on past price performance. In 
addition, we calculate the average beta for comparison purposes. 
All existing studies on the investment value of stockbrokers' 
recommendations bar one calculate beta over a pre-event period. The only 
exception is Stickel (1995) who uses a beta estimate from the post-event 
period on the basis that analysts may base recommendations on past price 
performance. 
No intercept term was calculated as previous research has shown that the 
alpha term is not statistically significant (Firth, 1975~ Brown and Warner, 
1980, 1985; Rippington, 1991; Brookfield and Morris, 1992) 
Returns are calculated using log prices, adjusted for dividends as follows: 
where: 
In = natural log 
Pt = share price in month t 
Dt = dividend in month t 
t = time on a monthly basis. 
(3) 
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As Strong (1992) points out there are both theoretical and empirical 
reasons for preferring log prices to discrete arithmetic prices in 
calculating returns: 
" Theoretically, logarithmic returns are analytically more tractable when 
linking together sub-period returns to form returns over longer 
intervals ... Empirically, logarithmic returns are more likely to be 
normally distributed and so conform to the assumptions of standard 
statistical techniques. " (p. 535) 
The results using the four models are presented in Table 1 below. 
Table 1 
Mean Abnormal Returns Around Recommendation 
Changes for All Four Return-Generating Models 
New Sell Recommendations 
Modela 4 3 2 1 
Month Abnormal t-Statistic Abnormal t-Statistic Abnormal t-Statistic Abnormal t-Statistic 
-6 
-5 
-4 
-3 
-2 
-1 
o 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Re~m R~um R~um R~um 
-0.18 -0.34 -0.18 -0.35 -0.17 -0.33 -0.09 
-0.07 -0.21 -0.08 -0.28 -0.06 -0.18 -0.08 
-0.62 -1.66* -0.63 -1.68* -0.63 -1.70* -0.62 
-0.69 -2.05** -0.69 -2.04** -0.69 -2.03** -0.72 
-0.27 -0.83 -0.27 -0.83 -0.26 -0.80 -0.27 
-0.73 -1.88* -0.73 -1.88* -0.72 -1.87* -0.65 
-3.05 -7.24*** -3.04 -7.21 *** -3.06 -7.22*** -3.08 
-1.68 -4.51*** -1.67 -4.53*** -1.67 -4.51*** -1.69 
-0.89 -3.05*** -0.83 -2.87*** -0.83 -2.85*** -0.84 
-0.66 -2.27** -0.77 -2.66** -0.77 -2.63** -0.71 
-0.71 -2.82*** -0.79 -3.15*** -0.79 -3.17*** -0.73 
-1.11 -3.25*** -1.11 -3.33*** -1.12 -3.33*** -1.17 
-0.82 -2.41** -0.80 -2.37** -0.80 -2.35*** -0.74 
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-0.17 
-0.26 
-1.69* 
-2.09** 
-0.82 
-1.71* 
-7.19*-
-4.60*** 
-2.89*** 
-2.46** 
-3.49*** 
-2.19*-
Table 1 (cont'd) 
New Buy Recommendations 
Modela 4 3 2 1 
Month Abnormal t-Statistic Abnormal t-Statistic Abnormal t-Statistic Abnormal t-Statistic 
Return Return Return Return 
-6 -0.34 -1.38 -0.34 -1.38 -0.34 -1.39 -0.31 
-5 -0.34 -1.60 -0.34 -1.61 -0.33 -1.58 -0.29 
-4 -0.45 -1.83* -0.46 -1.85* -0.44 -1.77* -0.37 
-3 -0.61 -2.60- -0.62 -2.62- -0.61 -2.60- -0.62 
-2 -0.48 -2.00** -0.47 -1.99- -0.48 -2.00- -0.38 
-1 -0.61 -2.59- -0.61 -2.63- -0.60 -2.55*** -0.62 
0 2.63 9.54- 2.62 9.51 *** 2.63 9.54*** 2.58 
1 0.38 1.85* 0.37 1.77* 0.35 1.68* 0.38 
2 0.13 0.67 0.13 0.65 0.12 0.62 0.11 
3 -0.68 -3.56*** -0.64 -3.38*** -0.63 -3.33*** -0.63 
4 -0.04 -0.20 -0.06 -0.31 -0.06 -0.29 -0.04 
5 -0.48 -2.34** -0.40 -1.96** -0.41 -2.00** -0.37 
6 0.00 0.01 -0.04 -0.25 -0.03 -0.18 -0.05 
a Model 4 calculates abnonnal returns using the average beta of the pre- and post- event period 
Model 3 calculates abnonnal returns using the post-event period beta 
Model 2 calculates abnonnal returns using the pre-event period beta 
Model I calculates abnonnal returns assuming a beta of 1 
n*= statistically significant at a=O.OI 
**= statistically significant at a=O.OS 
*= statistically significant at a=O.lO 
-1.23 
-1.35 
-1.48 
-2.61*** 
-1.60 
-2.62-
9.28*** 
1.81* 
0.57 
-3.28*** 
-0.20 
-1.80** 
-0.30 
The results in Table 1 show that no economic or statistical significance 
exists between the reported results conditioning on each of the models. In 
all that follows we use model 4. Adoption of model 4 enables comparison 
with previous research and is a reasonable compromise between those 
studies that employ a post-event period beta (Stickel, 1995) and those that 
adopt a pre-event beta (Elton, Gruber and Grossman, 1986; Groth, 
Bjerring, Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 1983). In addition, we argue in 
section 3.7.2.2 that even if we control for industry (Womack, 1996) or 
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size (Barber, Lehavy, McNichols and Trueman, 1999) our results are 
unlikely to be affected. 
3.5.8 Cumulative Abnormal Returns and related t-Statistics 
As described in Sections 3.2.6 we accumulate abnormal returns over time 
using a geometric approach following Womack (1996) and Ritter (1991). 
The formula is: 
CAR = I In Li ITt&TP (1 + ARi,t)-l 
where 
n = number of buy or sell recommendations, as appropriate, in month t 
ARi,t =abnormal return associated with recommendation i in month t 
TP = the event period (test period). 
The t-statistic for the CAR in month t is computed as follows: 
where 
nt =the number of recommendations outstanding in each month, and 
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(4) 
(5) 
} 112 csdt = {t*var+2(t-l)*cOV 
where 
t = event month 
var = average cross- sectional variance (over 13 months) 
cov = the fIrst order autocovariance of the ARt series 
See Ritter (1991, p 10) for more detail. 
3.6 Characteristics of the Sample of Recommendation Changes 
Table 2 presents the matrix of 2,506 recommendation changes for the six 
participating stockbroking houses over the 18-month period January 1994 
to June, 1995. 
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Table 2 
Matrix of Recommendation Changes 
New Recommendation 
Old Recommendation Bu Hold Sell Total 
Buy 846 28 874 
(34%) (1%) (35%) 
Hold 873 370 1243 
(35%) (15%) (50%) 
Sell 28 361 389 
(1%) (14%) (15%) 
Total 901 1207 398 2506 
(36%) (48%) (16%) (100%) 
There are a total of 90 1 new buy recommendations and 398 new sell 
recommendations yielding a ratio of 2.6: 1. 
The comparable ratio of new buys to new sells for Womack (1996) is 
6.3: 1. Elton, Gruber and Grossman (1986) report a ratio from their Table 
2 of 2.3: l. Stickel (1995) reports a ratio of l.1: l. However, Stickel 
includes recommendation changes from buy and strong buy to hold as 
quasi- sell recommendations. Adjusting for this yields a ratio of 4.6: 1. 
Comparable evidence does not exist for the UK market as Dimson and 
Fraletti (1986) only consider buy recommendations in their study. 
Dimson and Marsh (1984) are not directly comparable as they deal with 
share price forecasts and not recommendation changes per se. Breton and 
Taffler (1999, Table 1) report a ratio of2.6:1 for buys to sells but they 
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only consider broker recommendations cross-sectionally. not 
recommendation changes. 
We have already argued that analysts are less likely to issue sell 
recommendations for a number of reasons. For instance sell 
recommendations may be harmful to a house' s present and potential 
investment banking relationships (Dugar and Nathan, 1995). 
Also top management may limit or cut off the flow of information if a 
house issues an unfavourable recommendation (Francis and Philbrick, 
1993). In addition, issuing sell recommendations can be more risky as 
they are more visible and less frequent (Womack, 1996). 
As is evident from Table 2 UK stockbroking houses, on average, appear 
slightly less reluctant to issue sell recommendations than their US 
counterparts. 
Table 3 breaks down the sample of new buy and new sell 
recommendations by industry. Both the new buy and new sell 
recommendations are well diversified by industry with no single industry 
constituting more than 7% of the total. All London Stock Exchange 
sectors are represented in the sample. 
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Table 3 
Sectoral Decomposition of New Buy and Sell Recommendations 
Stock Exchange Sector New DUl: Recommendations New Sell Recommendations 
Building and Construction 3% 2% 
Building Materials 5% 3% 
Chemicals 4% 4% 
Diversified Industrials 3% 3% 
Electronic and Electrical 4% 1% 
Engineering 7% 7% 
Engineering, Vehicles 1% 2% 
Printing, Paper and Packaging 4% 2% 
Textiles 2% 1% 
Breweries 4% 4% 
Spirits, Wines and Ciders 1% 2% 
Food Manufacturers 4% 7% 
Household Goods 2% 1% 
Healthcare 1% 2% 
Pharmaceuticals 1% 1% 
Tobacco 0% 1% 
Distributors 1% 1% 
Leisure and Hotels 3% 1% 
Media 4% 1% 
Retailers, Food 2% 5% 
Retailers, General 7% 6% 
Support Services 4% 3% 
Transport 2% 3% 
Electricity 4% 3% 
Gas Distribution 1% 0% 
Telecommunications 1% 1% 
Water 3% 4% 
Banks 2% 4% 
Insurance 4% 5% 
Life Assurance 2% 3% 
Merchant Banks 2% 2% 
Other Financial 4% 2% 
Property 3% 7% 
Investment Trusts 0% 0% 
Extractive 1% 1% 
Oil, Integrated 1% 1% 
Oil, Exploration 2% 3% 
Business Support 0% 0% 
Metals 1% 1% 
Total ~%) 100% 100% 
Total 901 398 
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Table 4 reports the Stock Exchange index characteristics of the new buy 
and sell recommendations. The sample is not overly biased towards large 
capitalisation stocks as in the case of Dims on and Fraletti (1986) and 
Womack (1996). Approximately one third of both new buy and new sell 
recommendations are in respect of firms that lie outside the FTSE 100 
and FTSE Mid 250 indices. More importantly, the index constituents of 
the new buy and new sell recommendations are broadly similar. 
Table 4 
Index Constituent Decomposition of the New Buy and Sell 
Recommendations 
............ }.~.~.~~ ................. ~!?~.~~y. .. ~.~~.~.~~!?~.~~~.~.~.~ ......... ~!?~ .. §.~~.~ .. ~.~~.~.~.~~~~.~~.~.~.~ .... . 
FTSE 100 26% 33% 
FTSE Mid 250 40% 41 % 
Other 
Total (%) 
Total 
34% 
100% 
901 
26% 
100% 
398 
The distribution of the time a recommendation spends on the 
recommended list is presented in Table 5. Once a recommendation is 
removed from the recommended list we no longer include it in the 
calculation of abnormal returns. 
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Table 5 
Distribution of Time Spent on Recommended Lists 
Length of Recommendation 
Period 
New Buy 
Recommendation 
New Sell 
Recommendation 
·······························f·moo·ih··························································3·2"(4O/~)·······················································20·(5o/~)···························· 
2 months 67 (7%) 39 (10%) 
3 months 53 (6%) 29 (7%) 
4 months 41 (5%) 19 (4%) 
5 months 45 (5%) 19 (4%) 
6 months 52 (6%) 25 (6%) 
> 6 months 611 (67%) 247 (64%) 
Total 901 (100%) 398 (100%) 
A comparison can be made with Dimson and Fraletti (1986). In their 
sample of 132 companies that were new buy recommendations only 140/0 
remained on the recommended list for more than 6 months. This 
compares with 67% of buy recommendations remaining on the list for 
greater than 6 months in our sample. The length of time the average 
recommendation stays on the recommended list is broadly consistent with 
how our sample of stockbroking houses defines their recommendation 
periods. 
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3.7 Event Period Abnormal Return Performance 
As no difference is apparent conditioning on the model employed 
empirically (see section 3.5.7 above) we use Model 4 (using pre- and 
post-event period betas) in all subsequent analysis. Adoption of this 
fonnulation enables comparison with previous research and is a 
reasonable compromise between those studies that employ a pre-event 
period beta and those that adopt a post- event period beta. 
The abnonnal return perfonnances attributable to new buy and new sell 
recommendations are presented in Tables 6 and 7 respectively. The 
robustness of the return patterns and associated t-statistics are discussed 
below in section 3.7.2. 
Figures I to 4 present graphs of the cumulative abnonnal returns 
attributable to the new buy and the new sell recommendations. 
For comparison purposes, alternative dates for cumulating abnormal 
returns are presented. 
The cumulative abnormal returns with returns cumulated from six months 
prior to the recommendation change for new buy and sell 
recommendations respectively are documented in Figures 1 and 2. 
Figures 3 and 4 present the cumulative returns for new buy and sell 
recommendations respectively with returns cumulated from the month 
preceding the recommendation change. 
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Table 6 
Mean Abnormal Returns Around Recommendations Changes: 
New Buy Recommendations 
Month of Abnormal Abnormal Cumulative Cumulallve Cumulative Cumulative 
listing return return t- value abnormal abnormal abnormal abnormal 
-6 
-5 
-4 
-3 
-2 
-1 
o 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
-0.34 
-0.34 
-0.45 
-0.61 
-0.48 
-0.61 
2.63 
0.38 
0.13 
-0.68 
-0.04 
-0.48 
0.00 
••• = statistically significant at a-O.OI 
•• = statistically significant at a=O.OS 
• = statistically significant at a=O.1 o. 
-1.38 
-1.60 
-1.83* 
-2.60*'* 
-2.00** 
-2.59*** 
9.54*** 
1.85* 
0.67 
-3.56*·* 
-0.20 
-2.34*** 
0.01 
return -6,+6 return t- value return 0,6 return t- value 
-0.34 
-0.71 -2.27** 
-1.19 -3.09*** 
-1.86 -4.25*** 
-2.38 -4.93*·* 
-3.01 -5.72*" 
-0.53 -0.90 2.63 
-0.20 -0.33 3.01 8.55*** 
-0.04 -0.06 3.15 7.71*** 
-0.70 -1.02 2.49 5.38*** 
-0.65 -0.89 2.45 4.82*** 
-1.14 -1.53 2.00 3.63*** 
-1.13 -1.47 1.91 3.45*·· 
Table 7 
Mean Abnormal Returns Around Recommendation Changes: 
New Sell Recommendations 
Month of Abnormal Abnormal Cumulallve Cumulative Cumulallve Cumulallve 
listing return return T value abnormal abnormal abnormal abnormal 
-6 
-5 
-4 
-3 
-2 
-1 
o 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
-0.18 
-0.07 
-0.62 
-0.69 
-0.27 
-0.73 
-3.05 
-1.68 
-0.89 
-0.66 
-0.71 
-1.11 
-0.82 
••• = statistically significant at a=O.OI 
.. = statistically significant at a=O.OS 
• = statistically significant at a=O.IO. 
-0.34 
-0.21 
-1.66· 
-2.05** 
-0.83 
-1.88* 
-7.24**· 
-4.51'" 
-3.05*·· 
-2.27·* 
-2.82·" 
-3.25·** 
-2.41·· 
return -6,+6 return t value return 0,6 return t value 
-0.18 
-0.32 -0.57 
-0.98 -1.52 
-1.68 -2.27" 
-1.90 -2.36** 
-2.70 -3.24**· 
-5.75 -6.52*** -3.05 
-7.40 -8.18·** -4.73 -8.70·" 
-8.19 -8.76*** -5.61 -9.30*** 
-8.73 -9.01"· -6.28 -9.08**· 
-9.26 -9.21*" -6.99 -9.15*** 
-10.25 -9.92**· -8.09 -10.03'*' 
-10.76 -9.65'*· -8.91 -9.78*** 
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Figure 1 
Mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns Surrounding New Buy 
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Figure 2 
Mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns Surrounding New Sell 
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Figure 3 
Mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns Surrounding New Buy 
Recommendations: Base Date Month -1. 
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3.7.1 Return Performance o/New Buy and Sell Recommendations 
The abnormal return for new buy recommendations is +2.6% and the 
return for new sell recommendations is -3.1 % in the month of the 
recommendation change. 
The magnitude of our abnormal returns, at the time of the 
recommendation change, is comparable with Womack (1996). He found a 
three day abnormal return of + 30/0 for new buys and -4.7% for new sells. 
Our results, however, exceed those discovered by Elton, Gruber and 
Grossman (1986), who find smaller calendar month excess returns of 
+ 1.90/0 for new buys and -0.5% for new sells, and Stickel (1995) who 
finds abnormal returns of + 1.1 % (new buys) and -1.20/0 (new sells) for 
eleven day event windows. 
Groth, Llewellen, Schlarbaum, and Lease (1979) document a calendar 
month return of 1.8% for buys and -1 % for sells. 
F or new sell recommendations we document small negative abnormal 
returns in each of the six months prior to the month of the 
recommendation change, although in three of these months these 
abnormal returns are statistically, albeit not economically significant. 
Womack (1996) and Stickel (1995) also document negative abnormal 
returns in the period preceding the recommendation change though only 
Stickel finds his returns are statistically significant. However, Stickel's 
results need to be interpreted carefully as his sample of recommendations, 
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as described above in section 3.2.5, is derived from stockbrokers' 
circulars and, therefore, there are potential timing problems as to when 
the actual recommendation was released to the market. This potential 
confounding problem does not arise with our sample. 
However, Groth, Llewellen, Schlarbaum, and Lease (1979) observe no 
statistically significant residuals prior to sell recommendations. 
F or new buy recommendations, we find no evidence of price following 
behaviour in the months preceding the recommendation change. In fact 
returns are negative in all of the preceding six months and are statistically 
significantly negative in four of those months. No previous research study 
has documented such a finding. 
Groth et aI, in comparison, find positive and statistically significant 
returns in the six-month period prior to buy recommendations. They 
suggest that for buy recommendations: 
" Those happy circumstances were accompanied by a series of favourable 
news items disseminated through normal press channels to the investment 
community. The digestion of these items induced modest upward revisions 
in investors' expectations about the prospects of the companies involved, 
the responses to which are visible in the superior investment results 
during the pre-recommendation months. 
Perhaps because of this superior performance, the firms in question 
ultimately caught the attention of the research staff of the brokerage 
house. " (p. 37) 
In parallel Dimson and Fraletti (1986) find for the subset of their buy 
recommendations that represent recommendation changes (sample size 
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n=132) there is a 2.20/0 rise in price in the two weeks prior to the 
recommendation change. 
The negative returns for new sell recommendations even though 
consistent with "price following" behaviour, can be legitimised in other 
ways that are still consistent with analysts having an informational 
advantage. 
In terms of our results analysts are not "price followers" for buy 
recommendations. There is nothing in the literature to suggest that 
analysts are less able to process negative information about companies 
than positive information. In contrast, the analyst may face incentives not 
to issue an unfavourable report even though they may have negative 
information about a company (Francis and Philbrick, 1993; Francis and 
Soffer, 1997; Womack, 1996). 
Though Table 7 shows abnormal returns are statistically significant prior 
to the analysts issuing a new sell recommendation, their magnitude is 
much greater in the month of, and subsequent to, the recommendation 
change than in the preceding months. Thus the negative news circulating 
about companies prior to the recommendation change may not have been 
significant enough to justify analysts issuing "costly" sell 
recommendations (Womack, 1996). 
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3.7.2 Validity of Abnormal Return Performance 
3.7.2.1 The Normal Distribution 
To apply the t- statistic for evaluating the statistically significance of the 
abnormal returns, it is necessary for these to be reasonably normally 
distributed. 
The distribution of new buy recommendation returns had a kurtosis value 
of 5.6 and skewness of 0.77. The corresponding kurtosis and skewness 
statistics for the new sell recommendation returns are 2.72 and -0.69 
respectively. For the normal distribution to describe correctly the 
distribution of abnormal returns kurtosis should be less than 3 and 
skewness should not exceed 1.2. 
Both new buy and new sell recommendations are both satisfactory for 
skewness whereas for kurtosis new buy recommendations are on the high 
side. This would suggest that a greater proportion of the abnormal returns 
centre about the mean of the distribution than would be the case if returns 
were strictly normally distributed. 
This is, however, a lesser problem than skewness, the violation of which, 
if present, would suggest that the abnormal returns are being driven by a 
few large outliers. However, the evidence suggests that this is not the 
case. 
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The skewness and kurtosis statistics for other months in the 13-month 
event period are comparable to those of the month of the recommendation 
change. 
As a further test of whether our abnormal returns are being driven by a 
subset of recommendation changes that are outliers we eliminate the top 
50/0 and bottom 5% of the recommendations and find no change to our 
reported results (See Appendix 1). 
3.7.2.2 Multiple Recommendations 
Another potential bias is that the abnormal return distribution could be 
driven by multiple recommendations for the same company by several 
stockbroking houses simultaneously. An examination of the data, 
adopting a quite conservative procedure, suggests that this clustering of 
recommendations does not occur. 
We proceed by establishing the number of unique recommendations by 
eliminating for each company all contemporaneous recommendations of 
the same type made by more than one brokerage house in the same month 
of the recommendation change, or in the month before and the month 
after the recommendation change. This was necessary as the dates of the 
"summary" books used to identify the date of the recommendation 
change overlap. We thus adopted a quite conservative procedure. 
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The results suggest that 92% of the buy recommendations and 94% of the 
sell recommendations represent unique recommendation changes. In 
other words there is no evidence of analyst herding behaviour in making 
their recommendation changes. The lack of evidence of herding is also 
attributable to the fact that not all the stockbroking houses in our sample 
follow the same companies. This is particularly the case for the smaller 
finns in our sample which represent 340/0 of the new buy 
recommendations and 26% of the new sell recommendations (Table 4). 
Rerunning the test statistics using only the unique recommendation 
changes did not alter our results. (See Appendix 2). 
The possibility exists that reported t- values are upwardly biased due to 
"event month clustering". This occurs when the recommendation changes 
are driven by the same "event" in calendar time. Time clustering can 
result in positive cross-sectional correlation among abnonnal returns, 
thereby lowering the power of statistical tests. Using monthly and daily 
data, Brown and Warner (1980,85) show that when returns are adjusted 
using the market model it makes little difference whether cross-sectional 
dependence due to time clustering is taken into account. On the other 
hand, Bernard (1987) provides evidence that market model adjustments 
do not correct the problem if the sample finns are drawn from the same 
industry. 
F or our sample, there is little evidence that the recommendations are 
being driven by particular industry factors which may induce cross-
sectional dependence in abnormal returns. In addition, our sample of 
recommendation changes are reasonably spread out over the eighteen 
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month time period of our study and are not "clustered" in particular 
months. It is immediately apparent from Table 3 that our sample of new 
buy and new sell recommendations are reasonably diversified across 
industry, with no industry representing more than 7% of the total number 
of recommendation changes. We test whether industry covariation is 
driving the magnitude of the abnormal returns and associated t-statistics 
by recalculating our results truncating our sample of new buy and new 
sell recommendations to include only one recommendation change for 
each Stock Exchange sector in each time period. Thus, for example, if 
there are say three new buy recommendations in respect of stocks in the 
Engineering, Vehicles sector in January 1995 only one is included in our 
sample. This is a conservative procedure as it assumes perfect positive 
correlation between the abnormal returns on stocks in the same Stock 
Exchange sector in the same time period. Rerunning the results in this 
fashion does not alter our results (Appendix 3). 
In addition, the abnormal returns are not driven by size as the sample of 
recommendation changes is diversified on a size basis and the size 
characteristics for the new buy and new sell recommendations are broadly 
comparable (Table 4). 
In addition, there is a close correspondence between the actual companies 
included in the new buy recommendations and new sell 
recommendations. 80% of the companies that are the subject of a sell 
recommendation are also the subject of a buy recommendation during the 
eighteen-month sample period. The corresponding figure for buy 
recommendations is 640/0. Thus, not only are the sample companies 
similar in size and industry they are also in many cases the same 
compames. 
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3.7.2.3 Return -Generating Model 
Another potential challenge to the robustness of our results resides in the 
possibility that the abnormal returns generated are a function of the return 
generating model employed. Fama (1976) notes that computation of 
excess returns suffers from the joint hypothesis that computation of 
excess returns proceeds from some model of what returns are expected. 
Evidence on excess returns is questionable if the expected return-
generating model is deemed inappropriate. We argue that since the 
sample of firm recommendation changes is large and well diversified 
across time, size and industry controlling for such factors would be 
unlikely to impact on our empirical results. 
3.7.3 Price Response in the Months Following the Recommendation 
Change 
F or buy recommendations the evidence is that price reaction takes place 
in the month of the recommendation and in the immediately following 
month. The largest return occurs in the month of the recommendation 
change (+2.60/0) with +0.38% occurring in the following month. Though 
0.38% is statistically significant it is unlikely to be economically 
significant as it would probably be swamped by transaction costs. 
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Womack (1996) similarly documents that abnormal return performance 
for new buy recommendations continues for just one month after the 
recommendation change. Elton, Gruber and Grossman (1986) find 
statistically significant abnormal returns for month 0 and the two 
subsequent months. Diefenbach (1972) using yearly horizons finds that 
buys underperform the market by 0.4% but no t-statistics are reported. 
Bjerring, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1983) and Groth, Lewellen, 
Schlarbaum and Lease (1979) find no statistically significant returns in 
the period subsequent to the recommendation change for buys. 
It is difficult to make inferences about Dimson and Fraletti (1986) as no t-
statistics are reported and, in any case, they conclude that their returns are 
not economically significant. They report their CAR to be +0.95% for the 
26-week period after the recommendation ranging from a low average 
return of -0.160/0 in week 1 to a high of + 1.55% in week 24. 
Interestingly, we report evidence of a statistically significant price 
reversal in months 3 and 5. No previous study reports similar results. 
These results may be consistent with the "price pressure" hypothesis 
whereby prices rose too much at the time of the recommendation due to 
excess demand in the marketplace which ultimately reversed itself in 
subsequent months. The price pressure hypothesis predicts that "expert" 
analysts' recommendations create temporary buying pressure by naive 
investors in the recommended securities. This buying pressure can 
generate temporary abnormal returns followed by a subsequent return 
reversal. In this context our results are consistent with those studies 
reporting on the economic value of the secondary dissemination of 
analysts' recommendations in newspapers (Liang, 1999; Bauman, Datta, 
Iskandar-Datta, 1995; Barber and Loeffler, 1993). 
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On the other hand, for sell recommendations there is evidence of large 
negative statistically significant returns in each of the subsequent 6 
months. This is consistent with Womack (1996). He reports a six- month 
cumulative abnormal return of -9.1 %. Our equivalent abnormal return 
over the same six- month period is -8.9%. 
Elton, Gruber and Grossman (1986) record statistically significant returns 
for up to two months after the new sell recommendation though these are 
of smaller magnitude than we report. 
3.7.4 Validation of the Post- Recommendation Drift 
3.7.4.1 Index Matching 
As Dimson and Fraletti (1986) note, a long- term test of performance 
poses a challenge to event study methodology. This arises because the 
abnormal return estimated incorporates not only the return which is 
attributable to the event been investigated but also other firm specific 
components of the return. Cross- sectional averaging of abnormal returns 
is designed to neutralise firm specific price fluctuations unrelated to the 
particular event of interest. 
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However, these cross-sectional averages of cumulative performance are 
being averaged over periods which overlap. E.g. if all occurrences of the 
event take place at the same time, the CARs correspond to performance 
over a single observation period and firm specific factors will not be 
neutralised. Thus, for example, if a broker chooses domestic securities 
which are a hedge against the dollar, favourable performance would be a 
consequence of one and not a multitude of judgements. 
Therefore, they argue 
" Given these limitations of the event study methodology, it is clear that 
the long term CAR measures no more than the difference in performance 
between an experimental portfolio and a control portfolio. For the results 
to be meaningful, it is important that the control is matched; that is its 
constituents should be unaffected by the event but should be otherwise 
similar to the event securities. " (i.e. in both sector and capitalisation) (p. 
154). 
This view is also echoed in Elton, Gruber and Grossman (1986). 
We believe that the difference in abnormal returns between the buy and 
sell recommendations in our study is not driven by inappropriate 
matching with the control portfolio i.e. The FT All Share. This is because 
both the buy and sell recommendations are similar in terms of index 
constituents and industry composition (Table 3 and Table 4) but the drift 
exists for the sell recommendations only. 
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3.7.4.2 Time Varying Beta 
Another potential explanation of the "post-recommendation" drift may be 
time varying of beta. In this case the new buy recommendation firms 
would have to become, on average, more risky (higher beta) over time 
and the sell firms less risky (lower beta). Our results contained in Table 1 
show that the abnormal returns are insensitive to the choice 
of beta. Thus time varying risk does not explain the differences in the 
drift process for the new buy and sell recommendations. 
Womack (1996) similarly was unable to attribute his new sell 
recommendation drift to either risk per se or time varying risk. 
Our results are also consistent with the literature on the post - eamings-
announcement (PEA) drift discussed by Bernard and Thomas (1989). 
Bernard (1993) rejects possible explanations of the PEA anomaly based 
on failure to control adequately for risk research design flaws. 
Ball (1992) suggests that the evidence "points to the delayed reaction 
hypothesis". As we report a dichotomy between the length of the drift 
process for new buy and sell recommendations it can be argued that this 
delayed reaction hypothesis may be attributable in part to a loss-aversion 
hypothesis where there is a reluctance to dispose of losers (Shefrin and 
Statman, 1985; Thaler, 1985). Essentially the argument revolves around 
"regret" avoidance, whereby investors may resist the realisation of a loss 
because it stands as proof that their original purchase decision was 
incorrect. They hang on to their investments in the hope that more 
favourable news may occur thus mitigating the loss. This explanation 
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would be consistent with our results where there appeared to be a 
reluctance on the part of the analyst to respond to bad news as evidenced 
by the statistically significant negative returns prior to the analysts issuing 
their new sell recommendations (Womack, 1996). 
We asked the directors of research at the participating house for their 
views on the post-recommendation drift. They suggested that for new sell 
recommendations institutions are reluctant to sell in the absence of 
corroborating evidence from other sources. Therefore, there may be a 
time lag between the recommendation change and any subsequent price 
movement. The comments of the directors of research are consistent with 
Thaler (1985) and Shefrin and Statman (1985). 
Overall our results are consistent with Womack (1996). However, in 
contrast to Womack, we find a statistically significant price reversal for 
new buy recommendations in months 3 and 5, which may be consistent 
with market overreaction. Interestingly, our results in this regard, parallel 
the results of research by Easterwood and Nutt (1998) into the accuracy 
of analysts' earnings forecast revisions. They find that analysts tend to 
underreact to negative information and overreact to positive information. 
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3.8 Cross- Sectional Determinants of Recommendation Performance 
The determinants of the price performance of recommendations are 
investigated by cross- sectional regressions of abnormal returns on 
empirical proxies for variables expected to affect the magnitude of the 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). These variables and their empirical 
proxies are discussed below. 
We construct a cross-sectional regression equation with CAR as the 
dependent variable. We expect CAR to be a function of firm size, 
contemporaneous same-sign earnings forecast revision accompanying 
recommendations, the existence of an investment banking relationship, 
stockbroking house reputation, and the magnitude of the revision in the 
recommendation. 
CARs are calculated from the date of the recommendation change rather 
than from month -6 because of the arguments advanced in relation to 
"price- following" behaviour in section 3.7.1 above. 
We employ dummy variables for each of the variables expected to affect 
performance. We adopt a dummy variable basis rather than a continuous 
variable basis for the following reasons: 
First, certain variables are by their nature qualitative i.e. the existence of 
an investment banking relationship, stockbroking house reputation and 
the magnitude of the revision in recommendation. 
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Second, even for variables that are potentially continuous, such as 
earnings forecasts, revisions may be discontinuous. For example, for new 
buy recommendations, 38% have a positive contemporaneous earnings 
forecast revision, 50% have no earnings forecast revision and, 
interestingly, 12% have a negative contemporaneous earnings forecast 
revision. For new sell recommendations, 42% have a contemporaneous 
negative earnings forecast revision, 48% have no associated earnings 
forecast revision and 10% have a contemporaneous positive earnings 
forecast revision. In this context we document a stronger 
contemporaneous association between same-sign earnings forecast 
revisions and recommendations than Stickel (1995). He finds that only 
160/0 of buy recommendations and 28% of sell recommendations have 
same-sign earnings forecast revisions. 
Third, dummy variables ease interpretation of the results as they represent 
the marginal CAR associated with that particular category. 
Fourth, we facilitate comparison with Stickel (1995) who employed 
dummy variables in his cross-sectional determinants of recommendation 
performance. 
Subsections 3.8.1 to 3.8.5 explore the reasons for inclusion, in our cross-
sectional regression of determinants of recommendation performance, of 
our independent variables in more detail. The cross-sectional regression 
model itself is set out in section 3.9. 
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3.8.1 Differences in Firms' Information Environments 
As we have argued in Chapter 2, smaller firms tend to have less rich 
information environments and are less closely followed by analysts than 
their larger counterparts. The implication is that since information about 
smaller firms is gathered and processed less frequently, then the impact of 
any single information release is greater. 
We would then expect both buy and sell recommendations will have a 
greater price impact for smaller firms than larger firms. 
The variable "SMALLSTX" is set equal to 1 if the firm is not a 
constituent of the FTSE 100 index and zero otherwise. The coefficient on 
"SMALLSTX" is hypothesised to be positive for buys and negative for 
sells. In other words, buy and sell recommendations associated with 
"small" firms are expected to generate higher abnormal returns than those 
of FTSE 100 stocks. 
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3.8.2 Contemporaneous Earnings Forecast Revisions 
Francis and Soffer (1997) and McNichols and O'Brien (1996) find that 
recommendations and earnings forecast revisions both affect share prices 
and that price reaction to both buy and sell recommendations is enhanced 
by same- sign evidence from an earnings forecast revision. (The 
arguments relating to the potential differences in information content 
between those recommendation changes that are accompanied by a same-
sign earnings forecast revision and those that are not, are set out in 
section 2.7 and related subsections, in particular the discussion on Francis 
and Soffer, 1997 on page 45). 
We would then expect that buy or sell recommendations made 
contemporaneously with a same- sign earnings forecast revision will 
have greater price impact than recommendations made without such 
same- sign evidence. 
F or new buy recommendations the dummy variable "POSEFR" is set 
equal to 1 if the buy is accompanied by a positive earnings forecast 
revision for the current or next accounting year and set equal to zero 
otherwise. 
For new sell recommendations the dummy variable "NEGEFR" is set 
equal to 1 if the sell recommendation is accompanied by a negative 
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earnings forecast revision for the current or next accounting year and set 
equal to zero otherwise. 
The coefficient on "NEGEFR" ("POSEFR") is expected to be negative 
(positive). In other words we expect those sell (buy) recommendations 
that are accompanied by a same-sign earnings forecast revision should 
generate larger negative (positive) CARs than otherwise equivalent sell 
(buy) recommendations that are not accompanied by a same- sign 
earnings forecast revision. 
3.8.3 Existence of Investment Banking Relationship 
Dugar and Nathan (1995) argue that in order to preserve their investment 
banking relationships and to maintain good relations with management 
analysts will be more likely to issue buy recommendations for clients 
when they should be holds and will only issue sell recommendations 
when it is a very strong sell. 
The stockbroking houses summary books record the companies with 
which the houses maintain an investment banking relationship. 
We would expect that in cases where the company, which is the subject of 
a recommendation change, is a corporate client of the stockbroking 
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house, there is a greater probability that a buy recommendation should in 
fact be a hold recommendation. 
The dummy variable "IB" is set equal to one if the company, which is the 
subject of the recommendation change, is a corporate client of the 
stockbroking house and set equal to zero otherwise. The coefficient on 
"IB" is expected to be negative for new buy recommendations. In other 
words, we expect that new buy recommendations issued in respect of 
corporate clients should on average generate lower CARs than new buy 
recommendations where an investment relationship does not exist. 
We did not employ an investment banking dummy variable for new sell 
recommendations as an investment banking relationship exists for only 
three new sell recommendations! This latter case, of course, which is less 
than 1 % of the total, is supportive of our proposition on a face value 
basis. 
3.8.4 Stockbroking House Reputation 
As argued in section 2.7 of Chapter 2, analysts may have incentives to 
bias optimistically their investment recommendations and earnings 
forecast revisions. However, counterveiling forces may mitigate 
excessive optimism. These include reduced credibility for the firm's 
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analysts resulting in loss of investor clients and the possibility of lawsuits 
from dissatisfied investors (Dugar and Nathan, 1995). In addition, 
evidence from surveys (e.g. Dorfman, 1991) suggests that sell-side 
analyst compensation depends, inter alia, on an analyst's reputation. 
Thus we expect that analysts with a superior reputation will have greater 
influence than other analysts. Reputation is proxied by reference to the 
position of the stockbroking house in the Extel sectoral rankings. We use 
the stockbroking house sector ranking concurrent with the period of the 
recommendation change. For example, the 1995 "Ranking of Investment 
Analyst Survey" is used as the basis period for those recommendation 
changes that took place over the year May 1994 to April 1995 as the 
ranking is based on a survey carried out towards the end of April 1995. 
We would expect that buy or sell recommendations made by the firm 
ranked highest in the Extel sectoral ran kings will have greater price 
impact than recommendations issued by the other houses in our sample. 
To test this, the dummy variable "lllGHEXTEL" is set equal to 1 if the 
house ranked highest in the sectoral rankings amongst our participating 
stockbroking houses, subject to that ranking being at least a 1 or a 2, and 
zero otherwise. 
The coefficient on this variable is expected to be positive for buys and 
negative for sells. In other words, we expect a larger positive (negative) 
incremental CAR to be associated with a buy (sell) recommendation 
made in respect of a company in an industry where the stockbroking 
house has a higher reputation vis-a-vis recommendations made by other 
stockbroking houses. 
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3.B.5 Magnitude o/Revision in Recommendation 
Revisions in recommendations that skip a rank are expected to have a 
greater price impact than revisions that do not because of the larger 
change in expectations. For example, a revision from sell to buy is 
expected to have a greater price impact than a revision from hold to buy. 
Similarly, a revision from buy to sell is expected to have a greater price 
impact than a revision from hold to sell. 
We would expect revisions that skip a rank to have greater price impact 
than revisions that do not skip a rank. 
To test for this, for new buy recommendations, the dummy variable 
"STRONG" is set equal to 1 if the change in recommendation is to a buy 
from a sell and zero otherwise. For new sell recommendations, the 
variable "STRONG" is set equal to 1 if the change in recommendation is 
from a buy to a sell recommendation and zero otherwise. 
3.9 Experimental Design and Results 
The following regression is estimated for new buy recommendations: 
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C~t,t+s) = f30 + /31 SMALLSTX + /h POSEFR + /33 IB 
+ 134 HIGHEXTEL +135 STRONG + E (6) 
F or new sell recommendations the equation is the same except for the IB 
variable and that NEGEFR is substituted for POSEFR. 
The regression for new sell recommendations is: 
C~t,t+s) = /36 + p, SMALLSTX +/38 NEGEFR + flgHIGHEXTEL 
+ 1310 STRONG + E (7) 
where 
CA"R(t,t+s) = the cumulative abnormal return to the stock from event month t to t+s. 
SMALLSTX = a dummy variable set equal to 1 if the company is not a constituent of 
the FTSE 100 index and zero otherwise 
POSEFR = a dummy variable set equal to 1 if the new buy recommendation is 
accompanied by a positive earnings forecast revision for the current or next year and 
set equal to zero otherwise 
NEGEFR = a dummy variable set equal to 1 if the new sell recommendation is 
accompanied by a negative earnings forecast revision for the current or next year and 
set equal to zero otherwise 
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m = a dummy variable set equal to 1 if the company which is the subject of the new 
buy recommendation is a corporate client of the stockbroking house and set equal to 
zero otherwise 
HIGHEXTEL = a dummy variable set equal to 1 if the house ranks highest in the 
sectoral rankings amongst our participating stockbroking houses and set equal to zero 
otherwise 
STRONG = a dummy variable set equal to 1 if for new buy (sell) recommendations 
the change in recommendation is to a buy (sell) from a sell (buy) and set equal to zero 
otherwise. 
~O ••• ~IO are regression parameters to be estimated. 
The statistical reliability of the incremental CARs relies on the number of 
observations still remaining in each month after the recommendation 
change. Table 5 shows the number of recommendations that expire in 
each month. Tables 8 and 9 below separate out the number of 
recommendations remaining decomposed by their dummy variable 
characteristics for new buy and new sell recommendations respectively. 
The interpretation of the results for recommendations that skip a rank 
needs to be interpreted carefully particularly as the initial sample size is 
small (n= 28 for both new buy and new sell recommendations). 
In addition, by the end of the sixth month after the recommendation 
change there are only 15 recommendation changes from sell to buy and 
19 recommendation changes from buy to sell remaining. 
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Table 8 
New Buy Recommendations: 
Number of Observations Remaining for Each Dummy Variable in 
Each Month Following the Recommendation Change 
Dummy variable Month of 
Recommendation 
Change 
Month 1 Month 2 Month 3 Month 4 Month 5 Month 6 
···SMALLSTX···························_·6"i;7···························64"i················iio4···············S7O·····················S·47·····················s·i·6"···············46·7········ 
POSEFR 
IB 
HIGHEXTEL 
STRONG 
343 
164 
323 
28 
332 
159 
310 
2.5 
308 
148 
279 
22 
Table 9 
290 
139 
2.57 
21 
New Sell Recommendations: 
27.5 
131 
240 
20 
2.56 
121 
225 
18 
234 
liS 
202 
15 
Number of Observations Remaining for Each Dummy Variable in 
Each Month Following the Recommendation Change 
Dummy variable Month of Recommendation Month 1 Month 2 Month 3 Month 4 Month 5 Month 6 
Change 
SMALLSTX 264 252 225 205 195 179 163 
NEGEFR 166 159 145 131 122 114 105 
IB 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
HIGHEXTEL 125 114 96 85 77 70 59 
STRONG 28 26 25 23 20 20 19 
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Table 10 and Table 11 report the results of the regression equations for 
the new buy and new sell recommendations respectively. Although the 
tests of the hypotheses result in statistically significant evidence that is 
also economically significant, the percentage of the variation in stock 
returns explained by these regressions is low. The mean adjusted R2,s are 
approximately 1 % for new buys and 6% for new sells. However, even 
these low figures compare favourably with Stickel (1995), the only 
comparable study, who reports an R2 of 1 % for new buy and new sell 
recommendations. 
Table 10 
Determinants of Stock Price Performance of New Buy 
Recommendations 
CAR(O.O) CAR(O,1) CAR(O,2) CAR(O,3) 
Independent 
Dummy variable 
Intercept 
SMALLSTX 
POSEFR 
IB 
HIGHEXTEL 
STRONG 
Adjusted R2 (%) 
No. of 
Predicted 
Sign 
? 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
Mean 
Coefficient 
2.08 
1.29 
0.71 
-0.04 
-0.75 
3.46 
0.93 
Observations 901 
t-Statlstlc 
4.48'" 
2.21" 
1.26 
-0.06 
-1.31 
2.24" 
.. *= statistically significant at a-Om (two-tailed test) 
.. = statistically significant at a=O.OS (two-tailed test) 
• = statistically significant at a=0.10 (two-tailed tcst) 
Mean 
Coefficient 
1.84 
0.76 
1.n 
-0.05 
0.20 
4.00 
0.76 
869 
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t-Statlstlc 
3.10'" 
1.02 
2.47" 
-0.06 
0.28 
2.02" 
Mean t-Stabstlc Mean 
Coefficient Coefficient 
1.72 2.50'" 0.66 
1.34 1.55 1.17 
1.97 
-0.17 
0.20 
4.04 
0.74 
802 
2.38" 1.97 
-0.16 .-0.11 
0.23 1.07 
1.76' 7.50 
1.27 
749 
t-Statlstlc 
0.85 
1.19 
2.09" 
-0.08 
1.12 
2.89'" 
Table 10 (Continued) 
Determinants of Stock Price Performance of New Buy 
Recommendations 
CAR(O.4) CAR(0,5) CAR(0,6) 
Independent 
Dummy 
Variable 
Intercept 
Predicted 
Sign 
Mean t-Statlstlc Mean t-Statistic Mean t-Statistic 
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
SMALLSTX 
POSEFR 
IB 
HIGHEXTEL 
STRONG 
Adjusted R2 (%) 
No. of 
? 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
0.34 
1.15 
1.90 
-0.41 
1.85 
10.23 
1.89 
Observations 708 
.o. = statistically significant at a=O.O 1 (two-tailed test) 
0.40 
1.07 
1.85· 
-0.31 
1.n· 
3.60··· 
•• = statistically significant at a=O.OS (two-tailed test) 
• = statistically significant at a=0.10 (two-tailed test) 
Table 11 
0.04 0.04 -0.11 
0.63 0.54 0.46 
1.40 1.25 1.88 
-0.66 -0.46 -0.55 
2.49 2.20·· 2.31 
11.2 3.64··· 14.1 
1.83 1.65 
663 611 
Determinants of Stock Price Performance of New Sell 
Recommendations 
-0.12 
0.39 
1.68· 
-0.39 
2.03·· 
3.36··· 
CAR(O.O) CAR(0,1) CAR(0.2) CAR(0,3) 
Independent 
dummy 
variable 
Intercept 
Predicted 
Sign 
? 
Mean 
Coefficient 
-1.16 
-1.38 
-3.17 
0.93 
1.29 
3.82 
SMALLSTX 
NEGEFR 
HIGHEXTEL 
STRONG 
Adjusted R2 
No. of 
observations 398 
t-Statlstlc 
-1.32 
-1.55 
-3.78··· 
1.04 
0.79 
•• 0: statistically signiticant at a-O.O I (two-tailed test) 
•• = statistically significant at a=0.05 (two-tailed test) 
• = statistically significant at a=O.1 0 (two-tailed test) 
Mean 
Coefficient 
-1.72 
-3.37 
-3.13 
1.59 
1.83 
4.27 
378 
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t-Statlstlc 
-1.57 
-3.01··· 
-2.98··· 
1.43 
0.90 
Mean 
Coefficient 
-1.83 
-4.63 
-3.00 
1.43 
3.46 
5.13 
339 
t-Statlstlc 
-1.52 
-3.79··· 
-2.62··· 
1.18 
1.56 
Mean 
Coefficient 
-1.94 
-5.03 
-3.50 
1.40 
3.81 
5.09 
310 
t-Statlsllc 
-1.45 
-3.69··· 
-2.74··· 
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1.54 
Table 11 (Continued) 
Determinants of Stock Price Performance of New Sell 
Recommendations 
Independent Predlcled CAR(O.4) CAR(O.5) CAR(O.G) 
dummy variable slqn 
Mean t-Statlstlc Mean t-Statistic Mean t-Statlstic 
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Intercept ? -1.15 -0,80 -1.40 -0,92 -0,39 -0,23 
SMALLSTX -6.50 -4,41*** -8.18 -5.29*** -9,83 -5,82*** 
NEGEFR -3.63 -2.62*** -3.27 -2.25" -3.90 -2.46** 
HIGHEXTEL 0.44 0.30 1.05 0.68 0.66 0.39 
STRONG 4.13 1.54 3.42 1.22 1.82 0.59 
Adjusted R2 (%) 6.05 7.57 8.74 
No. of 
observations 291 272 247 
"': statistically significant at a:O,OI (two-tailed test) 
•• : statistically significant at a:O.OS (two-tailed test) 
• = statistically significant at a=O.1 0 (two-tailed test) 
3.9.1 Differences in Firms' Information Environments 
The results from Table 10 for new buy recommendations suggest that the 
CARs for SMALLSTX are 1.29% higher (t- statistic =2.21) than their 
larger counterparts at the time of the recommendation change (month 0). 
Thereafter, though the coefficients are in the expected direction they are 
not statistically significant. 
The results for new buy recommendations are not surprising as the results 
of Table 6 suggest that the market impact of buy recommendations is 
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impounded by the end of the first month after the recommendation 
change and, thereafter, there is evidence of price reversal. If this is the 
case it seems reasonable that the differential CAR attributable to 
"SMALLS TX" should dissipate after month one. 
As the differential CARs are not statistically significant we can conclude 
that the price reversal observable from Table 6 pertains to both the larger 
FTSE 100 stocks and their "smaller" counterparts in the FTSE Mid 250 
and below. 
Our results contrast with Stickel who documents that the incremental 
CARs associated with new buy recommendations for smaller stocks 
continues for at least 120 days after the recommendation change. 120 
days is the outer horizon of his event period. He concludes that the 
market is slow to assimilate the information in buy recommendations for 
smaller firms. 
For sell recommendations we find that SMALLSTX generate higher 
CARs for the month of the recommendation change and in each of the 
succeeding 6 months compared to their larger counterparts. The marginal 
CAR at the time of the recommendation change is -1.38% (t- statistic 
= 1.55) and thereafter continues to grow monotonically and is statistically 
significant. Stickel's results for new sell recommendations show that the 
incremental CAR is neither in the expected direction or statistically 
significant. 
Other studies on the market impact of brokers' recommendations are not 
comparable as they do not condition on size. 
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In summary, we find that the price response to recommendations is 
greater for "small" firms than for "large" firms, which is consistent with 
the information environment literature. In addition, there is a statistical 
difference in the post- recommendation drift conditioning on firm size i.e. 
smaller firms tend to generate bigger drifts than their larger counterparts. 
This is consistent with Lo and MacKinlay (1988) who document small 
firms exhibit greater short run price inertia than larger firms. 
Our results contrast with Stickel who only finds evidence of a differential 
response for buy recommendations. However, in interpreting Stickel's 
results, we need to be mindful of the potential methodological concerns 
we raised in respect of his study in section 3.2.5 above. 
3.9.2 Contemporaneous Earnings Forecast Revisions 
New recommendations have greater price impact if reinforced by a 
corroborating earnings forecast revision. New buy recommendations with 
an associated positive earnings forecast revision are associated with an 
incremental abnormal return of 0.71 % (t-statistic = 1.26), at the time of 
the recommendation change, compared to those buy recommendations 
that were either accompanied by no associated earnings forecast revision 
or a negative earnings forecast revision. 
In the following month the incremental CAR is 1.77% (t-statistic = 2.47). 
The CAR remains in expected direction and statistically significant 
thereafter with the exception of CAR (0,5). 
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In contrast to our results for frrm size where the differential CAR 
disappears in a statistical sense after month one, the incremental CAR 
associated with a contemporaneous positive earnings forecast revision 
issued with a buy recommendation continues to be significant up to the 
six month horizon of our study. 
New sell recommendations with an accompanying negative earnings 
forecast revision have a -3.17% (t -statistic =3.78) incremental CAR at 
the time of the recommendation change in comparison with those sell 
recommendations that either had no earnings forecast revision or a 
positive earnings forecast revision. The incremental CAR remains 
statistically significant for the entire 6-month horizon. 
Our results are consistent with Stickel (1995) and Stickel (1991) who 
found that positive abnormal returns follow positive earnings forecast 
revisions and negative abnormal returns follow negative earnings forecast 
revisions for approximately six months. 
Our results are consistent with Francis and Soffer (1997) who argue that 
recommendations and earnings forecast revisions both affect share prices 
and that the price reaction to both buy and sell recommendations is 
enhanced by same-sign evidence from an earnings forecast revision. 
Our results can also be compared with the post- earnings announcement 
drift (PAD) literature (e.g. Bernard and Thomas, 1989). 
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The UK evidence on the PAD documented by Hew, Skerratt, Strong and 
Walker (1996) suggests that there is only evidence of a PAD for smaller 
finns. In contrast we find evidence of PAD for both large and small 
finns. It must be noted, however, that our results are not strictly 
comparable to the PAD literature. This is because we deal with analysts' 
earnings forecast revisions that accompany their recommendations and 
not the earnings announcement per se which is the focus of the PAD 
literature. 
3.9.3 Existence of Investment Banking Relationship 
Our results for the impact of an investment banking relationship on the 
magnitude of the CARs are contrary to expectations. 
We expected that new buy recommendations for companies that are 
corporate clients of the stockbroking house should have negative 
differential CARs. In other words, we expected new buy 
recommendations issued in respect of corporate clients, on average, to 
underperform new buy recomm~ndations where no investment banking 
relationship exists. 
We find that whilst the coefficients are in the expected direction for all 
time periods they are not statistically significant or even close to being 
significant. 
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In this regard our results are similar to those reported in Dugar and 
Nathan (1995). They find that the difference between the market reaction 
to recommendations where an investment banking relationship exists and 
where it does not exist is in the expected direction but is not statistically 
significant. 
They argue that this may be attributable to their data source. They use 
brokerage reports from Investext as the source of their recommendation 
change. This creates a potential problem as the brokerage house reports 
were, in all probability, distributed orally to institutional investors prior to 
the written report. 
Our data does not suffer from this potential bias. We know the exact 
month of the recommendation change and find that there is no 
statistically significant differential CAR between those recommendations 
where an investment banking relationship exists and where it does not. 
Our results appear to suggest that analysts at least for buy 
recommendations do not appear to bias optimistically their 
recommendations where an investment banking relationship exists. 
This may be because of a counterveiling force that mitigates excessive 
optimism. An optimistic buy recommendation whilst satisfying the 
corporate client may reduce credibility for the analyst in the eyes of 
institutional investors resulting in loss of institutional loyalty and or 
lawsuits for potentially misleading recommendations. 
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Stickel does not include a dummy variable for the existence of an 
investment banking relationship in his regressions on the cross sectional 
detenninants of recommendation perfonnance, so we cannot compare our 
results to his. 
A stronger test would have been for new sell recommendations but, as 
pointed out in section 3.8.3 above, these are conspicuous by their 
absence! 
3.9.4 Stockbroking House Reputation 
The results suggest that contrary to expectations high stockbroking house 
reputation as proxied by the Extel sectoral rankings does not have any 
statistically significant on the CARs for new sell recommendations. 
Interestingly, for new buy recommendations the coefficients of the 
incremental CARs are positive except in the month of the 
recommendation change thus suggesting that there is a positive 
incremental CAR between those buy recommendations that are issued by 
houses with the highest Extel sectoral rankings and those buy 
recommendations issued by other houses. 
However, the coefficients are not statistically significant until CAR (0,4) 
to CAR (0,6). CAR (0,4) suggests that there is a + 1.85% (t-statistic 
= 1. 77) incremental CAR attributable to those new buy recommendations 
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that rank highest in the sectoral rankings over those that do not. The 
corresponding incremental CARs for CAR (0,5) and CAR(O,6) are 
+2.49% (t-statistic =2.20) and +2.31 % (t-statistic=2.03) respectively. 
These results suggest that for new buy recommendations it takes the 
market some time to distinguish between those buy recommendations that 
have superior investment value and those that do not. 
Our results, suggesting a differential impact of stockbroking house 
reputation on new buy and sell recommendations, are consistent with the 
arguments advanced by Francis and Soffer (1997) reviewed in Chapter 2. 
They argue that buy recommendations are, on average, less informative 
than sells as the analyst's environment encourages issuance of favourable 
information about fIrms. Therefore, stockbroking house reputational 
differences are more likely to be captured in the market's response to new 
buy recommendations than in the market's response to new sell 
recommendations. 
Other studies that compare the performance of recommendations across 
stockbroking houses generally conclude that a superior stockbroking 
house cannot be identifIed. 
Elton, Gruber and Grossman (1986) fInd no evidence that amongst their 
sample of 727 recommendations from 33 stockbroking houses that a 
superior stockbroking house can be identified or that one stockbroking 
house is consistently better than the others. 
Dimson and Marsh (1984) evaluate 4187 share price forecasts made by 
35 UK brokers during the calendar year 1980-1981. They fInd that 
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differences in the forecasting ability between brokers do not appear to 
persist over time. 
Stickel finds that for sell recommendations brokerage reputation as 
measured by their ranking on the II All American Research Team (the US 
equivalent of the Extel ranking) has no effect on differential CARs. 
However, for new buy recommendations he find a positive incremental 
CAR of 1.18% (t-statistic =2.55) at the time of the recommendation 
change but, for all subsequent periods the effect disappears suggesting 
that the reputation effect is short lived. 
Our results are consistent with Stickel (1995), Dimson and Marsh (1984), 
and Elton, Gruber and Grossman (1983) for sell recommendations. 
In contrast to Stickel we find that for new buys, rather than being short 
lived, the effect of superior reputation takes longer to be absorbed and 
appears to be permanent, or at least lasts out to the 6 month horizon of 
our study. 
3.9.5 Magnitude o/Revision in Recommendation 
As expected new buy recommendations that were originally sell 
recommendations generate higher incremental CARs than new buy 
recommendations that were originally hold recommendations. 
The incremental CAR in the month of the recommendation change is 
+ 3.460/0 (t-statistic =2.24) vis-a-vis those firms where the revision was 
from a hold to a buy. 
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It increases to 1l.1 % (t- statistic =3.64) for CAR (0,5) and to 14.l (t-
statistic =3.36) for CAR (0,6). However, these results must be interpreted 
cautiously as there are only 15 observations remaining in the 6th month 
after the recommendation change. 
In contrast for new sell recommendations there is no statistically 
significant differential CAR conditioning on whether the new sell 
recommendation was originally a buy recommendation or a hold 
recommendation. 
Therefore, our results are broadly consistent with Stickel but we must 
interpret our results cautiously as the sample sizes are small. 
3.10 Summary and Conclusions 
Our research into recommendation changes made by UK sell-side 
analysts indicate that share prices are significantly influenced by analysts' 
recommendation changes, not only at the time of the recommendation 
change but also in subsequent months. 
There is little evidence of "price following" behaviour for buy 
recommendations. For sell recommendations we find some evidence of 
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"price following" behaviour but we rationalise it as attributable to causes 
other than simply "price following". 
The price reaction to new sell recommendations is greater than the price 
reaction to new buy recommendations. We argue that this is associated 
with the potential costs of disseminating rather than gathering 
information per se. As new sell recommendations are less frequent and 
more visible an incorrect judgement on a sell recommendation is likely to 
be more costly to reputation than an incorrect buy recommendation when 
other analysts are likely to be making similar recommendations. Thus if 
the costs of issuing a sell recommendation are greater, then the analyst's 
expected return for issuing them will be greater as well. 
Even though the immediate price reactions are large, they appear to be 
incomplete showing considerable post- recommendation drift particularly 
for sell recommendations. We find that post- recommendation drift which 
appears analogous to the post- earnings announcement drift is not 
explained by a failure to control adequately for risk and hence may be 
suggestive of a delayed reaction hypothesis (Ball, 1992). 
In addition, we find that the magnitude of the abnormal returns generated 
by new buy and sell recommendations is influenced cross-sectionally by 
factors associated with a firm's information environment and the 
incentives literature. In particular we find that higher abnormal returns are 
generated by recommendations in respect of "smaller" ftrms and in 
circumstances where a contemporaneous same-sign earnings forecast 
revision accompanies the recommendation change and for those 
recommendation changes that skip a rank. 
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Analysts incur costs in acquiring, processing, and disseminating 
information to their clients. The issuance of new buy and sell 
recommendations has a substantial impact on prices both immediately 
and in subsequent months. The returns generated are consistent with 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) who argue that valuable information 
gathering should generate a return. 
In the next chapter we evaluate the role of the analyst in "relative" terms. 
We have shown that analysts' recommendations have investment value to 
the market. However, they may explain such a small proportion of 
company price movements that recommendations rank secondary to other 
more valuable information releases. In other words, how do analysts' 
recommendations and earnings forecast revisions rank relative to other 
categories of news that are released continuously throughout the financial 
year e.g. preliminary announcement, takeovers, management- related 
announcements etc. in explaining company price changes and trading 
volume movements. If analysts' recommendations and earnings forecast 
revisions explain only a small proportion of companies price changes 
during the course of a year the economic value of the analyst may be 
limited. This is despite the fact we have shown that the market values 
analysts' recommendations and earnings forecast revisions. 
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CHAPTER 4 
"RELA TIVE" VALUE OF SELL-SIDE ANALYSTS' 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND EARNINGS 
FORECAST REVISIONS IN DRIVING MARKET-
ADJUSTED COMPANY SHARE PRICE CHANGES 
AND TRADING VOLUME MOVEMENTS 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we evaluate the "relative" value of sell- side analysts' 
recommendations and earnings forecast revisions. Our results from the 
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last chapter suggest that sell- side analysts' recommendations have 
investment value in an "absolute" sense. We also demonstrate that the 
market responds to same- sign earnings forecast revisions, issued 
contemporaneously with investment recommendations. 
No existing research addresses the "relative" value of analysts' 
recommendations and earnings forecast revisions vis-a-vis other fIrm 
information sources in explaining stock specifIc returns during the course 
of a fInancial year. Such other information sources may include 
preliminary earnings announcements, interim earnings, AGMs, dividends, 
takeover bids, capital structure changes, trading in large blocks of shares, 
notifIcations of insider dealings, management changes, new product 
announcements etc. 
Weare concerned specifIcally in this chapter with how the price and/ or 
trading volume impact of analysts' recommendations and earnings 
forecast revisions compare with other categories of news that are released 
continuously throughout the fInancial year. 
We assess the "relative" significance of analysts' recommendations and 
earnings forecast revisions vis-a-vis other categories of news in 
explaining company-specifIc price changes and trading volume 
movements for 215 London Stock Exchange companies over the two-
year period 1 st January, 1994 to 31 st December, 1995. 
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The extant literature on the relationship between finn information and 
price/ trading volume activity gives prominence to a frrm's accounting 
releases in explaining company price changes and trading volume 
activity. However, accounting releases only take place at fixed intervals 
throughout the financial year and we argue that much of the infonnation 
content of these releases will be anticipated by the market and 
communicated via more timely sources. 
We argue that the sell-side analyst will playa major role in keeping the 
equity markets infonnationally efficient. The competitive advantage of 
the analyst may derive either from their superior infonnation processing 
skills (Merton, 1987) and/or from their preferential access to "private" 
information (Holland, 1998). In chapter 2 we show that the degree of 
analyst following is a critical component of a finn's information 
environment and that investors demand a risk premium, in terms of an 
increased return, for investing in stocks not closely followed by the 
community of investment analysts. Merton (1987) argues that the higher 
returns attributable to such factors as low PIE, may be associated with 
compensation for reduced infonnation availability. In this context the 
pivotal importance of the analyst as a key component of a finn's 
information environment is suggested by the dominance of analyst 
neglect over stock market anomalies namely size, low PIE and the 
January seasonal in explaining returns (Arbel, 1985). 
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As such we hypothesise that the size of (proxying for information 
content) of the price/ trading volume activity generated, will be larger for 
analysts' earnings forecast revisions and investment recommendations 
than for all other information events, including a fIrm's accounting 
information. 
No extant research on the market's response to analysts' investment 
recommendations investigates explicitly whether any price / trading 
volume activity apparently triggered by analysts' investment 
recommendations may, in fact, be triggered by other contemporaneous 
news announcements and not analysts' recommendations per se. Thus 
analysts may be "information followers" and may simply be 
piggybacking on publicly available information releases e.g. analysts 
issuing a buy recommendation on the same day as a company announces 
unexpectedly favourable preliminary results. We explicitly control for 
this possibility in our methodological design. 
The next section 4.2 reviews earlier work on the relationship between 
company information flows and related share price and trading volume 
activity. The following section places our work within the existing corpus 
and highlights our original contribution. Section 4.4 develops our 
hypotheses and the next section describes our methodology and data. 
Section 4.6 presents our empirical results. A summary and conclusion of 
our findings are provided in the final section of the chapter. 
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4.2 Relationship between Firm- Specific Information Flows and 
Share Price Performance and Trading Volume Movements 
4.2.1 Importance of Accounting Information 
Arguably, the most important company news releases relate to firms' 
accounting releases (interim results, preliminary results, annual report and 
accounts). 
The seminal study on the information content of the annual earnings 
announcement is Ball and Brown (1968). They demonstrate that the 
annual earnings announcement has information content as measured by 
the price response at the time of the release of the annual earnings. 
Firth (1981) examines the information content of the annual results, 
interim results and the annual report and accounts using UK data. He 
examines both the price and trading volume impact of these 
announcements for 120 companies using weekly data. His results 
demonstrate that, on average, firms' highest price and trading volume 
residuals are associated with the preliminary results (PA), interim report 
(rR) and annual report and accounts (ARA) respectively, thus suggesting 
that they are the most important sources of company news. 
Rippington and Taffler (1995) extend Firth's (1981) study by using daily 
data. Their sample consists of 337 UK companies. Their results confirm 
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the results of Firth in that the highest absolute price residuals are 
associated with the P A and the IR. 
However, a potential weakness of the methodology adopted by both Firth 
and Rippington and Taffler is, that in ranking their absolute return 
residuals, they do not explicitly take into account company news 
categories other than accounting releases. They simply calculate the 
average absolute return residuals associated with accounting releases and 
compare these to the average residuals generated, across their sample, for 
all other days during the course of the financial year. Thus those days on 
which valuable information is released are averaged with days on which 
little or no information is released, thus potentially concealing valuable 
information and biasing upwards the price residuals associated with 
firms' accounting releases. 
A better approach to assess the relative value of formal accounting 
information releases would be to include other potentially valuable news 
event categories, in addition to a firm's accounting releases, and compare 
the abnormal returns. 
We specifically address this issue in our study, as we argue that a firm's 
accounting releases, though valuable, are not a timely medium and that 
the market will anticipate much of the information content of such 
releases. Such anticipation will be reflected in the investment 
recommendations and earnings forecast revisions of the sell-side analyst 
to which the market will react. 
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4.2.2 Market Anticipation of Accounting Information 
In their seminal study, Ball and Brown (1968) argue that the market 
anticipates much of the information content of a firm's accounting 
releases days, weeks and even months prior to the actual announcement 
date. They investigate the timeliness and information content of the 
annual earnings announcement. Using the market model and monthly 
price data for a sample of 261 firms quoted on the NYSE they show that 
the market reacts to the earnings announcement up to 11 months prior to 
the announcement and continues to react for a period of approximately 
one month after the announcement. 
They conclude that 85% to 90% of the annual earnings announcement is 
captured prior to the date of its actual release. On this basis the annual 
earnings announcement has value but they question its timeliness: 
" However the annual report does not rate highly as a timely medium 
since most of its content is captured by more prompt media which 
includes interim reports." (p. 176) 
This view of the lack of timeliness of a firm's accounting disclosures is 
consistent with the findings of the literature on the earnings response co-
efficient (Beaver, Lambert, and Morse, 1980; Beaver, Lambert, Morse 
and Ryan, 1987; Kothari, 1992; Kothari and Sloan, 1992 and Donnelly 
and Walker, 1995). Interestingly, Donnelly and Walker, using UK data 
and a similar methodology to Kothari and Sloan, report that the extent to 
which prices anticipate earnings in the UK is less than that reported in the 
US. They do not specifically address the reasons for this difference, but 
speculate: 
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"In general, the effect could be due to differences in the information 
environment, or it could be due to differences between UK and US 
GAAP. " (p. 14) 
A key question is what other news categories contain information 
anticipating the information content of accounting disclosures, and hence 
trigger price and trading volume activity, prior to the formal release of the 
accounting results? In addition, are the information releases themselves 
the ultimate triggers of the market's response, or, alternatively their 
interpretation by the analyst? 
We argued in Chapter 2, in our discussion of Merton's (1987) model of 
capital market equilibrium in the presence of incomplete information, that 
the analyst may playa significant role in interpreting such information 
releases, particularly those of a complex nature. 
In addition, some information that may affect the accounting results may 
not become "publicly" available through conventional sources. In these 
circumstances, analysts may playa role in informing the market of this 
potentially valuable information. A potentially valuable source of 
information to the analyst is access to company management (Pike, 
Meerjanssen and Chadwick, 1993) who also have incentives to 
communicate certain types of information directly to a subset of analysts 
rather than to the market as a whole (Holland, 1998). 
In the next section, we review those studies that seek to establish the 
relationship between a set of potentially more timely news releases and 
company price movements and trading volume activity. We argue that 
these studies have potential deficiencies associated with them. In 
particular, they do not give prominence in their information event 
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classification schemes to the role of the analyst in explaining price and/or 
trading volume activity. 
4.2.3 Relationship between Company Price Changes and Trading Volume 
Movements and a "Comprehensive Set" of News Announcements 
We have argued that the lack of timeliness of a firm's accounting releases 
means that their information content may be incorporated into the share 
price by more timely news sources. 
Studies have documented the market impact of other types of firm 
specific news that are released continuously throughout the financial year 
such as takeover bids, rights issues, dividends, trading in large blocks of 
shares, notifications of insider dealings, management changes, 
stockbrokers recommendations and earnings forecast revisions, 
managers' profit forecasts etc. 
On the other hand, studies looking at the information content of a more 
"comprehensive set" of possible events of a firm specific nature are 
relatively few in number. Only three studies document the effect of a 
more comprehensive set of news announcements of company price and/or 
trading volume activity (Brookfield and Morris, 1992; Thompson, Olsen 
and Dietrich, 1987 and Morse, 1982a). 
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The motivation for these studies is that previous research examines the 
impact of various firm specific news releases in isolation, without regard 
to their relative importance vis-a-vis one another. 
All three studies start with a priori categories of news announcements and 
investigate whether they have information content in terms of abnormal 
price and/or trading volume response at the time of the release of the 
news to the market. 
Their classification schemes consist of 16, 12, and 9 news categories 
respectively. The detailed news categories employed in these studies are 
set out in Appendix 4. 
In each case the proxy for the time of release of news to the market is its 
publication date in the financial press. The US studies, Thompson, Olsen 
and Dietrich (1987) and Morse (1982a), use the publication date in the 
Wall Street Journal (WSJ) index. Brookfield and Morris (1992), using 
UK data, take the McCarthy Information fiche service as their 
information source and newspaper article publication date as the 
information release date. 
Typically company earnings announcements are employed as the 
benchmark and the market impact of other news announcements is 
established relative to the earnings announcement. Each of the three 
studies concludes that earnings announcements (annual, interim, and 
quarterly) convey the most value relevant information to the market. 
Other categories of news announcements generally have lower 
information content. 
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Brookfield and Morris (1992) is the only UK- based study and though it 
incorporates analysts' recommendations and earnings forecast revisions, 
these are amalgamated with forecasts and recommendations made by the 
newspapers themselves. Thompson, Olsen and Dietrich (1987) also 
consider sell-side analysts earnings forecasts but only as part of a 
category that also includes management forecasts. Morse (1982a) does 
not include analysts' investment recommendations or earnings forecast 
revisions as information events. 
4.3 Our Contribution to the Literature 
Extant work, as indicated above, does not give adequate prominence to 
the sell-side analyst. Our original contribution to the literature is that this 
chapter reports on the first true test of the relative importance of the sell-
side analyst in the equity markets. Specifically, though we also address, 
the relationship between a "comprehensive set" of news release and 
company price and trading volume behaviour, we explicitly include sell-
side analysts' investment recommendations and earnings forecast 
revisions as a separate information event category. 
In addition, we adopt an appropriate methodology for comparing the 
"relative" value of various company information releases to the market. 
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Our approach has a number of advantages over the traditional event study 
methodology used in earlier work. 
Extant research on the market's response to sell- side analysts' 
investment recommendations does not explicitly control for other 
contemporaneous news releases. Thus analysts may simply be changing 
their investment recommendations or revising their earnings forecasts at 
the same time as the market is responding to newly released company 
specific information. We specifically exclude all such investment 
recommendations from our study. 
In addition, we separately consider the relationship between company-
specific news categories and trading volume activity. There are arguably 
different interpretations associated with the price and the trading volume 
response to an "event". Price movements reflect a change in the market's 
consensus expectations generated by a news release (Beaver, 1968), 
whereas trading volume activity reflects changes in expectations of 
individual investors (heterogeneous expectations) consequent on the news 
release (Karpoff, 1986; Kim and Verrecchia, 1991). Thus, it is possible 
that an "event" may trigger a trading volume movement without any 
corresponding price change if, for example, investors interpret the 
"event" differently but, on average, the market average opinion does not 
change. 
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4.4 Hypotheses 
4.4.1 Proportion of Company Market-Adjusted Abnormal Price Changes 
and Trading Volume Movements Driven by Analysts' Recommendations 
and Earnings Forecast Revisions 
The link between company specific information flows and stock price and 
trading volume behaviour occupies a central position in the financial 
economics literature, with particular emphasis being placed on the role of 
firms' accounting releases. However, we argue that accounting releases, 
though an important source of company news, are not a timely source, 
and consequently, much of the news content will be anticipated by more 
timely news categories and that the activities of the sell-side analyst will 
playa major role in analysing and interpreting such timely news releases, 
particularly those of a complex nature (Merton, 1987). In addition the 
analyst may also act as a conduit for the dissemination of previously 
"private" information to the market (Fama, 1970; Holland, 1998). 
Therefore, we expect that analysts' recommendations and earnings 
forecast revisions will contain valuable information in their own right that 
will drive a significant proportion of company price changes and trading 
volume movements. 
Ho 1 : Analysts' earnings forecast revisions and investment 
Recommendations, not issued contemporaneously with other firm 
specific information releases, will not explain a significant 
proportion of companies' largest market- adjusted price and 
trading volume movements. 
137 
4.4.2 Relationship between Firm Size and the Proportion of Company 
Price Changes and Trading Volume Movements Driven by Analysts' 
Investment Recommendations and Earnings Forecast Revisions 
In the last subsection we argue that analysts' recommendation changes 
and earnings forecast revisions will an important news category in 
explaining company share price changes and trading volume activity in 
aggregate across all companies in the FTSE 100 and FTSE Mid 250 
indexes. In this subsection, we argue that analysts' earnings forecast 
revisions and investment recommendations will explain a greater 
percentage of price and trading volume movements for FTSE Mid 250 
stocks where there are fewer incentives for investors and the financial 
press to gather information (Grant, 1980; Thompson, Olsen and Dietrich, 
1987). FTSE Mid 250 stocks are still widely held by institutions (Gaved, 
1997), a factor which dominates size in explaining analysts' decisions to 
follow a stock (O'Brien and Bhushan, 1990). In other words, we argue 
that the larger FTSE 100 stocks should have rich information 
environments independently of analyst activity and therefore the analyst 
will playa larger role in gathering, interpreting, and disseminating 
information for "smaller" FTSE Mid 250 companies. 
Ho 2: There will be no difference in the proportion of companies' major 
price changes and trading volume movements driven by analysts' 
recommendations and earnings forecast revisions conditioning on 
company size. 
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4.4.3 Relative Size o/the Price (Trading Volume) Movements Associated 
with Analysts' Recommendations and Earnings Forecast Revisions vis-a-
vis other News Categories 
Analysts are a critical component of a firm's information environment. 
(Arbel, Carvell and Strebel, 1983; Arbel, 1985). Merton (1987) argues 
that the higher returns associated with such factors as analyst neglect, low 
market capitalisation, low PIE etc may be associated with compensation 
for reduced information availability. Arbel (1985) shows that the degree 
of analyst neglect dominates other stock market anomalies in explaining 
stock returns thus suggesting that the degree of analyst following is the 
best proxy of the variables tested by Arbel for the richness of a firm's 
information environment. 
Arguably, the most important company news releases relate to firms 
accounting releases. The information content of such releases is a major 
issue in the accounting literature (e.g. Ball and Brown, 1968; Beaver, 
1968; Firth, 1981; Rippington and Taffler, 1995). We hypothesise that a 
firm's accounting releases, though valuable, are not a timely source of 
company information. Much of the information content of such releases 
will be anticipated by the market, in particular through the investment 
recommendations and earnings forecast revisions of the sell-side analyst. 
On this basis, we hypothesise that the information content of analysts' 
earnings forecasts and investment recommendations will dominate the 
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information content of other firm information releases, including 
accounting releases. 
In this subsection we compare the size of the price/ trading volume 
movements generated by analysts' recommendations and compare them 
to the size of the price/ trading volume movements generated by the other 
major news categories. This provides insight into the marginal 
information content of analysts' recommendations and earnings forecast 
revisions relative to other information releases. In other words, the larger 
the price/ trading volume movement the greater the incremental news 
content of the news category. 
Ho 3: The size of the abnormal price changes and trading volume 
movements (proxies for information content) triggered by analysts' 
recommendations and earnings forecast revisions will not differ from the 
size of the price changes and trading volume movements triggered by a 
firm's accounting releases. 
Ho 4: The size of the abnormal price changes and trading volume 
movements (proxies for information content) triggered by analysts' 
recommendations and earnings forecast revisions will not differ from the 
size of the price changes and trading volume movements triggered by 
other company news categories. 
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4.5 Methodology and Data 
4.5.1 Company Selection 
Our sample consists of all industrial companies in the FTSE 100 and 
FTSE Mid 250 indices (excluding financials) for the two- year period 1 st 
January, 1994 to 31 st December, 1995. 
These are the largest capitalisation stocks in the UK and would be more 
likely to attract the attention of fund managers, stockbroking analysts and 
the financial press. Companies outside these indices are likely to have 
less rich information environments. They are likely to be followed by 
fewer analysts (O'Brien and Bhushan, 1990), attract less interest from 
institutional investors (Arbel, Carvell and Strebel, 1983 and O'Brien and 
Bhushan, 1990), and, importantly from our point of view, receive less 
coverage in the financial press and company news sources generally 
(Grant, 1980~ Thompson, Olsen and Dietrich, 1987). We explore the 
relationship between firm size and the incentives for gathering, 
processing and disseminating infonnation explicitly in Chapter 2. 
The original sample consisted of 254 industrial companies was narrowed 
down to 215 with companies in the original list eliminated for the 
following reasons: 
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(1) If share price or trading volume data was not available for the 
company for the full period 1 S\ January, 1993 to 31 st December, 1995, 
and/or 
(2) The company itself was not in existence for the entire period of the 
study, or had merged or de- merged. 
The sectoral decomposition of the 215 companies in our sample is 
presented in Table 12. 
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Table 12 
Sectoral Decomposition of Our Sample Companies 
Stock Exchange Sector 
Building and Construction 
Building Materials 
Chemicals 
Diversified Industrials 
Electronic and Electrical 
Engineering 
Engineering, Vehicles 
Printing, Paper and Packaging 
Textiles 
Breweries 
Spirits, Wines and Ciders 
Food Manufacturers 
Household Goods 
Healthcare 
Pharmaceuticals 
Tobacco 
Distributors 
Leisure and Hotels 
Media 
Retailers, Food 
Retailers, General 
Support Services 
Transport 
Electricity 
Gas Distribution 
Telecommunications 
Water 
Property 
Extractive 
Oil, Integrated 
Oil, E?,9?loration 
Total 
143 
Number of Companies 
8 
15 
9 
12 
5 
18 
3 
6 
3 
8 
3 
11 
1 
5 
2 
1 
7 
6 
17 
6 
17 
6 
9 
7 
2 
3 
7 
9 
2 
3 
4 
215 
4.5.2 Identification of Abnormal Price Outliers 
We adopt an appropriate methodology for comparing the "relative" value 
of various company information releases to the market. 
We identify price and trading volume "outliers" as the independent 
variables and then determine what company specific news categories, if 
any, are associated with these "outliers". To identify the price and trading 
volume outliers we find the largest 5% market- adjusted price and trading 
volume movements for each of the 215 companies in our sample over the 
two-year period. 
Using this methodology we do not need to generate a list of a priori 
categories of events expected to generate price and/or trading volume 
movements. Previous studies such as Brookfield and Morris are open to 
the possibility that any news releases they do not consider may generate 
greater price activity than their pre-specified news categories. Our 
methodology ensures, that insofar as is possible, we have a more 
complete picture of the news categories driving companies major price 
changes and trading volume movements. Thus we are not open to the 
potential criticism that other news categories not taken into account may 
dominate analysts' recommendations and earnings forecast revisions in 
explaining company price changes and trading volume activity. 
We seek to identify the largest company specific price changes and 
trading volume movements generated each year for each of the 215 
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companies in our sample. To do this we need to define the return-
generating model and the procedure for identifying "price outliers". 
4.5.2.1 Return-Generating Model 
We employ the market model with no intercept tenn to eliminate that 
component of a company's price movement that is attributable to the 
market as a whole. 
The market model approach is consistent with the methodology employed 
by Brookfield and Morris (1992) and Morse (1982a). Thompson, Olsen 
and Dietrich (1987) use raw returns unadjusted for market movements. 
No intercept tenn is calculated. The same arguments apply as in Section 
3.5.7 of the last chapter. 
A prior period beta is used as it represents our proxy of the markets ex 
ante estimate of a company's market risk for the forthcoming period. In 
addition, using a contemporaneous beta would mean that the "event 
period" itself is included in the "estimation period" for beta and thus this 
beta would be influenced by events occurring within the event period. It 
is desirable to prevent this simultaneous detennination from occurring. 
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Daily share price data was obtained from FT EXTEL. Daily trading 
volume data and dividend data were obtained from Datastream 
International. The Financial Times Actuaries All Share Index is used as 
the market index. 
The abnonnal return metric employed is defined as follows: 
U i,t = AR i,t - ER i,t (8) 
where 
U i,t = the abnormal return associated with company i on day t 
AR i t = actual return for company i on day t 
, 
ER i,t = expected return for company i on day t 
The expected return generating model is as follows: 
ER i,t = Pi R m,t (9) 
where 
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R m t = return on the FT All Share Index on day t 
J3i = LBS beta coefficient for company i 
Betas are obtained from the London Business School (LBS) Risk 
Measurement Service (RMS). We use the company beta estimate from 
the January-March, 1994 RMS book as our proxy for the market's ex ante 
estimate of systematic risk for the calendar year 1994. The January-
March book is based on share price movements up to and including 31 st 
December, 1993. Similarly, we use the January-March, 1995 book as the 
corresponding estimate of systematic risk for the 1995 calendar year. 
As explained in section 3.5.7 of the last chapter returns are calculated 
using log prices, adjusted for dividends as follows: 
where: 
In = natural log 
Pt =price in time period t 
Ot = dividend in time period t 
t= time on a daily basis 
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(10) 
4.5.2.2 Identification of Outliers 
We seek to identify the largest company- specific price changes by 
isolating those market- adjusted price movements that are in excess of 
two standard deviations from the average residual value. It is expected 
that these price movements, given their size, should be associated with 
firm specific news releases and not attributable to noise. 
If returns are normally distributed these residuals will lie in the 2 Y2 
percent tails of the normal distribution. As there are approximately 250 
trading days in the year, we will have approximately 12 observations per 
company per year. 
Diagnostic tests confirm that the market model residuals generated can 
reasonably be characterised as being normally distributed and the 
residuals fall within acceptable limits for kurtosis (less than 3) and 
skewness (not exceeding 1.2). 
The standard deviations used to identify the residuals are based on the 
standard deviations from the previous calendar year. Thus, for example 
the British Telecom price outliers for 1994 are estimated by initially 
calculating the market- adjusted returns by running the market model for 
the 1994 period as outlined above. Next, we apply the standard deviations 
generated from the market model residuals in the 1993 calendar year and 
identify all residual price movements for 1994 that lie in excess of two 
standard deviations from the mean residual. (We use 1993 standard 
deviations to identify the 1994 outliers as the 1993 standard deviations 
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are our proxy of the market's ex ante measure of British Telecom's 
market-adjusted price variability in 1994). 
4.5.3 Trading Volume Movements 
In our study we separately consider the relationship between company-
specific news categories and trading volume activity. Morse (1982a) is 
the only one of the three "comprehensive" studies that considers trading 
volume but as we previously mentioned he does not treat analysts' 
recommendations and earnings forecast revisions as one of his news 
categories. 
The following model derived from Morse (1980, 1982a,b), Bamber 
(1986, 1987) and Ziebert (1990) is used to calculate the market-adjusted 
trading volume residuals for the 215 firms over the two- year period 
1994- 1995. 
The abnormal volume metric employed is defined as: 
Ai,t =A V i,t - EV i,t (11) 
where: 
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A i,t = abnormal volume residual for company i on day t 
A V i,t = actual proportion of the shares of company i trading on day t 
EV i,t =expected proportion of the shares of company i trading on day t 
The expected volume- generating model is: 
EV i,t = Yi + Oi V m,t (12) 
where: 
EV i,t = expected proportion of the shares of company i trading on day t, 
V m,t = proportion of total shares traded on LSE on day t, and 
Yi, ,OJ = the intercept and slope estimates respectively. 
Trading volume data was obtained from Datastream. 
Trading volume delta factors are calculated using daily data observations 
for the previous calendar year. Thus in equation 12 we use the "delta" 
coefficient generated from the 1993 calendar year regression as our proxy 
for how company trading volume varies with market trading volume for 
the 1994 calendar year. This approach is analogous to that adopted for 
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price outlined in section 4.5.2.1 above. (The average coefficient of 
determination for the market-adjusted trading volume regression is 80/0 
with a range from zero to 30%. These results are consistent with previous 
research using daily data (Bamber, 1986, Morse, 1982(b)) The slope 
coefficient (OJ) is significant at 0.=0.05 in all but 6% of cases whilst the 
intercept term (yj) is only significant at 0.=0.05 in 3% of cases). 
However, isolating the volume residuals involves two issues that are not 
present in the calculation of the price residuals: 
(1) Trading volume may not be normally distributed. 
(2) A two- tailed test is inappropriate, as only the largest market-adjusted 
volume residuals are relevant for our study. Thus large volume 
residuals will be driven by either positive or negative firm- specific 
news. 
Accordingly, volume outliers are identified based on the number of 
abnormal price movements observed for each firm for each year. Thus, if 
a firm has 12 abnormal price outliers in 1994 and 13 abnormal price 
outliers in 1995, then the 12th and 13th largest market- adjusted trading 
volume movements for 1994 and 1995 respectively are chosen for the 
purposes of our study. 
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4.5.4 Event Window 
In order to capture the firm- specific news event driving the abnormal 
price movements and trading volume activity a five-day window either 
side of the abnormal price movement or trading volume movement is 
employed. In line with absence of price/trading volume activity taking 
place outside an II-day window in the three related studies discussed 
above, an II-day window centred on the date of the abnormal price 
change or trading volume movement is employed in our study. 
Price changes prior to public announcement can occur when some subset 
of investors receives a signal prior to public announcement. It is also 
possible that there is a time delay between the actual information release 
event and its formal publication in the media. 
A change in price in the days following a public announcement could 
imply delays in the dissemination of the information, the release of 
further corroborating information later, or alternatively, investors may 
require an information processing period to absorb the implications of the 
information release. 
In addition news may come o~t on a Saturday or Sunday. In this case 
there will be no price reaction until the Monday, an apparent one or two 
day lag as a result of the market's closure over the weekend. 
Trading activity may also occur prior to a public announcement because 
of differences in beliefs about the probability of different signals being 
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emitted by the announcement. These differences may be attributable to 
the asymmetric distribution of the information prior to its announcement. 
Trading volume following the announcement may be due to different 
interpretations of the announcement and/or investors returning to 
balanced portfolio positions after taking speculative positions prior to the 
announcement. 
We find that 73% (71 010) of "explained" company specific news items in 
our sample occur either on the same day or within one day either side of 
the price (trading volume) movement. This percentage increases to 90% if 
a three-day window either side of the event day is employed (Appendix 
5). 
-1.5.5 Sources of Company-Specific Information Releases 
Having identified the largest market- adjusted price changes and trading 
volume movements the next step is to associate these with company news 
items. 
It is crucial that that our sources of company specific information capture 
all value relevant information releases. There are four key information 
sources in the UK: 
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(1) London Stock Exchange News Announcements available on FT 
Graphite 
(2) Financial Times on CD ROM 
(3) McCarthy Information Fiche available on CD ROM 
(4) Reuters 
The fIrst three sources are equivalent to those employed in previous 
studies. Morse (1982) and Thompson, Olsen and Dietrich (1987) use the 
Wall Street Journal Index whilst BrookfIeld and Morris (1992) use the 
McCarthy Information Fiche. The Wall Street Journal is the US 
equivalent of the Financial Times. We use the fIrst three databases as our 
primary sources of company news. We investigate the incremental 
information content of Reuters on a pilot basis only, as it is not generally 
available for academic research purposes. 
-1.5.5.1 FT Graphite 
FT Graphite contains a listing of all the mandated company news 
announcements by the London Stock Exchange. 
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4.5.5.2 Financial Times 
The Financial Times (FT) is one of the world's leading business 
newspapers. The Financial Times on CD ROM is a huge database of 
financial and economic news, providing essential and timely information 
for the analysis of business events and trends, both international and UK 
based. Archive disks from 1988 are available. The FT is the UK 
equivalent of the Wall Street Journal. 
4.5.5.3 McCarthy Information Fiche 
McCarthy Information fiche is a unique compilation of company, 
industry, and market information and news and is one of Europe's leading 
databases of company and industry information. More than 150,000 
articles are selected from more than 40 newspapers and business 
magazines each year, indexed by company name, industry, country, and 
type of news. McCarthy also includes articles from the Financial Times 
but its coverage is not complete. 
4.5.5.4 Reuters 
Reuters is one of the world's leading news agencies with 216 bureaux 
serving 157 countries. Reuters is a major source of financial information 
with data sourced from 267 exchanges and OTC markets worldwide. 
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4.5.6 Categorisation of Events 
The ultimate objective is to assign all abnormal price and trading volume 
outliers to one of a number of exhaustive and mutually exclusive 
categories of frrm specific information release using the information 
sources specified in section 4.5.5 above. 
The initial classification scheme for news items is based on categories of 
events drawn from the three previous studies on the relationship between 
news releases and price andlofvolume behaviour (Brookfield, and 
Morris, 1992; Thompson, Olsen, and Dietrich, 1987; and Morse, 1982). 
(See Appendix 4). This initial classification scheme was augmented by 
those additional news categories suggested by our sample of stockbroking 
analysts in chapter 5 as being important (See Table 24). 
In cases where a news event could not be assigned to any of these sources 
additional news categories were created. To ensure accurate and unbiased 
classification of news items to information categories a research assistant 
(MSc. student) was employed and the senior researcher audited on a 
100% basis the assignments made. 
In most cases classification of the information event was self-
explanatory, e.g. release of the preliminary results. However, in other 
cases some interpretation of the news items was necessary prior to 
assignment to categories. In these cases, the press comment was retained 
and the two researchers independently assigned the news items to 
information categories. Once this process was complete the researchers 
discussed and agreed their assignments. A third researcher was asked to 
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adjudicate on the news content of those articles where the fIrst two 
researchers were unable to agree (less than 1 % of cases). In some cases it 
was not possible to allocate a news item to one specific category and, in 
such cases, (less than 5% of the total) the price or trading volume 
movement was allocated to more than one news category. 
The final list of categories (32 in total) is contained in Appendix 6 
together with a brief description of the types of news items assigned to 
the various categories. 
4.5.6.1 News Categorisation Strategy and Examples 
Where there is more than one news announcement for each price or 
trading volume outlier within the +/- 5 day timeframe, the news 
announced on the date nearest day zero takes precedence over other 
announcements. Day zero is the event date and not its publication date. 
Thus, for example, an event published in the Financial Times on a 
Tuesday is assumed to take place on the Monday, unless the FI indicates 
that the event date was earlier. 
For example, an announcement taking place on day + I is given 
precedence over an announcement taking place on day +2. 
This rule applies unless the press comment itself suggests that the later 
event was the ultimate trigger of the move and that for some reason there 
was a delay in reaction. 
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In circumstances where a price or trading volume move appears to be 
triggered by two events occurring equidistant to the date of the price or 
trading volume movement then they are both treated as the ultimate 
trigger unless surrounding press comment tends to suggest otherwise. An 
example of this is where there are two potential events one occurring on 
day +2 and one occurring on day -2. Thus we do not give precedence to 
those events that may imply possible insider information (price/ trading 
volume movement occurring before the event) over those events that may 
imply delay in information processing (price/ trading movement 
occurring after the event). Both are treated equally. 
However, in cases where it appears that the event occurs before the price 
movement simply because the event is published over the weekend, when 
the Stock Exchange is closed, we adjust the publication date accordingly. 
Thus if a price movement occurs on a Monday and an "event" is 
published on a Saturday we assume that the event was published on the 
Monday. 
In cases where two or more announcements take place on the same date, 
then precedence is given to the 'ultimate trigger' of the event. One typical 
example is where there is an analyst's recommendation along with an 
earnings announcement. In such cases, the analyst's recommendation, 
unless specifically indicated to the contrary, is assumed to be triggered by 
the earnings announcement. In most cases this is not problematical, as the 
press comment will usually quote from the broker indicating that the 
stock was rerated based on the results. 
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In the same way where an "event" occurs on the same day as a director's 
share deal precedence is given to the "event". This is because a director's 
share deal is not of itself an economic event. It is only a proxy for 
information. 
Dividend announcements are typically made at the same time as earnings 
announcements. Therefore, they are indistinguishable from the 
information content of earnings and are consequently assigned to the 
earnings announcement category. 
4.5.6.2 Analysts' Recommendations and Earnings Forecast Revisions 
Given the importance of the sell- side analyst in our study we review here 
in detail how we decided whether a price change or trading volume 
movement is driven by an analyst's investment recommendation or 
earnings forecast revision. 
A cursory examination of the text of stockbrokers' recommendations 
reveals that a proportion of stockbroker buy recommendations represent a 
belief that the market has overreacted to past bad news. Our results in 
chapter 3 on the "absolute" value of sell-side analysts' buy 
recommendations are consistent with this (section 3.7.1). 
If there is a buy recommendation and two days before this there is a 
negative share price movement, the buy recommendation may have been 
triggered by the price decline and not vice versa. The same reasoning 
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applies to positive price movements occurring before stockbrokers sell 
recommendations. 
Additionally, if a negative price movement follows a stockbroker's buy 
recommendation or a positive price movement follows a stockbrokers sell 
recommendation, the stockbroker's recommendation is not recorded as 
the ultimate trigger even if no other events occur in the II-day window. 
This is because the price movement is in the wrong direction. Thus we 
would hypothesise that some other unobservable event is triggering the 
price movement not the stockbroker's recommendation. 
In summary, therefore, in order for a stockbroker's recommendation to be 
regarded as the ultimate trigger of a price movement, a buy (sell) 
recommendation must be accompanied by a positive (negative) price 
movement occurring either before or after the recommendation. 
A positive (negative) price movement occurring before an analyst's buy 
(sell) recommendation may be consistent with prior dissemination to 
clients whilst a positive (negative) price movement after the 
recommendation may be consistent with a delay in information 
processing. 
4.5.7 Completeness of Our Information Sources in Picking up those News 
Items Explaining Company Price Changes and Trading Volume 
Movements 
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Table 13 reports that, across our entire sample, 240/0 of abnormal price 
movements and 260/0 of abnormal trading volume movements are 
apparently not related to our sources of reported news. However, the 
proportions "unexplained" differ considerably across index membership. 
Table 13 
Proportion of Price Changes (Trading Volume Movements) that are 
Apparently Unexplained by Publicly Available Information 
All companies 
FTSE 100 
FTSE Mid 250 
Price Volume 
Changes Movements 
24% 
9% 
32% 
26% 
12% 
33% 
The results presented in Table 13 raise potential concerns as to whether 
our methodological approach has enabled us to pick up substantially all 
available sources of "publicly" available information to match to 
company price changes and trading volume activity. 
We investigate several possibilities for this apparent lack of 100% 
association between news events and price and trading volume 
movements: 
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(1) Industry co-movement not picked up by the financial press 
(2) Limitations associated with our sources of company related news 
(3) Factors associated with a company's information environment 
These issues are discussed below in separate subsections. 
4.5.7.1 Industry Co-Movement 
Previous research documents that industry co-movement may have 
additional explanatory power over the market alone in explaining share 
returns (e.g. Rosenberg and Guy, 1976~ Draper, 1975). Draper (1975), 
using UK data, shows that on average 550/0 of share price movements can 
be explained by market wide effects, a further 15% by industry factors, 
and the residual 30%, by firm specific news. 
Foster (1986) argues that such industry co-movement may arise when the 
information releases of firm j are used to make inferences about the share 
price of fum i. For example, firm j's earnings releases could convey 
information about how movements in key variables are affecting 
profitability of other firms in an industry. A second reason is that firmj's 
release could convey information about competitive shifts in an industry~ 
for example, a report by a maj<:>f firm in an industry that it had increased 
its earnings and sales, in an industry with low overall growth, could 
convey favourable information about that frrm but negative information 
for other firms in that industry. 
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We investigate the possibility that industry co-movement that is not 
picked up and reported by the financial press may account for a 
proportion of our unexplained price movements. 
To do this we include the relevant Stock Exchange index for the sector of 
which the company is a member as an additional variable in our market 
model outlined in equation 9 above. These indices are sourced from FT 
Extel. Then we recalculate the residuals assuming that each company has 
a beta of one with the industry index. 
Revised equation 9 is as follows: 
ER i,t = Pi R m,t + Dn en,t (13) 
where 
ER i,t = expected return for company i on day t 
R m,t = return on the FT All Share Index on day t, 
Pi = LBS beta coefficient for company i, and 
Dn, =an industry dummy which equals one if company i is a member of 
industry n and 0 otherwise 
f:n,t = return on the relevant orthogonalised* FT sectoral index on day t. 
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(* En,t are the residuals from the regression of the industry sector index 
(dependent variable) on the FT All share index (independent variable). 
The residuals from this regression represent that part of the industry 
sector return that is not driven by the market, thus avoiding the possible 
double counting of the market impact in equation 13). 
The abnormal return metric employed is defined as follows: 
U i,t = AR i,t - ER i,t (14) 
where 
U i t = the abnormal return associated with company i on day t 
AR i t = actual return for company i on day t 
, 
In more than 900/0 of cases we are left with the same days generating the 
highest residuals (U i,t) as we obtained using equation 9, before the 
sectoral index is added, indicating that our original results are not 
substantially affected by industrywide co-movement. Thus we can 
conclude that unreported "industry transfer" effects are not important 
factors in providing explanations for our "unexplained" price movements. 
It is not possible to apply this approach to trading volume movements as 
indices are not available for industry trading volume. 
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These results are not surprising as even though firms are in the same 
industry they may be exposed to different economic factors. For example, 
comovements in the "Building and Construction" sector may be affected 
by regional considerations. 
In addition, some Stock Exchange sectors that are nominally sectors have 
companies that are not operating in similar lines of business. Examples 
include sectors such as "Diversified Industrials", "Leisure and Hotels", 
"Support Services", "Distributors". For instance how does one compare 
First Choice Holidays with Manchester United even though they are both 
in the "Leisure and Hotels" sector? 
Also, even in apparently cohesive sectors a comparison of the SIC codes 
for companies in the sector can throw up some interesting differences. As 
a result it is entirely possible that only a few firms within a sector may 
move together and that these movements are uncorrelated with other 
firms in the sector. 
F or both price and volume, we investigate this possibility for the four 
sectors in our sample (see Table 12) that have 15 or more companies that 
are constituents of the FTSE 100 or FTSE Mid 250 indexes: Building 
Materials~ Engineering, General; Media; and Retailers, General. We 
attempt to match the "unexplained" price movements for companies in 
these sectors to price movements occurring in other companies in our 
sample that are in the same sector. We employ a three- day window 
centring on each "unexplained" movement to allow for "industry 
transfer" delays. We find that less than 70/0 of "unexplained" price 
changes can be matched, on this basis, with equivalent price changes in 
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other companies in the sector, thus suggesting that unreported intra-
industry co-movement is not a major factor in providing explanations for 
"unexplained" price changes. 
The same test is applied for trading volume activity and the same 
conclusions are drawn. 
Thus, in summary, using both approaches outlined in this subsection, our 
results suggest that our "unexplained" price and trading volume 
movements (residuals) are not explained, to any great extent, by industry 
co-movement that is not picked up and reported on by our sources of 
company news. 
4.5.7.2 Limitations Associated With Our Sources o/Company Related 
News 
Another possibility for the unexplained price and trading volume 
movements is that they are explicable by publicly available information 
but that our three databases are not complete. 
Reuters Business Briefing (RBB) is the most detailed information source 
available, although it is not generally available for academic research 
purposes. 
We test on a pilot basis, for three companies whether "unexplained" 
movements can be explained by news events reported on RBB. 
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We find that for the three companies concerned very little incremental 
information of a value relevant nature appears to be reported that can 
explain our "unexplained" movements. 
We conclude even the use of Reuters, were this available, is unlikely to 
add much value to our study. 
4.5. 7.3 Firms' Information Environments 
Another possibility for these "unexplained" movements may arise from 
the differential incentives for information gathering for large and small 
firms (Freeman, 1987; Atiase, 1980). 
Thompson, Olsen and Dietrich (1987) show that larger firms receive 
greater coverage in the Wall Street Journal Index than smaller firms do. 
In addition to firm size, index membership can also affect a firm's 
information environment. McIlkenny, Opong and Watson (1996) shows 
that companies entering and leaving the FTSE 100 index generate 
positive and negative residuals ,respectively. This is attributed to the 
attention focused on FTSE 100 stocks by fund managers, both for 
indexing, and stock selection purposes. 
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Therefore, we argue that there should be an inverse relationship between 
the percentage of company price movements "unexplained" and market 
capitalisation and membership of the FTSE 100 index. 
A similar reasoning follows for trading volume movements that are 
"unexplained" . 
The regression equations are: 
%Price = Yo + YILn(MV)+y2 FTSE 
0/0 Vol = Y3 + Y4 Ln(MV)+ys FTSE 
where: 
%Price = price movements unexplained per company expressed as a 
percentage of the total number of price movements 
(15) 
(16) 
010 Vol = trading volume movements unexplained per company expressed 
as a percentage of the total number of volume movements 
Ln(MV) = Natural log of fIrm capitalisation 
FTSE = Dummy variable which equals 1 if the fIrm is a member of the 
FTSE 100 index and 0 otherwise 
Yo, Yl, Y2, Y4, Y5, Y6 =regression parameters to be estimated. 
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The results are reported in Table 14 below. 
Table 14 
Regressions of Percentage Pricel Trading Volume Movements 
Unexplained on Log of Market Capitalisation and FTSE 100 
Membership 
Dependent t -Statistic Dependent t-Statistic 
Variable Variable 
"% Price" "%Volume" 
Intercept 0.87 10.37*" 0.95 11.94"* 
CAP -0.09 -6.55*** -0.09 -7.88*** 
FTSE -0.08 -2.61*** -0.05 -1.54 
R2 44% 46% 
No. of 
observations 215 215 
... = significant at the a~ 0.01 
Table 14 shows that there is a negative relationship between 
"lUlexplained" price movements ("%Price") and market capitalisation and 
membership of the FTSE 100 (a=O.OI). In other words, there is a very 
strong positive relationship between firm size and membership of the 
FTSE 100 index and the number of price changes that are traceable to our 
sources of "publicly" available information. 
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For trading volume, firm size, as measured by the log of a firm's market 
capitalisation, is negatively related (a=O.OI) to the percentage of 
company trading volume movements unexplained ("0/0 Volume") as 
expected. However, the relationship between FTSE 100 membership and 
the percentage of trading volume movements unexplained, though in the 
expected direction, is not statistically significant at conventional levels 
but is close to being so. 
We conclude that our "unexplained" price and trading volume 
movements are consistent with the inverse relationship between firm size 
and the incentives to gather and report company information (Freeman, 
1987 ~ Thompson, Olsen and Dietrich, 1987 and Atiase, 1980). 
Together with the results obtained in Sections 4.5.7.1 and 4.5.7.2, we 
argue that alternative information sources, or industry- adjusted return 
generating models, are unlikely to add value in providing explanations for 
"unexplained" price movements and trading volume activity. 
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4.6 Results 
4.6.1 Proportion o/Company Market-Adjusted Abnormal Price Changes 
and Trading Volume Movements Driven by Analysts' Recommendations 
and Earnings Forecast Revisions 
Table 15 (Table 16) below summarises those events driving more than 
50/0 of those price (trading volume) movements that could be traced to 
publicly available information sources. These information events are 
described in Table 17. 
The top eight (seven) categories represent 68.9% (66.3%) of total 
"explained" price (trading volume) movements with the remaining 24 
(25) categories in Appendix 7 (Appendix 8) explaining the remaining 
31.1% (33.7%). 
Table 15 
Summary of the Major News Categories Driving Abnormal Share 
Price Movements for All Companies 
Event category N • % 
Analysts 
Director share dealing 
Bids 
Preliminary results 
Interim results 
Share deals 
Management changes 
Financing issues 
Total 
772 
404 
363 
349 
328 
296 
223 
205 
2940 
18.1% 
9.5% 
8.5% 
8.2% 
7.7% 
6.9% 
5.2% 
4.8% 
68.9% 
• The percentage the category represents of total 
explained price movements. 
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Table 16 
Summary of the Major News Categories Driving Trading Volume 
Movements for All Companies 
Category N * % 
Analysts 684 16.50% 
Director share dealing 453 10.89% 
Share deals 415 9.98% 
Bids 375 9.02% 
Preliminary results 316 7.60% 
Interim results 285 6.85% 
Financing issues 230 5.50% 
Total 2758 66.34% 
• The percentage the category represents of total 
explained volume movements 
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Table 17 
Descriptions of News Items Included in the Major Information Event 
Categories Reported in Tables 15 and 16 
Analysts: sell-side analysts' investment recommendations and earnings forecast 
: revisions 
i Director share dealing: the granting/exercise of share options together with 
directors' share purchases and sales. 
: Bids: announcements in relation to takeover and acquisition activity including 
• references to bid launches; pronouncements regarding acceptance/rejection of offers; 
i Takeover Panel statements; DTI approvaVrejection etc. News items relating to bid 
! rumours are included in the "speculation about bidS/disposals" news category. 
Preliminary earnings: Announcements of results!dividends for the financial year. 
Interim earnings: announcements of interim results/dividends. 
Share deals: news relating to large trading volume activity in a company's shares-
principally institutional purchases/sales. Excluded are new share issues which are 
dealt with as part of the "financing" category. 
Management changes: News items relating to appointments! dismissals/ retirements 
: from senior management and the board of directors. Also included is news relating to 
changes in managerial compensation packages. Excluded are share options granted to 
directors which are included in the "director share dealing" category. 
• Financing: Issues relating to new share capital (equity, bonds, bank loans etc); 
restructuring of existing share capital including share repurchase Warrants. Options 
.g!.anted to directors are included under "director share dealing"}. 
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We are forced to reject the null hypothesis Ho 1 that analysts' 
recommendations and earnings forecast revisions will not generate a 
significant proportion of companies' major price changes and trading 
volume activity. 
Analysts' recommendations and earnings forecast revisions constitute 
18% of total "explained" price changes and 16% of total "explained" 
trading volume movements. Therefore, consistent with our expectations, 
analysts' recommendations and earnings forecast revisions have a 
significant effect both on the markets consensus expectations (price 
changes) and, in addition, significantly alter investors' idiosyncratic 
beliefs. These proportions represent analysts' recommendations and 
earnings forecast revisions that do not occur simultaneously with other 
firm specific news releases and, therefore, may be regarded as indicative 
that analysts do have superior information processing skills and! or access 
to "private" information and do not simply piggyback on other news 
releases. 
Our results contrast with Brookfield and Morris (1992) and Thompson, 
Olsen and Dietrich (1987) who did not find significant price activity 
associated with analysts' recommendations and earnings forecast 
revisions. However, as we previously report neither study includes 
analysts' earnings forecast revisions and recommendations as a separate 
news category of their own right. Analysts are amalgamated with 
management forecasts in Thompson, Olsen and Dietrich and with 
newspaper predictions in Brookfield and Morris. 
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Another potential problem associated with both the studies of Brookfield 
and Morris, and Thompson, Olsen and Dietrich is that they apply the 
standard event study methodology whereby, for each news category, 
returns are averaged cross-sectionally on the publication date to assess 
whether such returns are statistically significant. This approach, however, 
assumes there is no leakage of the information prior to its public 
disclosure, or assimilation delays in the interpretation of the information 
content of the news release or, alternatively, if there is a leakage or delay 
in assimilating information it is systematic. For example, if all analysts' 
recommendations are disseminated to clients one day prior to "public" 
disclosure abnormal price activity will occur on day -1, but if some were 
disclosed on day -1, others on day -2 etc. daily cross sectional averaging 
may suggest that they have little or no information content whereas, in 
fact, they do. 
Prior disclosure may particularly be a problem in relation to analysts' 
investment recommendations where they have incentives to disseminate 
such releases to their clients prior to the market as a whole. This is 
evident from studies examining the price/ trading volume impact of the 
secondary dissemination of analysts' recommendations in the financial 
press which document price movement prior to "public" disclosure (e.g. 
Davies and Canes, 1978; Bauman, Datta, and Iskander-Datta, 1995). 
Interestingly, this difference in methodological approach adopted in our 
study may also explain why management related news, which is 
hypothesised by both Thompson, Olsen and Dietrich (1987) and 
Brookfield and Morris (1992) to have an impact on company price 
activity but did not appear to do so. Appendix 5 of our study shows that 
the "management changes" news category is associated with one of the 
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smallest contemporaneous associations with price and trading volume 
activity consistent with both prior leakage and delays in assimilation. We 
offer no explanation for this finding except perhaps that management 
news may be a "complex" information flow that may take some time to 
be assessed by the market (Merton, 1987). In addition, price/ trading 
volume activity prior to the public disclosure may be consistent with prior 
speculation, rumours or news leakage. 
As we treat the day of the price/ trading volume movement and a five-
day window either side as a single event window we do not suffer as 
much from this potential problem. 
In general, other news categories significantly affecting price movements 
tie in with the news categories hypothesised by Thompson, Olsen and 
Dietrich (1987), Morse (1982a) and Brookfield and Morris (1992). The 
only exception is directors' dealing activity which is not included as an 
information event in any of these studies. 
In our study directors' dealing activity is, next to analysts' investment 
recommendations and earnings forecast revisions, the second most 
important news category in driving price changes and trading volume 
activity thus suggesting that a sizeable proportion of such movements are 
driven by "insider" trades. Previous UK research by Gregory, Matatko, 
and Tonks (1997) shows that directors' trades are associated with 
abnormal returns. Donnelly and Walker (1995) working with the earnings 
response coefficient (ERe) document that the UK information 
environment may not be as rich as its US counterpart thus increasing the 
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probability that profits are obtainable from such "insider" trading activity. 
This may have a bearing on our results with directors' dealings. 
4.6.2 Relationship between Firm Size and the Proportion o/Company 
Price Changes and Trading Volume Movements Driven by Analysts' 
Investment Recommendations and Earnings Forecast Revisions 
In section 4.6.1 above we show that analysts' investment 
recommendations and earnings forecast revisions generate a significant 
proportion of price changes and trading volume movements, across all 
companies in our sample. In this section we test the hypothesis, set out in 
section 4.4.2, as to whether the activities of the sell-side analyst will play 
a greater role in explaining the share price changes and trading volume 
movements for "smaller" companies where there are fewer incentives for 
the financial press to gather and report company information. 
In section 4.6.2.1 below we describe our methodology, and in the 
following subsection we discuss our results. 
4.6.2.1 Methodology 
We run the following regressions: 
%Anal(P) ==yo + YILn(MV) 
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(17) 
where: 
%Anal(P) = Percentage of price changes that are triggered by analysts' 
recommendations and earnings forecast revisions 
Ln(MV) = Natural log of market capitalisation 
regression parameters to be estimated 
%Anal(V) ="(2 + Y3Ln(MV) (18) 
where: 
%Anal(V) =Percentage of volume movements that are triggered by 
analysts' recommendations and earnings forecast revisions 
Ln(MV) = Natural log of market capitalisation 
Y2,Y3 = regression parameters to be estimated 
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4.6.2.2 Results 
The results are presented in Table 18 below. 
Table 18 
Relationship between Company Size and the Proportion of Price 
Changes (Trading Volume Movements) Triggered by Analyst 
Activity 
% Anal(p) t-Statistic %Anal(V) t -Statistic 
Intercept -0.28 -2.7*** -0.2 -5.8*** 
Size .05 4.8*** 0.4 9.6**· 
R2 9% 30% 
No. of observations 215 215 
••• = statistically significant at the 99% level 
Weare forced to reject null hypothesis Ho 2 that there is no difference in 
the proportion of companies major price changes and trading volume 
movements driven by analysts' recommendations and earnings forecast 
revisions conditioning on company size. In fact, we report a positive 
relationship between firm size and the percentage of price and trading 
volume movements triggered by analysts' investment recommendations 
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and earnings forecast revisions thus suggesting that analyst activity is 
concentrated in the very largest stocks. 
We argued in section 4.4.2 that larger stocks should have rich 
information environments independently of analyst activity (Thompson, 
Olsen and Dietrich (1987; Grant, 1980) and that, therefore, the analyst 
will playa larger role in the gathering, processing and dissemination of 
information the smaller the size of the fIrm. Therefore, our results are 
contrary to expectations. 
Donnelly and Walker (1995) report that the UK. information environment 
appears less rich than its US counterpart. We may speculate that such 
analyst concentration in the very largest UK. stocks that we report may 
partly explain the results of Donnelly and Walker. In this context it would 
be interesting to conduct a similar study to our study employing US data 
to examine the nature of the differential information environments. 
In summary, our results suggest that the information environment of 
FTSE Mid 250 stocks are substantially less rich than their FTSE 100 
counterparts arising both from share price movements and trading volume 
activity "explained" by conventional sources (e.g. the fInancial press) and 
also from the activities of the sell-side analyst. 
4.6.3 Relative Size o/the Price (Trading Volume) Movements Associated 
with Analysts' Recommendations and Earnings Forecast Revisions vis-a-
vis other News Categories 
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In section 4.6.1 we show that analysts' investment recommendations and 
earnings forecast revisions generate a significant proportion of 
companies' largest market-adjusted price changes and trading volume 
movements. In this section we test the hypotheses developed in section 
4.4.3. We evaluate the information content, as measured by the size of the 
price/trading volume movements generated by analysts' earnings forecast 
revisions and company recommendations vis-a-vis those generated by 
other company news events, in particular a firm's formal accounting 
releases. In section 4.6.3.1 we describe our methodological approach, and 
in the following section we present our results. 
4.6.3.1 Methodology 
To compare the magnitude of the price! trading volume activity generated 
by analysts' investment recommendations and earnings forecast revisions 
vis-a.-vis other major news categories, a non-parametric Mann-Whitney 
Rank Sum test is performed in the first instance. This is because our price 
and trading volume residuals are by definition large price movements, 
and, therefore, may not be normally distributed thus suggesting that a 
normal parametric t-test of the difference in means of the abnormal 
returns generated by the various news categories may not be appropriate. 
We proceed by ranking the absolute value of the price outliers for each 
company over the two- year period from highest to lowest. The highest 
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absolute return residual for each company is assigned the rank of 1, the 
second highest absolute return residual a rank of 2 etc. In this wayan 
average ranking is obtained for all categories of firm specific news e.g. 
analysts' recommendations, preliminary results etc. together with a 
corresponding standard deviation. An F- test is performed on the event 
categories in Table 19 below. The results of the F-test confirm that the 
category variances were equal at a=0.05. Thus a series of pairwise t-tests 
assuming equal variances can be performed on the categories. 
4.6.3.2 Results 
The results of our test on price movements are presented in Table 19 
below. An identical methodology is adopted for trading volume activity 
and the corresponding results are presented in Table 20. Pairwise t-
statistics for the news event categories contained in Table 19 and 20 are 
reported in Appendix 9. 
Table 19 
Mann-Whitney Rank Sum Test on The Major Categories Of News 
Events Driving Large Price Movements For All Companies 
Category Average Std Dev 
Interim results 
Preliminary results 
Bids 
Financing issues 
Management changes 
Analysts 
Director share dealing 
Share deals 
10.83* 
11.50* 
12.92* 
12.99* 
14.06 
14.64 
14.81 
14.94 
• -statistically different from Analysts at a-o.O' 
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8.01 
8.29 
7.89 
8.04 
7.83 
7.78 
8.16 
7.78 
Table 20 
Mann-Whitney Rank Sum Test on The Major Categories Of News 
Events Driving Major Trading Volume Movements For All 
Companies 
Category Average Std Dev 
Share dealing 
Interim results 
Preliminary results 
Bids 
Financing 
Director share deals 
Anal sts 
11.76* 7.92 
11.93* 7.96 
12.55* 7.72 
13.09* 8.06 
13.54 8.53 
13.56 7.47 
14.32 7.61 
• =statistically different from Analysts at a-O.O' 
We reject Ho 3 that the size of the price changes and trading volume 
movements triggered by analysts' investment recommendations and 
earnings forecast revisions do not differ from the size of the price changes 
and trading volume movements generated by a fum's accounting 
releases. Table 19 shows that the greatest price changes are generated by 
the interim and preliminary results. These two news categories are 
statistically different, at the a=O.OSlevel, from all the remaining news 
categories, including analysts' investment recommendations and earnings 
forecast revisions (See Appendix 9). 
Table 20 shows that for trading volume activity share deals 
(unsurprisingly!) interim results and the preliminary results statistically 
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dominate analysts' earnings forecast revisions and company 
recommendations (See Appendix 9 for related t-statistics). 
Our results therefore suggest that the preliminary and interim results are 
associated with the greater changes in the market's consensus opinion (as 
measured by price activity) and, larger changes in individual investors' 
idiosyncratic expectations (as measured by trading volume movements) 
than analysts' earnings forecast revisions and company recommendations. 
The role of a fIrm's formal fInancial releases is not simply to confIrm 
other more timely information releases. Our results demonstrate a 
signifIcant proportion of the information content of a frrm's accounting 
releases is not, in fact, being anticipated by the market either through 
more timely information releases or through the activities of the sell-side 
analyst in gathering, interpreting and disseminating such "more timely" 
information to the market. 
We confIrm more rigorously the results of Firth (1981) and Rippington 
and Tamer (1995) that a firm's non- audited accounting releases are 
associated with the greatest information content by expressly 
incorporating the residuals associated with other news categories in 
addition to those generated by a firm's accounting releases in ranking 
those residuals. The only exception to the dominance of a fIrm's 
accounting releases is that the trading volwne activity triggered by the 
preliminary results is not, on average, statistically different to that 
generated by most other news releases (as Appendix 9 reports). In 
contrast Firth (1981) reports the preliminary announcement generates, on 
average, the largest trading volume activity. However, we argued in 
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section 4.2.1 that there are potential problems associated with Firth's 
methodological approach. 
We may speculate that because arguably the preliminary results are the 
most important announcement in the corporate calendar investors have 
incentives to gather information more vigorously just prior to the 
announcement thereby reducing information asymmetry on the 
announcement and hence trading volume activity. 
We reject Ho 4 that the size of the abnormal price changes and trading 
volume movements triggered by analysts' investment recommendations 
and earnings forecast revisions do not differ from the size of the price 
changes and trading volume movements generated by company news 
categories, other than a fIrm's accounting releases. (In this context, we 
exclude trading volume movements triggered by share dealing activity as 
share dealing activity by definition triggers large trading volume activity 
and, therefore, the interpretation of trading volume as measuring changes 
in investors' heterogeneous beliefs (see section 4.3) is not appropriate). 
Tab les 19 shows that, for price changes, analysts' investment 
recommendations and earnings forecast revisions are dominated, at a. = 
0.05, by takeover bid activity and events relating to companies' fInancing 
activity. Thereafter, analysts' earnings forecast revisions and company 
recommendations do not differ statistically from the remaining news 
categories, "management", "directors" and "share deals". Table 20 shows 
for trading volume activity that analysts' investment recommendations 
and earnings forecast revisions are, dominated at a. = 0.05 by news 
relating to takeover bid activity but do not differ statistically from the 
185 
remaining two major news categories, "financing" and "directors share 
dealing". 
Notwithstanding the results of this section, the sell-side analyst still plays 
an important role in keeping the equity market efficient. Even though the 
news content associated with analysts' investment recommendations and 
earnings forecast revisions are dominated by certain news categories, in 
particular a firm's accounting releases and takeover bid activity, the 
average scores do not differ from the other remaining news categories in 
Tables 19 and 20. 
4.7 Summary and Conclusions 
Our results suggest analysts' recommendations and earnings forecast 
revisions, not occurring simultaneously with other firm- specific 
information releases, playa significant role in explaining companies' 
major market-adjusted price changes and trading volume movements. 
They explain 18.1 % of "explained" price changes and 16.5% of 
"explained" trading volume movements. We show that the price/ trading 
volume response to analysts' recommendations and earnings forecast 
revisions does not derive from piggybacking on contemporaneous firm-
specific news releases (e.g. analyst issues a buy recommendation on the 
same day as a firm reports unexpectedly favourable preliminary results to 
the market). 
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Our results are consistent with the sell-side analyst playing a major role in 
keeping the UK equity market informationally efficient. This role may 
derive from hislher superior processing of existing "publicly available" 
information (Merton, 1987) and/or from their preferential access to 
"insider" information (Holland, 1998). 
Consistent with the predictions of the information environment literature 
we expect that the sell-side analyst will playa larger role in explaining 
the share price changes and trading volume activity for the "smaller" 
companies in the FTSE 100 and FTSE Mid 250 indexes, where there are 
fewer incentives for the financial press to gather and report information. 
We find, however, that contrary to expectations, analyst activity is 
concentrated in the "largest" stocks whose information environments are 
already rich thus suggesting that at least part of the analyst's 
informational advantage may derive from access to "insider" information 
or value added arising from the analytical process (Bouwman, Frishkopff 
and Frishkopff, 1987). Privileged access to company management may be 
one of these sources (Holland, 1998). In addition, we speculate that such 
apparent lack of analyst focus on FTSE Mid 250 stocks may, at least, 
partly explain the results of Donnelly and Walker (1995) who suggest the 
UK information environment is less rich than its US counterpart. 
A key issue, however, is whether analysts' investment recommendations 
and earnings forecast revisions provide a timely source of news to the 
equity markets, and, in particular, whether such analyst activity will 
anticipate much of the information content of a firm's formal statutory 
releases. We rank the price and trading volume outliers in order of 
magnitude and find analysts' recommendations and earnings forecast 
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revisions are dominated by the preliminary and interim results. Therefore, 
contrary to expectations a fIrm's accounting releases are of considerable 
value and their role is not simply to confinn more timely news releases. 
These results show that a significant amount of company news, even for 
those indexes representing the top 350 companies by market 
capitalisation, is not anticipated by the analyst, or the market in general, 
prior to the fonnal release of a finn's accounting results, thus suggesting 
that the existence of news services and the stockbroking industry are not 
substitutes for a finn's accounting results. Our results thus have important 
public policy implications regarding the importance of statutory 
accounting releases for even the largest capitalisation stocks on the 
London Stock Exchange. We thus provide support for Firth (1981) and 
Rippington and Taffler (1995) who suggest that a finn's accounting 
results impart valuable infonnation to the market dominating other 
sources of finn- specific news. 
In addition to a firm's accounting releases, we find that analysts' 
recommendations and earnings forecast revisions are dominated, in tenns 
of infonnation content, by the "takeover bid" and "financing" news 
categories for price activity and by the "takeover bid" news category for 
trading volume activity. These results suggest that although analyst 
activity generates the greatest proportions of companies' largest price 
changes and trading volume activity, the information content, as 
measured by the size of the price/ trading volume movement generated, is 
greater for certain other news categories, in particular, a firm's formal 
accounting releases. 
In addition, we find that in total 24% of "abnormal" price changes and 
260/0 of "abnormal" trading volume activity could not be traced to 
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company specific information apparently driving these movements. 
Therefore, it appears that "non-public" information plays an important 
role in explaining such movements. This appears to be particularly the 
case for FTSE Mid 250 companies where 32% of their largest market-
adjusted returns (33% of trading volume activity) do not appear to be 
driven by "publicly-available" information. The corresponding proportion 
for FTSE 100 index constituents is only 9% (12% for trading volume 
activity). 
The next chapter investigates, on a pilot basis, the role of the sell-side 
analyst in providing explanations for share price movements, particularly 
for those firms having less rich information environments. In addition, we 
also use the services of the sell-side analyst to address the nature of any 
information that is not in the "public domain" driving share price changes 
and determine whether such information differs in nature from its 
"publicly-available" counterpart. We argue that potential differences in 
the nature of the information that is not "publicly available" may explain 
why such information goes unreported in the financial press in many 
cases. 
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CHAPTER 5 
COMPANY SPECIFIC INFORMATION NOT IN THE 
PUBLIC DOMAIN AND THE ROLE OF THE SELL-
SIDE ANALYST 
5.1 Introduction 
Our results in the previous two chapters suggest that the sell- side analyst 
plays a major role in the UK equity market. In chapter 3 we show that 
analysts' recommendations have value in an "absolute" sense. In the last 
chapter we show that analysts' recommendations and earnings forecast 
revisions explain a significant proportion of companies' largest market-
adjusted price movements and trading volume activity. These results 
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collectively suggest analysts' recommendations and earnings forecast 
revisions playa significant role in keeping the equity market informationally 
efficient. 
However, we argued in Chapter 2 the analyst's role in keeping the markets 
efficient remains an unresolved issue. Does any potential informational 
advantage that the analyst possesses derive from he/she being a superior 
processor of existing publicly available information (Merton 1987, 
Bouwman, Frishkopff and Frishkopff, 1987) and/or from the incorporation 
of private (non-public) information into their investment recommendations 
and earnings forecast revisions (Fama, 1970; Holland, 1998). 
In this chapter we attempt to shed some light on the nature of the analyst's 
informational advantage, in particular their potential role as a conduit for the 
dissemination of "non-public" information to the market. We do this by 
testing their degree of knowledge of the nature of information not 
"apparently" in the public domain that is driving company price changes. 
To establish whether analysts may, in fact, use "non- public" information in 
arriving at their recommendation changes and earnings forecast revisions it is 
a necessary precondition that they indeed have access to such information. 
No existing study on the economic role of the equity analyst addresses the 
analyst's degree of superior market knowledge directly. 
We found in the last chapter that, for those indexes representing the largest 
350 companies on the London Stock Exchange, 24% of "abnormal" price 
movements could not be traced to company specific information apparently 
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driving these movements. Therefore, it appears that "non-public" 
information plays an important role in explaining such movements. This 
appears to be particularly the case for FTSE Mid 250 companies where 320/0 
of their largest market- adjusted returns do not appear to be driven by 
"publicly- available" information. The corresponding proportion for FTSE 
100 index constituents is only 9%, though some companies, particularly 
those in the lower echelons of the index, have "unexplained" price 
movements in similar proportions to their FTSE Mid 250 counterparts. We 
hypothesise that given the pre-eminent role ascribed to the sell-side analyst 
in the information environment literature he/she will playa significant role in 
providing explanations for these "unexplained" price movements 
particularly for those "smaller" stocks where there are fewer incentives for 
the financial press to gather information. 
In addition to directly testing the analyst's degree of market knowledge we 
also address the nature of the relationship between "unexplained" company 
price movements and capital market information flows. Are the "non-public" 
information flows driving such movements attributable to "hard" information 
that does not enter the public domain because it is either "private" 
information (Fama, 1970), or because of issues relating to firms' information 
environments (Freeman, 1987; Thompson, Olsen and Dietrich, 1987; Grant, 
1980)? This is an interesting research question the answer to which, as we 
argued in Section 2.1.2 of Chapter 2, depends on one's definition of 
"private" information. For our purposes we will defme "private" information 
as those price movements that the analyst is unable to explain. 
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Another possible explanation for such price movements is that they are 
driven by "soft" intangible factors such as underreaction, industry sentiment, 
fashions, overreaction etc (DeBondt and Thaler 1985, 1987~ Bernard and 
Thomas, 1989). These factors may not be reported in the financial press 
perhaps due to their intangibility. A cursory examination of Appendix 7, 
discussed in Chapter 4, shows that that only 1.19% of major price 
movements are "apparently" driven by such sources. These categories are 
"industry sentiment" (0.82%) and "profit taking" (0.37%). Nevertheless such 
factors have received considerable attention in the academic literature. 
Alternatively, there may only be an apparent lack of association between 
"public" information and share price activity due to information processing 
and assimilation delays (Cutler, Poterba and Summers, 1989~ Merton, 1987). 
We use the services of the equity analysts of three leading City of London 
based stockbroking houses to provide explanations for large price 
movements of 100 companies, drawn predominantly from the upper reaches 
of the FTSE Mid 250 index, over the eight week period ending 18t March, 
1996 that are not apparently driven by "public1y- available" information. 
However, our study is by its very nature only a pilot, as the directors of 
research at the three participating houses, whilst willing to participate in the 
study, were not prepared, at least initially, to commit their analysts beyond 
early March, a period coinciding with the height of the annual results 
reporting season. Therefore, our results are only indicative and should be 
treated with caution. 
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The next section 5.2 reviews earlier work on the relationship between capital 
market information flows and stock market activity measures and sets out 
our contribution to the literature. In the following section we develop our 
hypotheses and in section 5.4 our methodology and data are described. In 
section 5.5 and 5.6 we present our results. A summary and conclusion of our 
findings are provided in the final section of the chapter. 
5.2 Link between Stock Market Movements and Information Flows 
Roll (1988) attempts an empirical investigation of a prevailing paradigm, 
which is that with hindsight financial economists can explain most share 
price movements with a high degree of accuracy. Roll reports on the cross-
sectional distribution ofR2s for 96 large NYSE stocks using a single factor 
market model and a multifactor APT. Daily data is employed to investigate 
the incidence and impact of unique news about the firm. Every mention of 
the firm in either the Wall Street Journal or over the Dow Jones Broadtape is 
defined as an information event. Regressions on systematic factors are 
conducted only on non- information dates. These R2s are compared with the 
R2s obtained using all data points. The argument is that it should be possible 
to substantially improve the R2 of pervasive factors by considering only 
periods where there is no reported news about the firm. Thus when there is 
no observed news, all the observed changes should be due to pervasive 
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factors. However, even with this "information- censored" data, the average 
explanatory power is only marginally better. Roll concludes that this may be 
due to the existence of "soft" information sources in relation to particular 
shares or industries, or that the unexplained price movements may be due to 
the existence of non- public (private) information. 
We may speculate that "soft" information sources go unreported in the 
financial press as their intangibility may mean that such sources are difficult 
for financial journalists to analyse and explain. 
The fact that it is difficult to find a robust relationship between various 
measures of stock market activity and news releases is also apparent with 
respect to macroeconomic data and stock market index activity. Cutler, 
Poterba, and Summers (1989) seek to determine whether unexpected 
macroeconomic news announcements can explain a significant proportion of 
index price movements hypothesising that such announcements drive stock 
market activity in aggregate (Chen, Roll and Ross, 1986). 
The authors also investigate the importance of pervasive factors other than 
macroeconomic variables that could potentially affect share prices. They 
study the market reaction to major non- economic events such as elections 
and international conflicts, and, in addition, they analyse the largest stock 
market movements of the last fifty years reviewing coincident news reports 
to identify, where possible, the proximate cause of these moves. 
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However, the authors find it difficult to link major market moves to the 
release of economic or other information. Interestingly on several of the 
days, their news source, the New York Times, actually reported that there 
was no apparent explanation for the market's rise or fall. Thus, the authors' 
inability to identify the fundamental shocks that accounted for these 
significant market moves is difficult to reconcile with the view that such 
shocks should account for most of the variation in stock returns. 
Their results parallel Roll's (1988) finding that most of the variation in return 
for individual shares cannot be explained using publicly available measures 
of new information. They argue that further understanding of asset price 
movements requires research that attempts to model price movements as 
functions of evolving consensus opinions about the implications of given 
pieces of information. In other words, they suggest that the lack of direct 
association between news and price activity may not be due to "non-public" 
information but may instead be attributable to delays in the market 
impounding the information content of public news releases. 
Mitchell and Mulherin (1994), working with both macroeconomic and firm 
specific news, examine whether the amount of information that is publicly 
reported affects trading volume activity and price movements in equity 
markets. They take three measures of market activity: (1) daily trading 
volume, (2) absolute value of daily market returns, and (3) the average of the 
sum of the absolute value of daily firm- specific returns, and relate them to 
the broad sample of macroeconomic and firm- specific news announcements 
released by Dow Jones on the Broadtape and in the Wall Street Journal. 
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By running regressions the authors find that the number of Dow Jones 
announcements and market activity are directly related but the relationship is 
not strong as evidenced by the low regression R2,s. These results parallel the 
results of a similar study by Barry and Howe (1994) that uses intraday data 
and suggests that although public information flows do drive price and 
trading volume activity they only explain a small proportion of such 
movements. The authors, however, leave unaddressed potential reasons for 
this other than to suggest that the relationship between public information 
flows and stock market activity is complex and difficult to model. 
Alternative hypotheses are advanced by the various authors above as to why 
such an apparently weak relationship prevails though none of the studies 
attempts to test these hypotheses. 
In summary, therefore, the literature suggests that there is at best a weak 
relationship between public information and price changes and trading 
volume activity. These findings tie in with our results in the previous 
chapter, where we report that for those indexes representing the largest 350 
companies on the London Stock Exchange, 24% of significant company 
market-adjusted price changes could not be traced to company specific 
information apparently driving these movements. The corresponding 
proportion for abnormal trading volume activity is 26%. 
Our study, in contrast to previous research, attempts to establish the nature of 
the "unreported news" driving price changes. More specifically we address 
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the nature of the relationship between firm specific information flows and 
company market-adjusted price movements. We use the services of three 
leading stockbroking houses to "explain" the nature of the news driving 
company price activity that cannot be readily ascertained from "publicly-
available" sources. In using the services of the stockbroking houses in this 
manner we also gain insight into analysts' degree of market knowledge and, 
in particular, their potential role as a conduit for the dissemination of "non-
public" information to the market. 
5.3 Hypotheses 
The activities of the sell-side analyst constitute a major component of a 
firm's information environment. The degree of analyst neglect dominates 
firm size and other empirical anomalies such as low PIE and the January 
seasonality effect in explaining returns (Arbel, 1985). Given this prominence 
associated with the sell-side analyst in the literature we argue that he/she has 
a high degree of market knowledge and will be able to explain a significant 
proportion of price movements not apparently in the public domain, 
particularly for those companies in the upper reaches of the FTSE Mid 250 
and lower echelons of the FTSE 100 where, based on their size, there are 
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fewer incentives for the financial press to gather and report information 
(Grant, 1980; Thompson, Olsen, and Dietrich, 1987). 
Ho 5: Sell- side analysts do not have a high degree of market knowledge and 
are unable to explain a significant proportion of "unexplained" price 
changesfor those companies in the upper regions of the FTSE Mid 250 and 
the lower echelons of the FTSE 100. 
Merton (1987), Arbel, Carvell and Strebel (1983) and Arbel (1985) argue 
that the degree of analyst following is a critical component of a firm's 
information environment and firms that are less closely followed by the 
analyst community are more likely to be subject to anomalous behaviour. 
The empirical findings ofLo and MacKinlay (1988) on short- term price 
inertia, Hew, Skerratt, Strong, and Walker (1996) on the post-eamings-
announcement drift and Zarowin (1990), on overreaction all support the view 
that anomalous behaviour is driven by firm size, an empirical proxy for a 
firm's information environment. 
We work with "smaller" companies as we might speculate, as Merton (1987) 
does, that increased analyst coverage may reduce the incidence of such 
anomalies for larger FTSE 100 companies as analysts' superior information 
gathering and processing skills will keep the equity markets more efficient in 
respect of these companies. 
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We report in Section 5.1 above that only 1.2% of major price movements 
and 0.5% of major trading volume activity appear to be driven by "soft" 
sources. Do such "soft" sources go unreported in the financial press as 
perhaps due to their intangibility it is difficult for financial journalists to 
rationalise and explain and consequently is the analyst, with hislher 
specialised knowledge and analytical skills will be in a stronger position to 
"explain" such information flows? Null hypothesis 6 below follows on from 
this: 
Ho 6: "Unexplained" price changes, for "smaller" companies, are not 
materially driven by "soft" information sources such as underreaction, 
sentiment, profit taking, overreaction etc. 
5.4 Methodology and Data 
5.4.1 Company Selection 
In selecting our sample companies we focus only on those companies in the 
upper regions of the FTSE Mid 250 and the lower reaches of the FTSE 100 
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indexes. Our research in the last chapter shows that, as we expected, the 
smaller the company the lesser the apparent degree of association between 
price/ trading volume activity and "public1y- available" information. 
Whereas for FTSE 100 companies we reported that only 9% of their market-
adjusted price changes are "unexplained" by reference to "public1y-
available" information the corresponding percentage for FTSE Mid 250 
companies is 32%. In this regard our results are consistent with the 
arguments made in the information environment literature in general and the 
empirical results reported by Grant (1980) and Thompson, Olsen and 
Dietrich (1987) in particular. 
We hypothesise that the sell- side analyst will playa major role in providing 
explanations for "unexplained" price movements for those FTSE Mid 250 
and smaller capitalisation FTSE 100 companies where there are fewer 
incentives for the financial press and news services in general to gather and 
report information. 
In order to be included in our sample companies had to have a market 
capitalisation in excess of £100m. In addition all companies in the sample 
had to be followed by two of our three participating stockbroking houses so 
as to mitigate potential problems of ex-post rationalisation bias. (See Section 
5.4.4 below). 
The participating stockbroking houses (See section 5.4.4) agreed to provide 
the services of their analysts covering 13 Stock Exchange sectors in total. 87 
FTSE Mid 250 companies were followed by two stockbroking houses, came 
from one of the thirteen sectors and satisfied the minimum capitalisation 
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requirements. 13 companies drawn from the lower echelons of the FTSE 100 
were added to our sample to bring the total sample size to 100 companies. 
Table 21 below reports on the size characteristics of the 100 fIrms in our 
sample whilst a full listing of the 100 companies and their sectoral 
decomposition are provided in Appendix 10. 
Table 21 
Summary Size Statistics (n = 100) 
Mean 
Standard deviation 
Maximum 
Minimum 
Median 
5.4.2 Time Period 
Market Capitalisation 
(£m) 
1280 
860 
3830 
100 
1000 
The market-adjusted daily price movements for the 100 companies were 
monitored over the 8- week period ending 1 st March, 1996. An eight-week 
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period is chosen as our study is only a pilot project and, in addition, because 
the company reporting season reaches its most intense phase in early March 
the directors of research were unwilling to commit their analysts beyond this 
period. 
5.4.3 Return Generating Model and Identification of Outliers 
The exact same methodology as was adopted in the last chapter for 
calculating abnormal returns and identifying price outliers is adopted for the 
100 companies iIi our sample. After the close of business on each Friday of 
our eight- week study daily market- adjusted returns are calculated for each 
of the 100 companies. The returns generated are then compared to the mean 
returns for 1995 plus or minus 2 standard deviations. If the returns are above 
or below this number they are classified as "outlier" price movements that 
because of their size should be associated with frrm specific news and not 
noise per se. Table 22 provides a summary analysis of the distributional 
characteristics of the abnormal returns generated. 
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Table 22 
Abnormal Daily Price Movements: Summary Statistics 
Mean (absolute) 
Standard deviation 
Maximum 
Minimum 
5.4.4 Selection of Stockbroking Houses 
3.5 
3.6 
8.0 
-9.2 
We approached three stockbroking house all of whom agreed to participate 
in our study: SBC Warburg, James Capel and Credit Lyonnais Laing. These 
houses rank 2nd, 4th and 9th respectively in the 1995 Extel Ranking of 
Investment Analysts Survey, and, therefore their analysts would be expected, 
a priori, to have a high degree of market knowledge. The directors of 
research at the three stockbroking houses were willing to participate in our 
study, at least on a pilot basis. They were interested in the nature of the 
major news categories driving companies' major price changes and in 
particular, whether there were a number of pervasive themes on which their 
analysts could usefully focus their attentions. 
In addition, they were interested in their analysts' degree of market 
knowledge of the "events" driving price changes in companies that the 
houses themselves actively follow. 
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To obviate the potential problem of ex-post rationalisation bias we ensure 
that two stockbroking houses research each of the companies in our sample. 
We are thus able to test the consistency of analysts' responses. 
We met all the participating analysts and briefed them as to the objectives of 
our study. In addition, the directors of research emphasised to them the 
benefits to the house thus ensuring, insofar as possible, the analysts' active 
collaboration and participation in the study. 
We distributed a copy of the "Analysis of Major Price Changes" form that 
we intended to send them at the end of each week, for their comments on its 
structure and content. (See Appendix 11 for a pro-forma). The "Analysis of 
Major Price Changes" form asks the analysts to record the reasons driving 
the price change and, in addition, requests them to record whether the price 
changes results in any associated action by them e.g. an earnings forecast 
revision, recommendation change, comment to salesmen etc. 
5.4.5 Sources of Company-Specific Information Releases 
It is crucial that that our sources of company specific information capture 
value relevant information releases. Our sources of firm specific news are the 
Financial Times and the Stock Exchange News Announcements reported on 
FT Graphite. 
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The Financial Times is the UK equivalent to The Wall Street Journal, the 
primary source used by Morse (1982) and Thompson, Olsen and Dietrich 
(1987). 
As we monitor and seek explanations for companies' largest market-adjusted 
returns each week we cannot use an archival CD ROM based system such as 
McCarthys Information Fiche (used by Brookfield and Morris, 1992) which 
is updated only on a periodic basis. Unfortunately, a real time database such 
as Reuters or Blombergs is not generally available for academic purposes. 
5.4.5.1 FT Graphite 
FT Graphite contains a listing of all the mandated company news 
announcements by the London Stock Exchange. 
5.4.5.2 Financial Times 
The Financial Times (FT) is one of the world's leading business newspapers. 
The Financial Times is a huge database of financial and economic news, 
providing essential and timely information for the analysis of business events 
and trends, both international and UK based. The FT is the UK equivalent of 
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the Wall Street Journal. 
5.4.6 Procedure for Seeking Explanations for "Unexplained" Price 
Movements 
If the reason for the price "outlier" could not be ascertained by reference to a 
news event reported in either the Financial Times or Stock Exchange news 
announcements relating to the same day as the price change we dispatched 
our "Analysis of Major Price Changes Form" via fax to the relevant analysts 
for explanation. 
In the last chapter we employed an II-day window whereas in this chapter a 
I-day window is used. The reason is that our study in this chapter is a self-
standing test of analysts' ability to "explain" the reasons apparently driving 
price movements not obviously in the public domain. In other words, we are 
directly testing analysts degree of market knowledge. In addition, by 
employng only a I-day window analysts should be able to provide 
explanations for any apparent information processing delays (Merton, 1987; 
Cutler, Poterba and Summers, 1989). 
We dispatched the "Form" on the Monday morning of the week following 
the week of the "unexplained" price changes. The personal assistants to the 
directors of research agreed to co-ordinate the collection of the completed 
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forms, follow up the analysts for their responses and return these responses 
via fax on the Monday afternoon. 
5.5 Results 
5.5.1 Principal Findings 
There are a total of 166 major market- adjusted daily share price 
movements for the 100 companies in our sample over the eight-week 
period of the study. Table 23 summarises these news events with 28 
cases or almost 6 out of 10 attributable to company results or bid 
rumours. 
Of these only 48 (or 29%) could be traced to publicly available 
information reported in the Financial Times and/or via Stock Exchange 
News Announcements. 
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Table 23 
Summary of Abnormal Price Movements 
Explained by Publicly Available Information 
News Category 
Mergers/acquisition activity 
Annual results and dividend declaration 
Large share trades 
Company announcements other than mergers 
Company restructuring activity 
Board changes 
Joint venture announcement 
MBO 
Total 
n 
16 
12 
8 
6 
2 
2 
1 
1 
48 
33 
25 
17 
13 
4 
4 
2 
2 
100 
In the last chapter we report that for FTSE Mid 250 companies 32% of 
price changes cannot be traced to "publicly-available" information. 
This contrasts with 71 % in this chapter. However, our results in this 
chapter should be treated with some caution as we are likely to 
underreport the degree of association between price changes and 
"public" information due to our more restricted sources of company 
news. In addition, in chapter 3 we employ an 11- day window whereas 
in this study, as discussed in section 5.4.6, the window is only 1 day. 
The remaining 118 major market-adjusted daily price movements 
(representing 71 % of the total) were despatched to the analysts at the 
participating houses for explanation. 103 replies were received, 26 of 
which were for two analysts following the same stock in different 
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houses. Thus analysts provided responses for 90 of the 118 price 
movements, a response rate of 76%. 
Table 24 provides a breakdown of analysts' explanations for these price 
movements and Appendix 12 provides analysts' detailed responses. 
Table 24 
Summary of the Explanations Received from Analysts for the 
Information Events Driving Major Share Price Movements 
Explanation Total % 
Trading volume 12 13 
Takeover bid rumours 11 12 
Company presentations to analysts/ institutions 8 9 
Analysts' recommendations 6 7 
Industry transfer 6 7 
Industry/company sentiment 5 6 
Volatile price 4 4 
Rumours other than bid 4 4 
Previous over/under reaction 4 4 
Re~cnuing 3 3 
Stock switching within a sector 3 3 
Input price changes 3 3 
Product information 3 3 
New contracts 2 2 
Profit taking 2 2 
Profit warning 2 2 
Market conditions abroad 2 2 
Buying on cheapness 1 1 
Speculation prior to results 1 1 
Financing 1 1 
... ~.~ .. ~p~.!.~~ ............................. -................................................. 7_ ............................... ~ ......................... . 
Total 90 100 
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Weare forced to reject Ho 5 that sell- side analysts do not have a high degree 
of market knowledge, and that they are unable to explain a significant 
proportion of "unexplained" price changes for those companies in the upper 
regions of the FTSE Mid 250 and the lower reaches of the FTSE 100. 
Analysts provided plausible explanations for the "unexplained" price 
movements in all but 7 of the 90 cases (80/0). In the 13 cases where two 
independent analysts reported on the same stock price movement, they 
were consistent 10 out of 13 times (770/0) suggesting that analyst 
explanations are not necessarily idiosyncratic or speculative 
rationalisations. However, it is noteworthy that in 86% of cases only 
one analyst responded. Unfortunately the time period of our study 
coincided with a significant number of companies reporting their 
annual results and, consequently, many analysts were absent from their 
desks briefing institutional clients and attending company presentations 
leading to the small number of incidents of more than one analyst 
reporting on each price movement. 
5.5.2 Other Indicative Results 
Because of the very small sample size and time period covered together 
with the experimental limitations associated with this pilot study the 
following results should only be viewed as indicative and treated with 
caution. Nonetheless, if replicated on a larger sample, with more 
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stockbroking houses and a longer time frame, the insights provided 
would certainly shed light on the nature of the information not in the 
public domain driving company share price activity, and on the role of 
the sell-side analyst in analysing, interpreting and disseminating such 
information. 
Only 8% of price movements are apparently driven by "private" 
information as defined in Section 5.1 above, thus suggesting that such 
information may not play a major role in explaining price activity for 
our sample companies. In addition, it is noteworthy that 16% of these 
price movements are generated either directly by analysts' 
recommendations (7%) or indirectly via company presentations to 
analysts/ institutions (9%), thus suggesting the important role the 
analyst perceives he/she plays in interpreting information and 
communicating their views to the market through their investment 
recommendations. This is consistent with our results in chapters 3 and 4 
where we show that analysts' recommendations and earnings forecast 
revisions have investment value. Such analyst activity may be 
underreported in the financial press, at least initially, as any valuable 
information the analyst gathers is likely to be disseminated to the 
clients of the stockbroking house prior to its disclosure to the market as 
a whole. 
It is interesting to note in passing that of the 76 price changes that are 
not attributable to either analysts' recommendations or company 
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presentations to analysts/institutions that in 19% of these cases analysts 
stated they rang their institutional clients to infonn them of the reasons 
behind these price changes thus suggesting that such infonnation may 
not have been available to the market from other sources. (These cases 
are indicated with an asterix (*) in Appendix 12). 
We reject Ho 6 that "unexplained" price changes, for our sample companies, 
are not materially driven by "soft" infonnation sources such as 
underreaction, sentiment, profit taking, overreaction etc. 17% of the total 
"unexplained" price movements are driven by event categories that may be 
regarded as related to "soft" sources. These categories are: 
(1) Industry/ company sentiment (6%) 
(2) Previous overreaction (40/0) 
(3) Profit taking (2%) 
(4) Buying on cheapness (1 %) 
(5) Volatile price (40/0) 
Explanations for these categories appear in Appendix 12. These 
categories do not appear as items explaining price movements in the 
previous chapter thus providing some support for Roll's (1988) 
hypothesis that a significant proportion of company specific price 
movements may be related to "soft" infonnation flows and may in fact 
go unreported in the financial press. 
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In addition there is also some very preliminary evidence of information 
assimilation delays in at least 10% of cases as seen in some of the 
analysts' comments in Appendix 12. These results are consistent with 
the speculations of Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1989). For example, 
House of Fraser had three successive days of price changes in excess of 
3% triggered by takeover rumours/ pressure for management 
changes following on from a poor January trading statement (see 
Takeover Bid Rumours category in Appendix 12). Powell Duffryn had 
a return of+2.8% on 17th January followed by +3.6% on 19th January 
triggered by a reappraisal of the company by investors consequent on a 
presentation to analysts (see Company Presentation to Analysts/ 
Institutions in Appendix 12). 
In further work it would be interesting to ask the analysts why such 
assimilation delays take place. Is it for instance due to the nature of the 
news? Is the information content complex to interpret and therefore 
requires a digestion period, or is it something to do with the information 
dissemination process itself? 
Thus, in summary, our results for this subsection provide preliminary 
evidence that suggests that a not insignificant proportion of 
"unreported" information in respect of our sample companies relates to 
"soft" information sources and to information processing delays thus 
suggesting that these reasons generate significant price activity for 
companies with less rich information environments. 
214 
5.6 Further Analysis of Analysts' Explanations 
It is possible that a proportion of the explanations provided by the 
analysts were in the public domain and could be picked up by extending 
the event window to five days either side of the price change. An 11 day 
window is consistent with the methodology adopted in the last chapter. 
We find that by extending the event window to eleven days we are able 
to substantiate 19 (21 0/0) of the analysts' explanations provided in 
Table 24. (These additional 19 cases are indicated with a '+' in 
Appendix 12). Of these 19 cases 7 price movements take place prior to 
the information coming into the "public domain" and, therefore, may be 
suggestive of "insider" information driving the price activity. 
Interestingly, 4 of these cases relate to the Takeover bid rumours 
category. The remaining 12 cases occur within the five day period prior 
to the price movement and, therefore may be consistent with information 
assimilation delays (Merton, 1987). For the remaining 71 cases (790/0 of 
the total) extending the event window to 11 days does not yield any 
news events thus providing further support for our hypothesis that the 
sell-side analyst has a high degree of market knowledge. 
For two categories of information events Trading volume and Volatile 
share price we can substantiate the analysts' explanations by reference 
to stock market data. If share prices are volatile we would expect the 
volatilities of these stocks to be higher than the other stocks in our 
sample. For the four cases reported in Appendix 12 the volatilitities are 
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in the top 13% of all company volatilities which is consistent with the 
analysts' explanations. 
There are 12 events in the Trading volume news category and analysts' 
explanations are of two types. Eight of these represent price 
movements that are caused by trading volume activity "suggested" by 
the analysts to be greater than "normal". (These are denoted with a ' ... ' 
in front of the company name in Appendix 12). The remaining 4 are 
"suggested" by the analysts to be attributable to trading volume activity 
being less than "normal". 
For each company we define "normal" as the average market- adjusted 
trading volume activity generated in the first 3 months of 1996. The 
methodology adopted is as follows: 
N,t =A V i,t - EV i,t (19) 
where: 
A. i,t = abnormal volume residual for company i on day t 
A V i,t = actual proportion of the shares of company i trading on day t 
EV i,t =expected proportion of the shares of company i trading on day t 
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The expected volume- generating model is: 
EV i,t = Yi + Oi V m,t (20) 
where: 
EV it = expected proportion of the shares of company i trading on day t, 
V m,t = proportion of total shares traded on LSE on day t, and 
Yi, ,Oi = the intercept and slope estimates respectively. 
Trading volume data was obtained from Datastream. 
Trading volume delta factors are calculated using daily data observations for 
the previous calendar year. Thus in equation 20 we use the "delta" coefficient 
generated from the 1995 calendar year regression as our proxy for how 
company trading volume varies with market trading volume for the first 3 
months of 1996. This is consistent with the methodology adopted in section 
4.5.3 of the last chapter. 
We calculate for each company the average "A" variable in the first three 
months of 1996 and compare the "A" generated on the event day with 
this average. Those "A's" above the average "A" are regarded as above 
"nonnal" and vica versa. 
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We find that in all 12 cases analysts' explanations are consistent 
with the data. Thus analysts' explanations of trading volume activity 
triggering the "abnormal" price movements appear reasonable. 
5.7 Summary and Conclusions 
The results of our study provide preliminary evidence on the extent to 
which information not reported via Stock Exchange News 
announcements or published in the Financial Times is driving major 
price movements for companies in the upper reaches of the FTSE Mid 
250 and the lower echelons of the FTSE 100. Only a third of major 
price movements could be traced to these two sources of "publicly-
available" information. Analysts are able to provide explanations for 
over 90% of the major daily price movements not related to these 
sources thus not consistent with concerns that analysts "don't know". 
Consistency in terms of explanation, despite the small number of cases, 
where more than one analyst followed the same stock, is indicative that 
there is a good degree of market knowledge and the absence of ex-post 
rationalisation bias. These results are encouraging and suggest that 
analysts may "know" what is driving price activity in these "smaller" 
compames. 
We show that a number of pervasive themes are associated with 
unexplained major share price movements, many of which can be 
categorised as soft information events requiring more judgement and 
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interpretation to analyse. In addition the market may not impound all 
information immediately into the share price and, in certain 
circumstances, there may be information processing delays. 
However this study is only a pilot project and, therefore, our results are 
Only of a very preliminary nature and should be treated with caution. In 
Any subsequent study we would make the following potential 
improvements: 
First, we would extend coverage to include larger FTSE 100 stocks to 
establish whether notwithstanding their size a proportion of their price 
activity is caused by "soft" information and/or information processing! 
assimilation delays although our prior expectations are that this is 
unlikely to be the case. In addition we would include stocks from the 
lower regions of the FTSE Mid 250 and also USM companies for 
comparison purposes. 
Second, we would redesign the "Analysis of Major Price Changes" 
form to include questions, asking the analyst to record the timing of the 
disclosure of the information to the market if it differed to the date of 
the price movement. We would inquire of the analysts as to why they 
believe that certain sources of news go unreported? Is it, perhaps due to 
the intangibility of the information? To restricted availability of the 
information? Why do they think there are information processing 
delays? The answers to these questions may provide insight into how 
"market experts" such as sell-side analysts view the information 
gathering, processing and dissemination process. 
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Thirdly, we would extend the number of stockbroking houses 
participating in any subsequent study to ensure that at least three 
analysts follow each of the companies. There are two reasons for this. 
(a) A difference of opinion between two analysts is difficult to resolve 
in the absence of a third expert who will hopefully corroborate one 
of the first two analysts. 
(b) Though in our study where two analysts replied they tended to 
corroborate each other, it is inevitable, that due to analysts busy 
working schedules, active participation will not always be a priority. 
Thus the greater the number of analysts following each company the 
greater the likelyhood that at least two analysts may reply. 
The results, so far, are encouraging and validate the methodology 
adopted. They suggest that a fuller study over a longer time period, 
with more extensive company coverage, a greater number of 
participating analysts and incorporating modifications to the "Analysis 
of Major Price Changes Form" could lead to more definitive 
conclusions. In this way we may be able to contribute to the debate on 
how and what information gets to the market and, how such 
information is processed and assimilated. This has important 
implications for market efficiency because, as Ball (1992) points out, 
market efficiency is a pure exchange theory and is silent on how 
information is gathered and on the process by which the market 
becomes informed. It simply assumes that given the supply of 
information rational investors' actions will lead to market efficiency. 
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CHAPTER6 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this thesis we set out to address the economic role of the sell-side 
analyst in the UK equity markets. We conduct three empirical studies 
evaluating separate aspects of this role. 
Chapter three evaluates the economic role of the equity analyst in 
"absolute" terms by assessing the market's response to analysts' new buy 
and new sell recommendations. We find that analysts' recommendations 
have value in an "absolute" sense. Company share prices are significantly 
influenced by analysts' recommendation changes, not only in the month 
of the recommendation change but also in subsequent months, thus 
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suggesting evidence of a post-recommendation drift analogous to the 
familiar post-earnings-announcement drift (PAD). We find that evidence 
of this recommendation drift phenomenon is more sustained and long 
lasting for new sell recommendations than for new buy recommendations. 
Womack (1996) reports similar evidence using US data. 
We also find that the magnitude of the abnormal returns associated with 
the recommendation changes are influenced cross-sectionally by factors 
associated with firms' information environments and the analysts' 
incentives literature. In this context we document higher abnormal returns 
for both new buy and new sell recommendations conditioning on 
company size, and also with the issuance of a contemporaneous earnings 
forecast revision. In addition, for new buy recommendations we find that 
recommendations issued by a stockbroking house with a superior 
reputation generate higher abnormal returns than otherwise equivalent 
recommendations issued by other stockbroking houses. We report no 
such evidence for new sell recommendations but we speculate that this 
differential response may be attributable to the incentives for analysts to 
bias optimistically their investment recommendations, whereby, 
differences in analyst quality may be reflected in the market's response to 
new buy recommendations only (Francis and Soffer, 1997). In aggregate 
our results suggest that analysts' incentives both to gather and 
disseminate information are important determinants of recommendation 
performance. 
Though we find in chapter 3 that analysts' investment recommendations 
and contemporaneously issued earnings forecast revisions have market 
value we are also interested in their "relative" value in explaining 
companies' "large" market-adjusted share price changes and trading 
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volume movements vis-a-vis other sources of firm- specific news. In 
other words, though analysts new recommendations may generate 
abnormal returns, the size of the abnormal returns may be small 
compared to those generated by other company news categories thus 
implying other news categories may have greater information content. 
We attempt to resolve this issue in chapter 4 where we address the 
"relative" value of analyst recommendations in explaining the largest 
market-adjusted share price changes and trading volume movements for 
215 of the largest companies quoted on the London Stock Exchange over 
the two- year period 1994-1995. 
We find that analysts' recommendations and earnings forecast revisions 
explain a significant proportion of these movements. Thus, not only do 
their recommendations and earnings forecasts revisions have value in an 
"absolute" sense, but, they also explain a significant proportion of 
companies major market- adjusted price changes and trading volume 
movements on a year- on- year basis. 
However, we also report that the information content of analysts' 
earnings forecasts and company recommendations, as measured by the 
magnitude of the price! trading volume response, is dominated by a firm's 
accounting releases. This suggests that whilst the analyst may 
communicate valuable information to the market a significant amount of 
company information is not anticipated prior to the formal release of a 
firm's accounting results, by either the community of investment 
analysts, andlor the markets in general. 
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It is noteworthy that Donnelly and Walker (1995) report that the extent to 
which prices anticipate earnings in the UK is less than that reported for 
US companies, suggesting that UK firms' information environments may 
be less rich than their US counterparts. 
Our results in Section 4.6.2 of chapter 4 suggest that analysts playa 
larger role in explaining share price changes and trading volume activity 
for FTSE 100 stocks than for those in the FTSE Mid 250. This is contrary 
to our expectations, as we expected the analyst to be a more important 
component of the information environment of FTSE Mid 250 stocks, 
where due to their smaller size, there may be fewer incentives for the 
financial press to gather and report information and that consequently the 
analyst would fill this vacuum. It is an interesting speculation as to 
whether this apparent concentration of analyst effort in the very largest 
capitalisation companies may partially explain the results of Donnelly 
and Walker (1995). 
In chapter 5 we address in greater detail the analyst's role in respect of 
"smaller" stocks. We argue that, notwithstanding that fewer analysts 
follow these stocks, those analysts who do, may playa major role in 
keeping the market informationally efficient in these stocks. In addition, 
they may also act as an important conduit for the dissemination of" non-
public" information in respect of these stocks to the market. Our results 
suggest that the sell-side analyst has, in fact, a high degree of market 
knowledge and is able to account for in excess of 90% of those price 
movements that we cannot link to " public" sources. 
In chapter 5 we also use the services of the sell-side analyst to provide 
insight into the nature of the information driving "unexplained" price 
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movements to establish whether such infonnation may differ in type to its 
"publicly- available" counterpart. We find that a significant proportion of 
these price movements (17%) are driven by factors that are not "hard" 
information but rather are factors unrelated to information flows per se, 
e.g. fads, fashions, industry sentiment etc. In this way we provide 
empirical support for Roll's (1988) conjecture that a significant number 
of company market-adjusted price changes may be driven by "softer" 
factors. In addition we find that there are apparent information 
processing delays in at least 10% of cases thus suggesting that 
information is not always impounded immediately into share prices, and 
the market may, in certain circumstances, take time to assimilate and 
process infonnation. This is consistent with the speculations of Cutler, 
Poterba and Summers (1987) and Merton, (1987). 
However, our results in Chapter 5 are only of a very preliminary nature 
and, therefore, should be treated with some caution. Notwithstanding this, 
we speculate that a fuller study, run over a longer time period, involving 
the participation of a greater number of stockbroking houses and covering 
more companies may provide useful insight into how information flows 
into the capital market, the nature of the market's information 
assimilation process, and why certain types of information may go 
unreported or be associated with information processing delays. 
The results across our three empirical studies have important public 
policy implications and suggest sell-side analysts plays a major economic 
role in the UK equity market. Their investment recommendations and 
earnings forecast revisions communicate valuable information to the 
market. Analysts' recommendations and earnings forecast revisions 
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explaining a significant proportion of companies largest market- adjusted 
price changes and trading volume movements on a year on year basis. In 
addition, we provide evidence that the analyst is a knowledgeable source 
of firm specific information and that he/she may playa pivotal role in 
communicating valuable "non-public" infonnation to the market. 
Our results, in aggregate, suggest that, notwithstanding the reduced 
reliance placed on the services of the sell-side analyst by the largest fund 
managers in the UK (Gaved, 1997), they nevertheless playa major role in 
keeping the equity markets efficient. 
Our results show no source of company news release, including analysts' 
investment recommendations and earnings forecast revisions, has greater 
information content (as measured by the size of the price/trading volume 
movement), than a firm's formal accounting releases, thus suggesting that 
the role of accounting releases is not simply to confirm what the market 
already knows via potentially more timely news categories. 
The results in chapter 5 provide preliminary evidence that analysts have a 
role to play in communicating "non-public" information to the market 
thus suggesting that tests of the investment value of analysts' 
recommendations and earnings forecast revisions may, at least in part, be 
tests of strong-form market efficiency. 
We believe that a potentially fruitful ground for future research is to use 
the expertise of the sell-side analyst to address, in more detail, those 
issues relating to efficient markets that we raised in Chapter 5. Such 
issues have not been addressed heretofore in the literature, as to do so, 
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requires access to a knowledgeable source of the complexities associated 
with information processing and dissemination in the equity markets. Our 
results suggest that the sell-side analyst may indeed constitute such a 
knowledgeable source. 
Another potential area for future research derives from our results in 
chapter 3. In that chapter we find a post-recommendation drift 
particularly in relation to new sell recommendations. Anecdotally, the 
directors of research suggest that for negative news, fund managers do 
not accept, at face value, recommendations of the stockbroking house. 
They, therefore, go and seek corroborative evidence from other sources. 
This process may take time resulting in a delayed price response. In this 
context, it would be interesting to conduct a study of a sample of 
stockbroking houses institutional sales desks, using the telephone 
transcripts, to record any differences in the decision processes and 
reactions of institutional clients to new buy and sell recommendations. 
Such issues have not, heretofore, being addressed in the literature. 
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Appendix 1 
Mean Abnormal Returns Around Recommendation 
Changes (Excluding 5% Tails) 
Mean Abnormal Returns Around Recommendation Changes: New 
Buy Recommendations (Excluding 5% Tails) 
Month of Abnormal return t-value 
change 
-6 
-5 
-4 
-3 
-2 
-1 
o 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
-0.23 
-0.35 
-0.41 
-0.78 
-0.21 
-0.74 
2.37 
0.29 
0.04 
-0.79 
-0.24 
-0.55 
0.01 
-0.89 
-1.65* 
-1.65* 
-3.37*** 
-0.89 
-3.13*** 
12.14*** 
1.40 
0.20 
-3.97*** 
-1.28 
-2.59*** 
0.06 
Mean Abnormal Returns Around Recommendation Changes: New 
Sell Recommendations (Excluding 5% Tails) 
Month of Abnormal return t-value 
change 
-6 
-5 
-4 
-3 
-2 
-1 
o 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
• "-significant at a-o.O 1 
•• -significant at a-o.OS 
• ·significant at a-O.lO 
-0.30 
-0.12 
-0.46 
-0.76 
-0.14 
-0.47 
-2.75 
-1.43 
-0.98 
-0.62 
-0.76 
-1.01 
-0.82 
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-0.56 
-0.36 
-1.22 
-2.18-
-0.42 
-1.18 
-9.19-
-4.02-
-3.25-
-2.07-
-2.95-
-3.12-
-2.31-
Appendix 2 
~Iean Abnormal Returns Around Recommendation 
Changes: (Unique Recommendations Changes Only) 
Mean Abnormal Returns Around Recommendation Changes: New 
Buy Recommendations (Unique Buy Recommendations) 
Month of change Abnormal return t-value 
-6 
-5 
-4 
-3 
-2 
-1 
o 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
•••. =significant at a=O.OI 
•• =significant at a=0.05 
• =significant at a=O.1 0 
-0.31 
-0.29 
-0.54 
-0.47 
-0.59 
-0.73 
2.74 
0.40 
0.06 
-0.70 
0.04 
-0.53 
-0.07 
-1.18 
-1.33 
-2.07-
-1.89* 
-2.37** 
-3.03*** 
9.59*** 
1.85-
0.27 
-3.54*-
0.22 
-2.44-
-0.39 
Mean Abnormal Returns Around Recommendation Changes: New 
Sell Recommendations (Unique Sell Recommendations) 
Month of change Abnormal return t-vaJue 
-6 
-5 
-4 
-3 
-2 
-1 
o 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
... -significant at a=O.OI 
•• =significant at «=0.05 
• =significant at 0.=0.10 
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-0.31 
-0.09 
-0.58 
-0.76 
-0.34 
-0.63 
-3.08 
-1.63 
-0.88 
-0.62 
-0.85 
-1.03 
-0.74 
-0.58 
-0.29 
-1.53 
-2.18-
-1.02 
-1.65* 
-7.25*** 
-4.25-
-2.95-
-2.07-
-3.34-
-2.90-
-2.15-
Appendix 3 
Mean Abnormal Returns Around Recommendation 
Changes (adjusted for contemporaneous recommendations 
made for other firms in the same industry) 
New Buy Recommendations 
Month of Abnormal return t-value 
Change 
-6 
-5 
-4 
-3 
-2 
-1 
o 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
-0.25 
-0.33 
-0.49 
-0.52 
. -0.48 
-0.64 
2.58 
0.39 
0.06 
-0.68 
0.05 
-0.48 
-0.03 
-0.97 
-1.56 
-1.89* 
-2.13-
-1.95* 
-2.69--
9.24--
1.81* 
0.28 
-3.53--
0.27 
-2.25-
-0.16 
New Sell Recommendations 
Month of Abnormal return t-value 
Change 
-6 
-5 
-4 
-3 
-2 
-1 
o 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
·"-significant at a-o.Ol 
•• -significant at a-Q.OS 
• -significant at a.-Q.IO 
-0.18 
-0.04 
-0.60 
-0.71 
-0.35 
-0.66 
-3.04 
-1.63 
-0.93 
-0.66 
-0.76 
-1.10 
-0.80 
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-0.34 
-0.14 
-1.61 
-2.07-
-1.10 
-1.70* 
-7.12--
-4.31--
-3.18--
-2.20-
-3.01--
-3.17--
-2.32-
Appendix 4 
Information Event Categories Used in Previous Research 
Brookfield and Morris (1992) 
(1) Predictions of interim earnings just prior to their announcement. 
(2) Interim earnings announcements, covering quarterly or (more usually 
half yearly periods. 
(3) Predictions of annual earnings just prior to their announcement. 
( 4) Preliminary earnings announcements, covering yearly periods. 
(5) Reports based on a company's annual report and accounts, and/or 
reports of a company's annual general meeting (AGM). 
(6) Company news releases, including statements by the chairman and 
announcement of new issues, but excluding any statement 
coincidental with items (1) - (5) above or specifically mentioned in 
items (7) - (16) below. 
(7) Reviews of a company's prospects and profit forecasts by newspapers 
or stockbrokers (but excluding any report coincident with (2), (4) and 
(5) above. 
(8) Share recommendations by newspapers or stockbrokers but which do 
not include a detailed profit forecast (classified under (7) above). 
(9) Announcement of major new investment projects, the award of 
contracts and progress on contracts. 
(10) Announcements of redundancies and closures. 
( 11 ) Disposals of subsidiaries and assets. 
(12) Speculation about takeover bids. 
(13) Announcements of bids and material news relating to bids (e.g. 
counterbids ; acceptances; references to the Monopolies and 
Mergers Commission (MMC); decisions of the MMC. 
(14) Changes in management (including the Board of Directors). 
(15) Dealings in large blocks of shares (other than those reported under 
(13)) above. 
(16) Review of industry prospects. 
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Thompson, Olsen and Dietrich (1987) 
( 1) Earnings announcements: Quarterly and annual earnings 
announcements and corrections. 
(2) Dividend announcements: Cash dividend, stock dividend, and stock 
split announcements and corrections. 
(3) Accounting / corporate: Changes in accounting methods, independent 
auditors, corporate bylaws, fiscal year ends, and listing status, plus 
regulatory actions affecting accounting procedures or disclosures. 
(4) Capital/ownership changes: Corporate issuance or repurchase of 
debt, preferred stock, common stock, and stock options, as well as 
purchase or sale of stock among investors. 
(5) Asset changes: Acquisition and disposition of tangible and intangible 
assets (including corporate entities), together with announcements of 
capital expansion plans, joint ventures and revisions of each. 
(6) Management related: Changes in management personnel, corporate 
directors, and management compensation agreements. 
(7) Labour related: Events that affect compensation of non-management 
personnel, employee benefits, occupational safety, andjob security. 
(8) Forecast / analysis: Financial projections and performance and 
evaluation of prior performance by managers and outsiders. 
(9) Product related: changes in research and development, production, 
and marketing activities, plus regulatory actions th~t affect such 
acti vities, 
(10) Financial distress: Bankruptcy proceedings, default on debt 
contracts, and restructuring of loan agreements. 
(11) Income tax related: Internal Revenue Service actions and 
corporate responses to those actions. 
(12) Not classifiable: all events that cannot be elsewhere categorised. 
Morse, (1982a) 
(1) An increase in dividends. 
(2) A large sale of a product. 
(3) An unfavourable earnings forecast by a company official. 
( 4) A favourable earnings forecast by a company official. 
(5) An acquisition. 
(6) A construction or building project. 
(7) A stock split. 
(8) A labour strike. 
(9) Quarterly earnings. 
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Appendix 5 
Association Between Information Event Occurrence And 
Price/ Trading Volume Movement For The Major 
Categories Of Information Events Driving Such 
Movements. ** 
Association Between Event Occurrence And Price Movement For The Major Categories 
Of Events Driving Major Price Movements. 
• 
• 
%-5,+5 %-4,+4 %-3,+3 %-2,+2 %-1,+f % on day 
All events 100 96 90 82 73 51 
Analysts 100 96 89 78 69 52 
Director share dealing 100 93 84 75 61 33 
Bids 100 95 90 81 71 49 
Preliminary results 100 98 93 87 80 59 
Interim Results 100 98 95 93 87 66 
Share deals 100 91 83 77 63 39 
Share deals 100 91 83 77 63 39 
Management changes 100 91 86 77 65 36 
Financing issues 100 96 88 82 66 49 
"% -1,+ 1" represents the percentage of price movements that occur within one day either side of the 
"information event". The other colwnns may be interpreted in a similar fashion. 
Association Between Event Occurrence And Volume Movement For The Major 
Categories Of Events Driving Major Volume Movements 
%-5,+5 %-4,+4 %-3,+3 %-2,+2 %-1,+1 % on day 
All events 100 96 90 81 71 46 
Analysts 100 96 91 77 66 45 
Directors share dealing 100 94 86 75 63 34 
Share deals 100 95 86 77 62 34 
Bids 100 95 89 80 71 46 
Preliminary results 100 97 93 88 82 60 
Interim results 100 97 95 92 87 68 
Financing issues 100 97 92 83 74 47 
Mana ement chan es 100 92 85 75 61 36 
"% -1 , + 1 " represents the percentage of price movements that occur within one day either side of the 
"information event". The other colwnns may be interpreted in a similar fashion . 
.. The items included in each of the "information events" are described in Appendix 
6. 
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Appendix 6 
Description of the News Categories Driving Price and 
Trading Volume Activity 
Analysts: sell-side analysts' investment recommendations and earnings 
forecast revisions 
Director share dealing: the granting/exercise of share options together 
with directors' share purchases and sales. 
Bids: announcements in relation to takeover and acquisition activity 
including references to bid launches; pronouncements regarding 
acceptance/rejection of offers; Takeover Panel statements; DTI 
approvaVrejection etc. News items relating to bid rumours are included in 
the "speculation about bids/disposals" news category. 
Preliminary results: Announcements of results/dividends for the 
financial year. 
Interim results: announcements of interim results/dividends 
Share deals: news relating to large trading volume activity in a 
company's shares- principally institutional purchases/sales. Excluded are 
new share issues which are dealt with as part of the "financing" category. 
Management changes: News items relating to appointments/ dismissals/ 
retirements from senior management and the board of directors. Also 
included is news relating to changes in managerial compensation 
packages. Excluded are share options granted to directors which are 
included in the "director share dealing" category. 
Financing: Issues relating to new share capital (equity, bonds, bank loans 
etc); restructuring of existing share capital including share repurchase, 
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warrants. (Options granted to directors are included under "director share 
dealing). 
AGM: News relating to the AGM such as Board statements, resolutions 
passed at the AGM etc. 
Speculation about bids/ disposals: stock market rumours relating to 
possible takeover activity/ disposals but excluding news items occurring 
after a takeover bid is announced. (See "bids" above). 
Government regulations: News relating to the impact of 
governmentlEU regulations e.g. OFW AT pronouncements on the water 
industry, oil exploration permits granted. Specifically excluded are 
regulations relating to takeover activity. These are included in the "bids" 
category. 
Disposals: News items relating to disposal of subsidiaries and substantial 
asset sales. 
Profit warning and trading conditions statement: Company 
announcement regarding trading conditions, profit margins, sales 
prospects etc. Excluded are company announcements made at the AGM 
which are included under the "AGM" category. 
New contracts: News items relating to substantial new orders received or 
in the process of negotiation. 
Review of company prospects: Issues relating to the review of a 
company's prospects by newspapers and others but excluding reviews by 
sell-side analysts and company management which are included under the 
"analysts" and "profit warning and trading conditions" categories 
respectively. 
Product! input price changes: News items relating to changes in 
companies pricing strategy including the impact of industry price wars. 
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Product information: news items relating to market research on new 
products and expectations regarding success of new product launches. 
Rumours other than hid/disposal rumours: Market rumours circulating 
relating to capital structure changes, contracts, new product introductions 
etc. 
Stock switching: Newspaper comment in relation to investors switching 
between companies in a sector. 
Company presentations to analysts/ institutions: News relating to 
changes in investor sentiment following companies' presentations to 
analysts and institutions. 
New investment projects: News relating to major new investment 
projects undertaken by a company such as launching a new business 
activity, major upgrade of a company's facilities etc. 
Industry sentiment: news relating to buoyant or depressed industry 
sentiment not attributable to any specific cause. 
Legal issues: legal issues other than those relating to takeover bid 
activity (included in "bids" category), such as references to civil action 
damage claims lodged, settlements reached etc. 
Company restructuring: News items relating to company 
reorganisations and strategy reshaping but excluding issues relating to 
disposal of subsidiaries and capital restructuring which are included under 
the "disposals" and "financing" news categories respectively. 
Labour related issues: news items relating to employees pay 
settlements, new work practices and incentive schemes, layoffs and 
redundancies and industrial activity. 
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Stake-building! reduction: news of share acquisition! disposal activity 
Profit taking: news items relating to profit taking! technical trading not 
attributable to any specific cause. 
Annual earnings prediction: newspaper comments regarding impending 
preliminary earnings announcements, not attributable to sell-side analysts 
(included in "analysts" news category). 
Thin trading: News items referring to technical squeezes, illiquidity etc 
Change in FTSE constituents: News of company moving in! out of 
FTSE 100 index. 
Change in broker: new broker appointed! broker dismissed. 
Accounting and tax issues: news relating to the effect~ of a new 
accounting standard and to changes in a company's tax status. 
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Appendix 7 
Frequency Distribution of the Information Event Categories 
Driving Abnormal Price Movements For All Companies 
Infonnation Event Category N %* 
Analysts 772 18.08 
Director share dealing 404 9.46 
Bids 363 8.50 
Preliminary results 349 8.17 
I nterim results 328 7.68 
Share deals 296 6.93 
Management changes 223 5.22 
Financing issues 205 4.80 
AGM 166 3.89 
Speculation about bids/disposals 153 3.58 
Government regulations 134 3.14 
Disposals 106 2.48 
Profit warning and trading statements 99 2.32 
New contracts 90 2.11 
Review of industry prospects 86 2.01 
Productl input price changes 69 1.62 
Product information 61 1.43 
Rumours other than bid/disposal rumours 53 1.24 
Stock switching 48 1.12 
Company presentation to analysts/institutions 36 0.84 
New investment projects 35 0.82 
Industry sentiment 35 0.82 
Legal issues 34 0.80 
Company restructuring 30 0.70 
Labour related issues 21 0.49 
Stake building/reduction 17 0.40 
Profit taking 16 0.37 
Annual earnings prediction 12 0.28 
Thin trading 12 0.28 
Change in FTSE 100 constituents 10 0.23 
Change of broker 4 0.09 
Accounting and tax issues 3 0.07 
Total explained price movements 4270 
Unexplained price movements 1359 32.0 
Total price movements 5629 
* percentages of total "explained • price 
movements 
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Appendix 8 
Frequency Distribution of the Information Event Categories 
Driving Abnormal Trading Volume Movements For All 
Companies 
Information Event Category N %* 
Analysts 684 16.45 
Director share dealing 453 10.89 
Share deals 415 9.98 
Bids 375 9.02 
Preliminary results 316 7.60 
Interim results 285 6.85 
Financing issues 230 5.50 
Management changes 202 4.86 
AGM 173 4.17 
New contracts 119 2.86 
Government regulations 116 2.79 
Disposals 115 2.77 
Profit waming 89 2.14 
Review of industry prospects 83 2.00 
Speculation about bids/disposals 78 1.88 
Product/input price changes 73 1.76 
Product information 58 1.39 
Rumours other than bid/disposal rumours 42 1.01 
Legal issues 37 0.66 
Stock switching 36 0.89 
New investment projects 33 0.79 
Company restructuring 31 0.75 
Labour related issues 21 0.51 
Stake building/reduction 19 0.46 
Company presentation to analysts/institutions 18 0.43 
Profit taking 14 0.34 
Thin trading 13 0.31 
Industry sentiment 12 0.29 
Annual earnings prediction 8 0.19 
Accounting and tax issues 4 0.10 
Change in FTSE 100 constituents 3 0.07 
Change of broker 2 0.05 
Industry transfer 1 0.02 
Total explained 4158 
Total unexplained 1431 34.42 
Total volume movements 5589 
* percentages of total -explained • volume movements 
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Appendix 9 
Associated Pairwise t-Statistics for the Mann-Whitney Rank 
Sum Test on the Major Categories of Events Driving l\'lajor 
Price and trading Volume Movements 
Mann-Whitney Rank Sum Test on the Major Categories of Events 
Driving Major Price Movements: Pairwise t- Tests 
Preliminary Bids Financing Management Analysts Director Share 
results changes share deals 
dealing 
Interim results 1.07 3.46* 3.03* 4.71* 7.39* 6.62* 6.51 * 
Preliminary 2.34* 2.06* 3.70· 6.14· 5.51 * 5.41 * 
results 
Bids 0.14 1.76 3.54· 3.32· 3.35· 
Financing 1.40 2.69* 2.62* 2.72* 
Management 0.99 1.12 1.32 
changes 
Analysts 0.34 0.55 
Director share 0.56 
dealing 
b difference In means slgmficant at a =0.05 
Mann-Whitney Rank Sum Test on the Major Categories of Events 
Driving Major Volume Movements: Pairwise t- Tests 
Interim Preliminary Bids Financing Director Analysts 
results results share 
dealing 
Share deals 0.17 1.64 2.35· 2.67* 3.45· 5.33· 
Interim results 1.33 1.97· 2.31* 2.94* 4.54· 
Preliminary 0.89 1.36 1.75 3.34· 
results 
Bids 0.64 0.19 2.46· 
Financing .03 1.31 
Director share 1.66 
dealing 
"= difference m means SI8I'IIficant at a =0.05 
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Appendix 10 
Sectoral Listing of Sample Companies in Chapter 5 
Building Materials and Construction 
Blue Circle* 
Tarmac 
BPB Industries 
Caradon 
Hepworth 
Pilkington pIc* 
Rugby Group 
Wolesley 
Redland* 
Travis Perkins 
Wilson Bowden 
Wimpey (George) 
Chemicals 
Allied Colloids 
British Vita 
Laporte 
BTP 
• =FTSE 100 constituent 
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Distributors 
Electrocomponents 
Farnell Electronics 
Inchcape 
Lex Service 
Cowie Group 
Diversified Industrials 
Cookson Group* 
Lonrho 
Trafalgar House 
Tomkins * 
TT Group 
Powell Duffryn 
Berisford 
Electricity 
East Midlands Electricity 
London Electricity 
Midlands Electricity 
Scottish Hydroelectric 
Yorkshire Electricity 
Scottish Power* 
• =FTSE 100 constituent 
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Electronics 
Bowthorpe 
Racal Electronics 
Delta 
Eurotherm 
Cray Electronic Holdings 
Fairey Group 
Engineering 
BBAGroup 
FKI 
Glynwed International 
IMI 
Johnson Mathey 
Laird Group 
Lucas Industries 
Morgan Crucible 
Rolls Royce* 
Smiths Industries 
T&N 
Vickers 
Weir Group 
British Aerospace 
GKN* 
McKechnie 
Halma 
Spirax-Sacro Engineering 
• =FTSE 100 constituent 
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Food 
Booker 
Dalgety 
Hillsdown holdings 
Northern Foods 
Tate and Lyle* 
Unigate 
United Biscuits 
Associated British Foods* 
Albert Fisher 
Devro International 
Printing, Paper, Packaging 
Smith CDS) Holdings 
Bunzl 
Low and Bonar 
De LaRue 
Arjo Wiggins Appleton 
Property 
British land 
Brixton Estate 
Great Portland Estates 
MEPe 
Hammerson 
• =ITSE 100 constituent 
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Retailers (General) 
Argos* 
MFI Furniture 
Next* 
Sears 
Smith (W.H) 
Storehouse 
Lloyds Chemists 
Body Shop International 
Brown (N) Group 
House of Fraser 
Menzies John 
Support Services 
BET 
Chubb Security 
Hays 
Salvesen (Christian) 
Rentokil* 
Serna Group 
Water 
Anglian Water 
Northumbrian Water Group 
South West Water 
Welsh Water 
Wessex Water 
Yorkshire Water 
• =FTSE toO constituent 
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Appendix 11 
Analysis of Major Price Changes Form 
JAMES CAPEL 
Analyst: Week ending Friday 
COMPANY: 
City University Business School Research Study: 
What Drives Share Price Changes- The Role of the Sell-Side Analyst 
Analysis of Major Price Changes Form 
1. The price of inC de )creased by % after adjusting for market 
movements on . What are the reasons, if any, for this change? (Please 
be as specific as possible) 
2. Was there any associated action by you e.g. earnings forecast revision, 
recommendation change, call to clients, internal note, comment to 
salesmen, no reaction etc.? 
3. Any further comments generally? 
Please attach copy of any internal notes (e.g. for morning meeting) and 
return to Paul Ryan via Amanda when completed. Thank you for your 
assistance. 
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Appendix 12 
Analysts' Detailed Explanations of the Information Event Categories 
Driving "Unexplained" Major Share Price Movements 
Trading Volume 
Name of Company Date %Chanle Analysts' Comments 
Salversen II!V96 +2.5% Analyst I: Bear squeeze on market 
makers 
Analyst 2: Stock shortage 
Allied Colloids ... II!V96 -5% Placing of line of stock by Capels 
Glynwed International • 3111196 +3.5% Good buyer in the market 
Chubb ... 1/2/96 +2.5% Technical buying by Capels 
IMI. 5/2/96 +4.5% Good buyer in the market 
Rentokil 6/2/96 +2% Analyst I: Most thinly traded stock in 
FTSE 
Analyst 2: Stock. shortage 
Rentokil 9/2/96 +2% Analyst I. Most thinly traded stock in 
FTSE 
Analyst 2: Stock. shortage 
Hays • 1412/96 +2% Analyst I: Technical buying 
Analyst 2: No apparent reason 
Powell Duffryn • 2112196 -3% Luge sell order 
Johnson Matthey 2212196 +2% Thin market 
Weir. 2812196 +6% One market maker was short and 
another heard about it and marked up 
the price 
Associated British 113/96 +2% Technical buying 
Foods ... 
• = analysts discuss with institutional clients the reason behind the price change. 
• = analysts' explanations substantiated by extending the event window to II days . 
• - analysts suggest daily trading volume activity will be greater than normal 
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Takeover Bid Rumours 
0/0 Analysts' 
Name of Company Date Comments 
Chanl!e 
+3% 
Reaction to defence mergers in the US and is seen 
British Aerospace + 8/1196 as a bid candidate * 
Rebound after disappointing trading statement, is 
House of Fraser IIIlI96 +3.5% being supported by buyers seeking management 
changes and is a possible bid candidate· 
Mdland Electricity 22/1196 +4% Takeover rumours 
L10yds Chemists + 16/2/96 +4% Analyst I: Bid speculation 
Analyst 2: Bid speculation 
Pilkington 16/2/96 +4% 
Bid rumours and a bear squeeze 
Vickers + 16/2/96 +8% 
Bid rumours and a market squeeze 
Vickers 19/2/96 -2.5% Lack of appearance of previous week's rumoured 
bid 
House of Fraser + 20/2/96 +4% Analyst I: Takeover rumours 
Analyst 2: Pressure for management change 
intensified after January trading statement * 
Analyst I: Takeover rumours 
House of Fraser + 21/2/96 +~% 
Analyst 2: Pressure for management change 
intensified after January trading statement * 
Analyst I: Takeover rumours 
House of Fraser + 2212/96 -3% 
Analyst 2: Pressure for management change 
intensified after JanUlll')' tradiq statement * 
Yorkshire Electricity+ 
1/3/96 +4.5% Takeover rumours * 
• = analysts discuss with institutional clients the reason behind the price change. 
+ = analysts' explanations substantiated by extending the event window to 11 daya. 
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Company Presentations to Analysts/lnstitutions 
./. Analysts' 
Name of Company Date Comments 
Chanle 
+4.5% Company visit to institutional holders 
BTP 8/1/96 
+2.8% 
Company presentation to investors and bounce 
Powell Duffrvn 17/\196 back from previous underperformance 
Power Duffryn 1911196 +3.6% 
Company presentation to investors and bounce 
back from previous underperformance 
Analyst 1: Company was in Scotland making 
Next 19/1/96 -3% presentation to investors 
i 
! 
Analyst 2: Perhaps profit taking 
Smith (DS) 23/\196 +3% Institutional lunches and lunches with journalists 
McKechie 
+2% 
2511/96 Analyst visit 
Smith (OS) 26/1196 +3% Institutional lunches and lunches with 
journalists 
BET 1/2196 +3% 
Analyst 1: Large market trade following 
analyst's visit 
Analyst 2: Analyst's visit 
• s analysts discuss with institutional clients the reason behind the price change. 
+ - analysts' elCplanations substantiated by elrtending the event window to II days. 
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Analysts'Recommendations 
0/0 Analysts' 
:-.lame of Company Date Comments 
ChanRe 
-2.5% Downgrade by CLL and other analysts followed suit 
Tate and Lyle + 8/1196 
-3% 
County Natwest downgraded forecast and since the 
Hepworth 16/1196 stock is thinly traded the price dropped 
+2.25% Reiteration of buy recommendation by Warburgs 
Electrocomoonents 19/1/96 
+2% Major broker issuing a buy recommendation 
Dalgety 7/2/96 
+3.5 
Hoare Goven, Blue Circle'a brokers, brought out a 
Blue Circle 12/2/96 buy note 
Hays 113/96 +3% 
Recommendation by Warburg 
Industry Transfer 
!"Jameof Analysts' 
Date % Chanae Comments 
Company 
-3.5% 
Redland profit warning 
Blue Circle 8/1/96 
-3% 
12/1196 Redland profit warning 
Argos 10/1196 Analyst 1: Stock moved in sympathy with Dixons 
-2.5% 
Analyst 2: Market may have been expecting a 
downbeat trading statement • 
Analyst 1: BZW moving to the DockJands considered 
British Land 18/1/96 bad news for City property price. 
-2.5% 
Analyst 2: BZW moving to the Docklands considered 
bad news for City property prices 
Thin market in share. and a markdown by 
Hays 26/1196 
-2% market makers following warnings from small 
chemical companie. • 
Tomkins + 3111196 
-2.4% 
Negative reactions to Hanson dernergel' 
• = analysts discuss with institutional clients the reason behind the price change. 
+ s analysts' explanations substantiated by extending the event window to 11 day •. 
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Industry/Company Sentiment 
Name of °/. Analysts' i 
Date Comments I 
Company ChanRe I 
-5.5% Sentiment about UK DIY market 
Ikrisford 9/1/96 
+3.5% 
Stock shortage in a sector percei ved to be a value sector by 
\ l'nigate 19; 1196 some investors 
Ass. British 19/1196 Stock shortage in a sector perceived to be a value sector by 
+2% 
some investors 
Foods 
+2% Squeeze by investors to pick up previous poor perfonners 
IMI 20/2/96 
Analyst I: US utilities lining up water utilities in their 
Yorkshire Water 20/2/96 +3% sights * 
Analyst 2: Stock squeeze and Warburgs produced utility 
sector review showing Yorkshirc Water was undervalued. 
which may have been the reason 
Volatile Share Price 
Name of Analysts' 
Date Ofo Cbanle Comments 
Company 
Analyst I: Share trades 
Body Shop 12/1196 in a volatile fashion 
International 
+6% 
Analyst 2: Market may 
have been expecting a 
bullish trading statement? 
Smith (David S) 31/1196 
Volatile Stock +2.~% 
Smith (David S) 14/2/96 
Volatile Stock +2.7% 
Smith (David S) 16/2196 
+2.7% Volatile Stock 
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Rumours other than Bid Rumours 
Name of % Analysts' 
Date Comments 
Company Change 
+2.5% 
Market rumours of cost reductions prior to 
Scottish Power 17/1/96 announcement • 
-2.6% Rumours of delay in product launch • 
Vickers 19/1/96 
+3% 
Anticipation of bullish electronics materials workshop a 
10hnson Matthey 2/2/96 few days later • 
Previous price run up in respect of rumours of a large 
Rolls Royce + 8/2/96 -3.5% order from Singapore reversed after only a small order 
materiali sed 
Previous Under-Overreaction 
Name of Analysts' 
Date %Chanlle Comments 
Company 
-2.5% 
Previous good run in the shares but profit expectations were 
Wolesley 9/1196 too hildl 
+4% 
Rebound after dip in share price following the previous 
House of Fraser 25/1/96 week's trading statement 
612/96 
+2.S% Recovery from oversold position 
Menzies 
In preparation for management meetings with the 
Albert Fisher 9/2/96 -7% investment community, the investment community looked 
at the stock and realised that its prospects are not good. 
Restructuring 
Name of 0/. Analysts' 
Date Comments 
Company Chanle 
Dalgety + 16/1196 
-2.S% Doubts over restructuring 
+7% 
News that the company wu selling Ideal Homes subsidiary 
Trafalgar House + 2211196 with consequent improvement in aearing • 
Previous strong run up in the stock reversed by 
Caradon 9/2/96 -S% announcement of exceptional charge to cover 
ill-judged diversification 
• - analysts discuss with institutional clients the reuon behind the price change. 
+ - analysts' explanations substantiated by extending the event window to 11 days. 
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Stock Switching within a Sector 
% Analysts' 
;'\lame of Company Date Comments 
Change 
+3% Switching out of Farnell 
Electrocomponents 25/1/96 
+3% 
Switching into building stocks capitalising on 
Hepworth 31/1/96 European recovery 
+4% 
Investors watching the underperfonnance of Rugby 
Rugby 6/2/96 relative to Blue Circle 
Input Price Changes 
Name of 0/. Analysts' 
Date Comments 
Company Chanl!e 
AIjo Wiggins 8/1/96 +4% Pulp prices faU 
Appleton 
Blue Circle 1/2196 
+3% News of cement prices in the US • 
Cookson 1512/96 
-2.5% Worries over semiconductor llUll"ket • 
Product Information 
Name of 0/. Analysts' 
Date Commen .. 
Company Chanl!e 
Racal's stake in Camelot firmed share price and the 
Racal Electronics 10/1196 +4% confidence in the company increased after the recent 
acquisition ofBRT 
Lonrho 2/2196 +3% Gold price is expected to go higher • 
Cookson + 1912196 +2.5% 
News of two new plants in Asia and bounce back from 
previous weakness 
• = analysts discuss with institutional clients the reason behind the price change. 
+ ~ analysts' explanationa substantiated by extending the event window to II days. 
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New Contracts 
Analysts' 
Name of Company Date % Change Comments 
Weir + 8/1196 +5.5% Buyers following reports of new contracts 
Trafalgar House + 13/2/96 +5% News of contract in Thailand for subsidiary • 
Profit Taking 
Analysts' 
!'lame of Company Date % Change Comments 
BBA 26/1/96 
-3% 
Profit taking after strong performance over previous 
period * 
GKN+ 7/2196 
-3% Profit taking * 
Profit Warning 
Analysts' 
Name of Company Date %Chanle Comments 
Redland + 811196 
-2% 
Poor trading statement caused by poor trading in the 
German market 
Redland + 1211196 
·3% 
Poor trading statement caused by poor trading in the 
German market 
• - analysts discuss with institutional clients the reason behind the price change. 
+ = analysts' explanations substantiated by extending the event window to 11 days. 
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Market Conditions Abroad 
Analystll' 
Name of Company Date % Change Commentll 
Redland 31/1/96 +3°/• Announcement by German government of plan to 
stimulate growth in employment 
Analyst I: Concern regarding exposure to European 
Harnmerson 2/2/96 
-2.5% markets 
Analyst 2: Negative comment on sector as a whole 
Buying on Cheapness 
Analysts' 
Name of Company Date %Chan&e Commentll 
Northern Foods 12/1/96 Company had a bad time recently due to changes in 
+3.25% the milk industry and now looks cheap to some 
investors 
Speculation Prior to Results 
Analysts' 
Name of Company Date 0/0 Chance Conunents 
Anticipation offollowing week's results 
Dcvro International 113/96 -2% 
• - analysts discuss with institutional clients the reason behind the price change. 
+ : analysts' explanations substantiated by extending the event window to II days. 
2SS 
Financing 
Analysts' 1 I 
!'lame of Company Date % Chance Comments 
News of Airbus, having to fund a new plane 
British Aerospace + 7/2/96 -2.5% 
• ; analysts discuss with institutional clients the reason behind the price change. 
+ ; analysts' explanations substantiated by extending the event window to 11 days. 
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